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Case: CR-2004-0026831-C Current Judge: Thomas J Ryan
Defendant: Watkins, Vance A

State of Idaho vs. Vance A Watkins

Felony
Judge

Date
12/8/2004

12/9/2004

12/10/2004

New Case Filed-Felony

James A. (J.R.) Schiller

Hearing Held

James A. (J.R.) Schiller

Criminal Complaint

James A. (J.R.) Schiller

Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment (In Custody) 12/08/200401 :32 PM)

James C. Peart

Arraignment 1 First Appearance

James A. (J.R.) Schiller

Constitutional Rights Warning

James A. (J .R.) Schiller

Order Appointing Public Defender

James A. (J.R.) Schiller

Commitment On Bond - set $100,000

James A. (J.R.) Schiller

No Contact Order

James A. (J.R.) Schiller

Change Assigned Judge

Robert M. Taisey

Hearing Scheduled (Preliminary Hearing 12/22/2004 08:30 AM)

Robert M. Taisey

Warrant Issued - Arrest Bond amount: 100000.00 NO CONTACT
WNICTIM

Gregory M Culet

Case Status Changed: Inactive

Gregory M Culet

SUPERCEDING Indictment

Gregory M Culet

Hearing result for Preliminary Hearing held on 12/22/200408:30 AM:
Hearing Vacated

Robert M. Taisey

Change Assigned Judge

Renae J. Hoff

Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment (In Custody) 12/10/2004 01:30 PM)

James A. (J.R.) Schiller

Warrant Returned

Gregory M Culet

Case Status Changed: Activate (previously inactive)

Renae J. Hoff

Motion for bond reduction or release on own recognizance & notice of hr

Renae J. Hoff

Request For Discovery

Renae J. Hoff

Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 12/22/2004 08:30 AM) motn for bond Gregory M Culet
reduction
Hearing resultfor Arraignment (In Custody) held on 12/10/200401 :30 PM:
Arraignment 1 First Appearance

James A. (J.R.) Schiller

12/16/2004

Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 12/22/2004 09:00 AM) motn for bond Gregory M Culet
reduction-HOFF

12/22/2004

Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 12/22/2004 09:00 AM:
Arraignment 1 First Appearance motn for bond reduction-HOFF-PT-JAN
31 @3:00-JT-MARCH 10@9:00

Gregory M Culet

Hearing Scheduled (Pre Trial 01/31/200503:00 PM)

Renae J. Hoff

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 03/10/200509:00 AM)

Renae J. Hoff

Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 01/07/200509:00 AM) motion for
bond reduction

Renae J. Hoff

Request For Discovery

Renae J. Hoff

Demand For Notice Of Defense Of Alibi

Renae J. Hoff

Pa's Response For Request For Discovery

Renae J. Hoff

Notice of Intent Rule 404(b), IRE Evidence

Renae J. Hoff

Motion for Order to Produce Grand Jury Transcript

Renae J. Hoff

113/2005
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Case: CR-2004-0026831-C Current Judge: Thomas J Ryan
Defendant: Watkins, Vance A

State of Idaho vs. Vance A Watkins

Felony
Judge

Date

1/4/2005

Order to produce GJ transcript

1/7/2005

Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 01/07/200509:00 AM:
Held motion for bond reduction

Renae J. Hoff
Motion

Renae J. Hoff

Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 01/07/200509:00 AM: Motion
Denied motion for bond reduction

Renae J. Hoff

1/18/2005

Specific Request For Discovery

Renae J. Hoff

1/21/2005

PA's Response to Specific Request For Discovery

Renae J. Hoff

PA's First Supp/Response For Request For Discovery

Renae J. Hoff

Pa's second suppl Response For Request For Discovery

Renae J. Hoff

1/28/2005

pa's third suppl Response For Request For Discovery

Renae J. Hoff

1/31/2005

Hearing result for Pre Trial held on 01/31/200503:00 PM: Continued
Lewd Conduct

Dennis E. Goff

Hearing Scheduled (Pre Trial 02/28/200503:00 PM) Lewd Conduct

Renae J. Hoff

2/112005

Specific Request For Discovery

Renae J. Hoff

2/10/2005

Transcript Filed (Grand Jury)

Renae J. Hoff

Document sealed
Pa Fourth Suppl Response For Request For Discovery

Renae J. Hoff

2/22/2005

pa's fifth suppl Response For Request For Discovery

Renae J. Hoff

2/28/2005

Hearing result for Pre Trial held on 02/28/2005 03:00 PM: Interim Hearing Renae J. Hoff
Held Lewd Conduct

1/24/2005

4/412005

4/15/2005

4/20/2005
4/29/2005

Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 03/10/200509:00 AM: Hearing
Vacated

Renae J. Hoff

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 04/05/200509:00 AM)

Dennis E. Goff

Hearing Scheduled (Conference - Status 04/04/200501 :30 PM) Lewd
Conduct

Renae J. Hoff

Hearing result for Conference - Status held on 04/04/2005 01 :30 PM:
Continued Lewd Conduct

Renae J. Hoff

Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 04/05/2005 09:00 AM: Hearing
Vacated

Dennis E. Goff

Hearing Scheduled (Conference - Status 05/02/200501 :00 PM)

Dennis E. Goff

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 05/03/200509:00 AM)

Dennis E. Goff

Amended Notice Of Hearing

Renae J. Hoff

Hearing result for Conference - Status held on 05/02/2005 01 :00 PM:
Hearing Vacated

Dennis E. Goff

Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 05/03/2005 09:00 AM: Hearing
Vacated

Dennis E. Goff

Hearing Scheduled (Conference - Status 04/28/200501 :30 PM)

Dennis E. Goff

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 05/02/200509:00 AM)

Dennis E. Goff

Motion to continue & notc of hr

Renae J. Hoff

Hearing result for Conference - Status held on 04/28/2005 01 :30 PM:
Continued motn to cant

Dennis E. Goff

Hearing Scheduled (Conference - Status 05/02/200509:00 PM)

Dennis E. Goff
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Case: CR-2004-0026831-C Current Judge: Thomas J Ryan
Defendant: Watkins, Vance A

State of Idaho vs. Vance A Watkins

Felony
Judge

Date

4/29/2005
5/212005

5/5/2005
5/11/2005

5/17/2005
6/612005

Stipulation to Continue JT

Renae J. Hoff

Waiver Of Speedy Trial

Renae J. Hoff

Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 05/02/2005 09:00 AM: Continued

Renae J. Hoff

Hearing result for Conference - Status held on 05/02/2005 09:00 PM:
Continued STIP TO CONTINUE AND RESET

Renae J. Hoff

Order resetting jury trial

Renae J. Hoff

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial OS/24/200509:00 AM)

Dennis E. Goff

Amended Order Resetting JT

Renae J. Hoff

Hearing result for Jury Trial held on OS/24/2005 09:00 AM: Hearing
Vacated

Dennis E. Goff

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 06/28/200509:00 AM) cont

Renae J. Hoff

Motion in Limine and NOHR

Renae J. Hoff

Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 06/06/2005 11 :30 AM) in limine

Renae J. Hoff

Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 06/06/2005 11 :30 AM:
Hearing Held

Renae J. Hoff

Interim

Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 06/28/2005 09:00 AM: Hearing
Vacated cont

Renae J. Hoff

Hearing Scheduled (Conference - Status 08/29/200501 :30 PM)

Phil Becker

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 08/30/200509:00 AM)

Phil Becker

Motion to Suppress and NOHR

Renae J. Hoff

Specific Request For Discovery

Renae J. Hoff

Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 07/18/2005 10:00 AM) motn to
suppress

Renae J. Hoff

6/15/2005

Order on OF's Motion in Limine

Renae J. Hoff

6/24/2005

Motion to Extend Time to File PT Motns

Renae J. Hoff

PA's Response to Specfic Request For Discovery

Renae J. Hoff

Specific Request For Discovery

Renae J. Hoff

6/10/2005

Motion to Compel Discovery and NOHR

Renae J. Hoff

Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 07/01/200509:00 AM) motn to
compel

Renae J. Hoff

6/28/2005

Order to extend time to file PT motions

Renae J. Hoff

6/30/2005

Motion to compel discovery/motn shorten time/NOHR

Renae J. Hoff

7/1/2005

Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 07/01/200509:00 AM: Hearing
Held motn to compel/shorten time - defense motion to compel withdrawn

Renae J. Hoff

Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 07/01/200509:00 AM: Motion
Granted motn to compel/shorten time - state's motion to compel granted

Renae J. Hoff

Pa's Sixth Supp/Response For Request For Discovery

Renae J. Hoff

7/13/2005

Defs Response For Request For Discovery

Renae J. Hoff

7/14/2005

States objection to defs motion to suppress

Renae J. Hoff

7/18/2005

Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 07/18/2005 10:00 AM:
Continued motn to suppress

Renae J. Hoff
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Case: CR-2004-0026831-C Current Judge: Thomas J Ryan
Defendant: Watkins, Vance A

State of Idaho vs. Vance A Watkins

Felony
Judge

Date

7/18/2005

Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 08/26/2005 09:00 AM) motion to
suppress

Renae J. Hoff

7/21/2005

Specific Request For Discovery

Renae J. Hoff

7/27/2005

Pa's Response For Request For Discovery

Renae J. Hoff

Ex-parte motion for production of medical records/R. Watkins

Renae J. Hoff

Ex-parte motion for production of medical recordslV. Watkins

Renae J. Hoff

8/24/2005

Pa's eighth suppl Response For Request For Discovery

Renae J. Hoff

8/26/2005

Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 08/26/200509:00 AM: Interim
Hearing Held motion to suppress - MOTION DENIED

Renae J. Hoff

8/29/2005

Motion in Limine/Motn to Shorten time and Notc of Hearing

Renae J. Hoff

Specific Request For Discovery

Renae J. Hoff

Witness List

Renae J. Hoff

Hearing result for Conference - Status held on 08/29/2005 01 :30 PM:
Hearing Held

Phil Becker

Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 08/30/2005 09:00 AM: Jury Trial
Started motn in limine

Phil Becker

Pa Response For Request For Discovery

Renae J. Hoff

Jury Trial Day 2

Phil Becker

Motion to Admit Evidence of False Allegations of Sex Crimes

Renae J. Hoff

Jury Trial Day 3

Renae J. Hoff

Motion for Deposition

Renae J. Hoff

Jury Trial Continued

Phil Becker

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 09/06/200509:00 AM) day 4

Phil Becker

9/2/2005

Acknowledgement of Discovery

Renae J. Hoff

9/6/2005

Jury trial
Continued

Phil Becker

PSI & psychosexual ordered

Phil Becker

Found Guilty After Trial

Phil Becker

Hearing Scheduled (Sentencing 11/21/200509:00 AM)

Renae J. Hoff

Jury Instructions

Phil Becker

Verdict form

Phil Becker

9/8/2005

Order for psycho-sexual abuse eval

Renae J. Hoff

9/15/2005

Order on defendant's Motion to Suppress

Renae J. Hoff

8/12/2005

8/30/2005

8/31/2005
9/1/2005

Ex Parte Motion for Production of H & W Records

Renae J. Hoff

Order for Production of H & W Records and/Or Order to Show Cause

Renae J. Hoff

Hearing Scheduled (Order to Show Cause 11/21/200509:00 AM)

Renae J. Hoff

11/15/2005

Lodged- SentenCing Memorandum

Renae J. Hoff

11/17/2005

Submission pursuant to Id Code governing the protecton/disclosure of
department records

Renae J. Hoff

11/21/2005

Hearing result for Sentencing held on 11/21/200509:00 AM: Continued
Lewd Conduct w/Minor

Renae J. Hoff

11/10/2005
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Case: CR-2004-0026831-C Current Judge: Thomas J Ryan
Defendant: Watkins, Vance A

State of Idaho vs. Vance A Watkins

Felony
Date

Judge

11/21/2005

Hearing Scheduled (Sentencing 12128/2005 09:00 AM) Lewd Conduct
W/Minor

Renae J. Hoff

11/28/2005

Lodged- Conduct Assessment from CCSO

Renae J. Hoff

12/28/2005

Hearing result for Sentencing held on 12/28/200509:00 AM:
Lewd Conduct W/Minor

Hearing Held Renae J. Hoff

Hearing result for Sentencing held on 12/28/200509:00 AM: Final
Judgement, Order Or Decree Entered Lewd Conduct W/Minor

Renae J. Hoff

Hearing result for Sentencing held on 12/28/200509:00 AM: Sentenced
To Fine And Incarceration Lewd Conduct W/Minor

Renae J. Hoff

Hearing result for Sentencing held on 12/28/200509:00 AM: Commitment Renae J. Hoff
- Held To Answer Lewd Conduct W/Minor
Case Status Changed: closed pending clerk action

Renae J. Hoff

$5000.00 Civil penalty imposed

Renae J. Hoff

12/29/2005

Letter from def

Renae J. Hoff

115/2006

Judgment and Commitment

Renae J. Hoff

1/27/2006

Notice of Appeal

Renae J. Hoff

Appealed To The Supreme Court

Renae J. Hoff

1/30/2006

Motion for Appointment of State Appellate Public Defender

Renae J. Hoff

2/112006

Order appointing State Appellate PO in direct appeal

Renae J. Hoff

2/28/2006

Amended Notice of Appeal

Renae J. Hoff

6/212008

Opinion (S C - Judgment Vacated & Remanded)

Renae J. Hoff

6/5/2008

Motion to transport def

Renae J. Hoff

Order to transport def upon receipt of remittiturlGave all copies back to PA Renae J. Hoff
3/31/2009

States Request for Status Conference to be set

Renae J. Hoff

4/812009

Order setting case for status conference

Renae J. Hoff

Hearing Scheduled (Conference - Status 05/13/2009 02:00 PM)

Renae J. Hoff

4/9/2009

Motion to Transport Def

Renae J. Hoff

4/30/2009

Hearing Scheduled (Conference - Status 05/18/2009 10:00 AM)

Renae J. Hoff

5/112009

Amended Notice of Hearing

Renae J. Hoff

5/7/2009

Motion to Quash Transport Order

Renae J. Hoff

5/14/2009

Order to quash transport order

Renae J. Hoff

5/18/2009

Hearing result for Conference - Status held on 05/18/2009 10:00 AM:
Hearing Vacated Lewd Conduct wlChiid Under 16 - Per Judge

Renae J. Hoff

12/28/2009

Opinion (S C - Judgment Vacated and Remanded - After Review)

Renae J. Hoff

111112010

Motion to Transport Defendant

Renae J. Hoff

1/15/2010

Order to transport def

Renae J. Hoff

1/25/2010

Remittitur

Renae J. Hoff

1/29/2010

Hearing Scheduled (Conference - Status 02/04/201001 :00 PM)
SCHEDULING CONF

James C. Morfitt

Notice Of Hearing

Renae J. Hoff

Motion for Disqualification, Accompanying Affidavit and Notice of Hearing

Renae J. Hoff

2/2/2010
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Case: CR-2004-0026831-C Current Judge: Thomas J Ryan
Defendant: Watkins, Vance A

State of Idaho vs. Vance A Watkins

Felony
Judge

Date
2/2/2010

Affidavit of Lance Fuisting, Defendant's Attorney

Renae J. Hoff

Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 02/11/2010 10:30 AM) Motion to DO Renae J. Hoff
Judge Hoff
2/4/2010

Hearing result for Conference - Status held on 02/04/201001 :00 PM:
Interim Hearing Held SCHEDULING CONF

James C. Morfitt

Hearing result for Conference - Status held on 02/04/2010 01 :00 PM:
Order RE-Appointing Public Defender

James C. Morfitt

Hearing result for Conference - Status held on 02/04/201001 :00 PM:
Commitment On Bond - $200,000.00

James C. Morfitt

Hearing result for Conference - Status held on 02/04/2010 01 :00 PM: No
Contact Order

James C. Morfitt

Hearing Scheduled (Pre Trial 03/19/201001 :30 PM)

James C. Morfitt

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 06/14/201009:00 AM)reset due to the court James C. Morfitt
being unavailable

2/5/2010
2/8/2010

2/9/2010

Notice Of Hearing - setting PT&JT

Court Clerks District (998)

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 07/06/201009:00 AM)

James C. Morfitt

Motion For Order To Produce Grand Jury Transcript

Renae J. Hoff

Request For Discovery

Renae J. Hoff

Order to produce GJ transcript

Renae J. Hoff

Order to enlarge time for Pretrial Motions/No later than 3-19-10

Renae J. Hoff

Specific Request For Discovery

Renae J. Hoff

Amended Notice Of Hearing

Renae J. Hoff

Request For Discovery

Renae J. Hoff

Demand For Notice Of Defense Of Alibi

Renae J. Hoff

Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 02/11/201010:30 AM:
Vacated Motion to DO Judge Hoff

Hearing

Renae J. Hoff

Pa's Response to Request for Discovery & Notice of Intent to Use I.R.E.
404(b) Evidence

Renae J. Hoff

Order for Disqualification/Hoff

Renae J. Hoff

Change Assigned Judge

Court Clerks District (998)

Order of assignment/Morfitt

Court Clerks District (998)

Change Assigned Judge

James C. Morfitt

2/11/2010

Motion to Disqualify 1 Morfitt

James C. Morfitt

2/16/2010

PA's Response To Specific Request For Discovery

James C. Morfitt

2/17/2010

Order for Disqualification 1 Morfitt

James C. Morfitt

Change Assigned Judge

Court Clerks District (998)

Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 07/06/201009:00 AM: Hearing
Vacated

James C. Morfitt

Hearing result for Pre Trial held on 03/19/201001 :30 PM: Hearing
Vacated

James C. Morfitt

Order of Assignment - Ryan

Court Clerks District (998)

2/10/2010

2/19/2010

000006

Date: 1/12/2011

icial District Court - Canyon Coun

Time: 10:39 AM
Page 7 of 10

User: RANDALL

ROA Report
Case: CR-2004-0026831-C Current Judge: Thomas J Ryan
Defendant: Watkins, Vance A

State of Idaho vs. Vance A Watkins

Felony
Date

Judge

2/19/2010

Change Assigned Judge

Thomas J Ryan

2/23/2010

Hearing Scheduled (Conference - Status 03/08/2010 11 :00 AM)

Thomas J Ryan

2/25/2010

Notice Of Hearing: Conference - Status

Thomas J Ryan

3/812010

Hearing result for Conference - Status held on 03/08/2010 11 :00 AM:
Interim Hearing Held

Thomas J Ryan

Hearing result for Conference - Status held on 03/08/2010 11 :00 AM:
District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Kim Saunders
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100

Thomas J Ryan

Hearing Scheduled (Conference - Status 05/18/201001 :30 PM)

Thomas J Ryan

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 06/21/201009:00 AM)

Thomas J Ryan

3/9/2010

Notice of hearing to PA and PO

Thomas J Ryan

3/12/2010

Motion to Release Evidence for New Trial

Thomas J Ryan

3/15/2010

Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 03/19/2010 09:00 AM) Motn to
Release Evid for New Trial

Thomas J Ryan

3/19/2010

Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 03/19/201009:00 AM:
Held Motn to Release Evid for New Trial

Thomas J Ryan

Hearing

Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 03/19/201009:00 AM: Motion
Granted Motn to Release Evid for New Trial

Thomas J Ryan

Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 03/19/201009:00 AM: Order
releasing evidence for new trial

Thomas J Ryan

District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Kathy Klemetson
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100

Thomas J Ryan

Def's Specific Request For Discovery

Thomas J Ryan

Motion For Order To Produce Search Warrant and Detention Order
Materials

Thomas J Ryan

5/11/2010

Order to produce search warrent and detention order materials

Thomas J Ryan

5/13/2010

Pa's Response To Specific Request For Discovery

Thomas J Ryan

Objection to def's motion and order for transcript of search warrant and
detention ordre and supporting documentation

Thomas J Ryan

Notice of intent rle 404 (b) IRE evidence

Thomas J Ryan

5/6/2010

5/18/2010

Motion in Limine

Thomas J Ryan

Motion to amend indictmentlNOHR

Thomas J Ryan

Hearing result for Conference - Status held on 05/18/201001 :30 PM:
Hearing Held Amend indictment

Thomas J Ryan

Hearing result for Conference - Status held on 05/18/201001 :30 PM:
Motion Granted Amend indictment

Thomas J Ryan

Order granting motion to amend Indictment

Thomas J Ryan

Amended Indictment

Thomas J Ryan

District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Kim Saunders
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100

Thomas J Ryan

Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 05/27/201001 :30 PM) all afternoon

Thomas J Ryan
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icial District Court - Canyon Co

Time: 10:39 AM

ROA Report
Case: CR-2004-0026831-C Current Judge: Thomas J Ryan
Defendant: Watkins, Vance A

State of Idaho vs. Vance A Watkins

Felony
Judge

Date
5/19/2010

Transcript Filed (SW# 1847))

Thomas J Ryan

5/21/2010

Motion for Bail Reduction or release on own recognizance and notice of
hearing

Thomas J Ryan

Def First motion to suppress and notice of hearing

Thomas J Ryan

Def Second motion to suppress and notice of hearing

Thomas J Ryan

Defendant's First Motion In Limine and Notice of Hearing

Thomas J Ryan

Defendant's Second Motion In Limine and Notice of Hearing

Thomas J Ryan

Motion to Dismiss Amended Superceding Indictment and Notice of
Hearing

Thomas J Ryan

5/24/2010

Amended notice of intent Rule 404(b) IRE evidence

Thomas J Ryan

5/25/2010

Brief in support of motion to dismiss indictment

Thomas J Ryan

Affidavit of Vance A Watkins in support of Defendant's first motion to
suppress

Thomas J Ryan

Affidavit of Vance A Watkins in support of defendant's 2nd motion to
suppress

Thomas J Ryan

Brief in support of motion to suppress and motions in Limine

Thomas J Ryan

PA's First Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery

Thomas J Ryan

Response to Defendant's First Motion to Suppress

Thomas J Ryan

Response to Defendant's Second Motion to Suppress

Thomas J Ryan

Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss

Thomas J Ryan

5/26/2010

State's Brief in Support of 404(b) Evidence

Thomas J Ryan

Witness List, Exhibit List and Notice of Intent

Thomas J Ryan

States Proposed Jury Instructions

Thomas J Ryan

States scond brief in Opposition of Def Motion to dismiss

Thomas J Ryan

PA's Second Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery

Thomas J Ryan

5/27/2010

Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 05/27/201001 :30 PM:
Held all afternoon 1 Bond Reduction
Defendant's First Motion In Limine
Defendant's Second Motion In Limine
Motion To Dismiss Amended Superceding Indictment

5/28/2010

Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 05/27/201001 :30 PM: Motion
Denied - Bond Reduction, Motion To Dismiss Amended Superceding
Indictment, Defendant's Second Motion In Limine

Thomas J Ryan

Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 05/27/2010 01 :30 PM: District
Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Kim Saunders
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100

Thomas J Ryan

6/8/2010

PA's Third Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery

Thomas J Ryan

6/9/2010

Supplemental in support of 404(b) evidence

Thomas J Ryan

6/16/2010

6/17/2010

Hearing

Thomas J Ryan

Defendant's Second Specific Request For Discovery

Thomas J Ryan

Amended Witness List - Exhibit List

Thomas J Ryan

Defs motion pursuant rule 412 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence

Thomas J Ryan

PA's Response to Second Specific Request For Discovery

Thomas J Ryan
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icial District Court - Canyon Co

ROA Report
Case: CR-2004-0026831-C Current Judge: Thomas J Ryan
Defendant: Watkins, Vance A

State of Idaho vs. Vance A Watkins

Felony
Judge

Date
Defendant's Proposed Jury Instructions

Thomas J Ryan

Defendant's Witness and Exhibit Lists

Thomas J Ryan

Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 06/21/201009:00 AM: Jury Trial
Started

Thomas J Ryan

District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Kim Saunders
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: over 100

Thomas J Ryan

6/22/2010

District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Kim Saunders
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: over 100

Thomas J Ryan

6/23/2010

Found Guilty After Trial

Thomas J Ryan

Jury Instructions

Thomas J Ryan

Jury question #1 and answer

Thomas J Ryan

Special Verdict Form

Thomas J Ryan

District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Kim Saunders
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: over 100

Thomas J Ryan

6/18/2010
6/21/2010

Hearing Scheduled (Review Hearing 07/07/2010 03:00 PM) and possible Thomas J Ryan
sentencing
7/1/2010

Notice Of Intent To Assert Fifth Aemendmant Right and Request For New
Presentence Investigation Report
Hearing result for Review Hearing held on 07/07/201003:00 PM:
Vacated and possible sentencing

Thomas J Ryan

Hearing Thomas J Ryan

Hearing Scheduled (Sentencing 07/14/2010 11 :00 AM)

Thomas J Ryan

7/2/2010

Notice Of Hearing

Thomas J Ryan

7/13/2010

Letter concerning def

Thomas J Ryan

7/14/2010

Hearing result for Sentencing held on 07/14/2010 11 :00 AM: Hearing Held Thomas J Ryan
Hearing result for Sentencing held on 07/14/2010 11 :00 AM: Final
Judgement, Order Or Decree Entered

Thomas J Ryan

Hearing result for Sentencing held on 07/14/2010 11 :00 AM: Sentenced
To Fine And Incarceration

Thomas J Ryan

Hearing result for Sentencing held on 07/14/2010 11 :00 AM: Commitment Thomas J Ryan
- Held To Answer
Hearing result for Sentencing held on 07/14/2010 11 :00 AM: $5,000.00
civil penalty in favor of the victim pursuant to 19-5307

Thomas J Ryan

Case Status Changed: closed pending clerk action

Thomas J Ryan

District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Kim Saunders
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100

Thomas J Ryan

7/21/2010

Judgment for Victims (Civil Jdmt)

Thomas J Ryan

7/22/2010

Appealed To The Supreme Court

Thomas J Ryan

Notice of Appeal

Thomas J Ryan

Motion for Appointment of State Appellate Public Defender

Thomas J Ryan

Restitution Ordered 5000.00 victim # 1 CIVIL JUDGMENT

Thomas J Ryan

7/23/2010
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Case: CR-2004-0026831-C Current Judge: Thomas J Ryan
Defendant: Watkins, Vance A

State of Idaho

VS.

Vance A Watkins

Felony
Judge

Date
7/23/2010

Judgment and commitment

Thomas J Ryan

7/26/2010

Order Appointing State Appellate Public Defender

Thomas J Ryan

7/28/2010

S C - Order Suspending Appeal

Thomas J Ryan

8/16/2010

S C - Order Augmenting Appeal

Thomas J Ryan

11/24/2010

Objection To The Record

Thomas J Ryan

12/312010

Orderl record on appeal

Thomas J Ryan
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JOHN T. BUJAK
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
Canyon County Courthouse
1115 Albany Street
Caldwell, Idaho 83605
Telephone: (208) 454-7391

FEB 09 20tO
CANYON COUNTY CLERK
B RAYNE, DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
THE STATE OF IDAHO

CASE NO. CR2004-26831

Plaintiff,

DEMAND FOR NOTICE OF
DEFENSE OF ALIBI

vs.
VANCE WATKINS
Defendant

TO:

VANCE WATKINS, the above named Defendant, and to the Canyon County Public

Defender, Attorney for the above named Defendant:
COMES NOW, JOHN T. BUJAK, Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney, who
demands that the Defendant serve upon him within ten (10) days from the date of this notice or at
such other time as the Court may direct, a written notice of the Defendant's intention to offer a
defense of alibi.
Such notice by the Defendant shall state the specific place or places at which the
Defendant claims to have been at the time of the alleged offense and the names and addresses of
the witnesses upon whom the Defendant intends to rely to establish such alibi.
If prior to or during trial the Defendant learns of additional witnesses whose
identity, if known, should have been included in this information furnished pursuant to this
DEMAND FOR NOTICE OF
DEFENSE OF ALIBI

1
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Demand, the Defendant or the Defendant's attorney shall promptly notify the Canyon County
Prosecuting Attorney ofthe existence, identity and addresses of such additional witness or
witnesses.
The failure of the Defendant and the Defendant's attorney to comply with this
Demand may result in the exclusion of the testimony of any undisclosed witnesses which may be
offered by the Defendant to establish said alibi.
This Demand was made and based upon Idaho Code Provision 19-519.
DATED This

~ day of February, 2010.

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct
copy of the foregoing instrument was served
upon the attorney for the defendant, the
Canyon County Public Defender, by placing
said instrument in their ba~i at the Clerk's
Office, on or about the --'::t- day of
February, 2010.

DEMAND FOR NOTICE OF
DEFENSE OF ALIBI

2
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MAY 2 5 2010

MARK J. MIMURA
CANYON COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER

CANYON COUNTY CLERK
J DRAKE, DEPUTY

LARY G. SISSON
510 Arthur Street
Caldwell, Idaho 83605
Telephone: (208) 639-4610
Facsimile: (208) 639-4611
Idaho State Bar No. 6072

Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
STATE OF IDAHO,

Case No. CR-2004-26831-C

Plaintiff:

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
TO DISMISS INDICTMENT

vs.
VANCE A. WATKINS,
Defendant.

COMES NOW Defendant, by and through his attorneys of record, the Canyon
County Public Defender's Office and hereby provides the following legal and factual
support and argument in support of its Motion to Dismiss the Indictment in this matter
THIS MOTION is based on the pleadings, papers, records and files in the above
entitled action including the transcript from the Grand Jury Proceedings.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 8, 2004 a Criminal Complaint was filed against Defendant and an
Arrest Warrant issued. That same day, the alleged six year old victim in this case, plus
Detective Don Peck of the Nampa Police Department, testified during a Grand Jury
Proceeding. As a result the Grand Jury issued a one count Superceding Indictment for
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS THE INDICMENT
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Lewd Conduct with Minor Child Under Sixteen. The Arrest Warrant was returned on
December 10, 2004.
Defendant was arraigned in the District Court on the Superceding Indictment on
December 22, 2004. Presumably, Defendant entered a not guilty plea on the Superceding
Indictment. Eventually, a jury trial was held in this matter from August 30, 2005 thru
September 6,2005. A jury found Defendant guilty of Lewd Conduct with Minor Child
Under Sixteen. Defendant was sentenced on December 28, 2005 to a minimum of fifteen
(15) years fixed and an indeterminate period of life with the Idaho Department of
Corrections.
On January 27,2006, Defendant appealed his Judgment and Conviction to the

Idaho Supreme Court. On January 25,2010, the Canyon County District Court received
a Remittitur from the Idaho Supreme Court overturning Defendant's conviction and
remanding the matter back to the Canyon County District Court for a new trial. On
January 29,2010, the Court scheduled a Scheduling Conference in front of Judge Hoff
for February 4,2010. However, on February 2,2010, Defendant's attorney filed a
Motion and Affidavit to Disqualify Judge Hoff. A hearing was hold on the Motion on
February 9, 2010. The next day the Court issued an Order disqualifying Judge Hoff and
assigning the case to Senior Judge Morfitt.
On February 11, 2010, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Disqualify Judge Morfitt. That

Motion was granted on February 17, 2010. Consequently, on February 19, 2010, District
Court Judge Thomas J. Ryan was assigned to preside over this case. As Status
Conference was held in the matter on March 8,2010. On that date, a Pre-Trial
Conference was set for March 18, 2010 and a Jury Trial for June 21,2010.

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS THE INDICMENT
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On May 13,2010, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend Indictment and set a hearing

for the Pre-Trial Conference. Defense counsel did not take a position on Plaintiff s
Motion to Amend. Therefore, the Court allowed the filing of the Amended Indictment.
At the hearing, defense counsel stated its intention to file several pre-trial motions. The
Court stated it would hear pretrial Motions on May 27,2010.
Subsequently, on May 21,2010, defense counsel filed, among other documents, a
Motion to Dismiss the Amended Indictment in this matter.

ARGUMENT
Under Idaho Code Section 19-1107, the grand jury may issue an indictment when
"all the evidence before them, taken together, if unexplained or uncontradicted, would, in
their judgment, warrant a conviction by a trial jury."
The role ofthe prosecutor in grand jury proceedings is to facilitate the
presentation of competent witnesses who can testify to matters within their personal
knowledge that relate to the inquiry. During its investigatory proceedings, the grand jury
can receive any evidence that is given by witnesses produced and sworn before them.
I.C. § 19-11 05.
"Only legal evidence, excluding hearsay or secondary evidence can be received
by the grand jury. I.C.R. 6(f). An indictment will be sustained as long as the grand jury
has received legally sufficient evidence which in and of itself supports a finding of
probable cause. State v. Jones, Idaho, (S.Ct. No. **181 *85419432, slip op. August 27,
1993); State v. Edmonson, 113 Idaho 230, 236-37, 743 P .2d 459, 465-66 (1987).

Any objections based on defects in a charging document are waived unless raised
prior to trial; the only exception is if the objection alleges either the charging document

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS THE INDICMENT
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fails to establish jurisdiction or fails to charge an offense. In re Doe, 2007 WL 473701
(Idaho.App., 2007). The assertion that a charging document fails to assert jurisdiction
may be raised at any time during the proceedings. State v. Anderson, 175 P.3d 788
(2008). There is a strong presumption of validity of a charging document, if the defects
are raised in an untimely manner.

State v. Anderson, 175 P.3d 788 (2008). Although

due process concerns related to a charging document may be valid, they are waived
unless raised before trial. State v. Jones, 101 P.3d 699 (2004).
Testimony of R.W.
In this particular case, on December 1, 2004 the alleged victim (R.W.) disclosed
to her school counselor, and then later to police, that defendant had committed lewd acts
upon her on the morning of December 1st and again the previous day. She also disclosed
that this kind of behavior had been going on since they had moved to Idaho two years
prior.
RW. testified at the Grand Jury proceedings on December 8, 2004.

The

Prosecuting Attorney examining R W. convered such topics as the difference between a
truth and lie, body parts, and, presumably to test RW.'s memory asked her about her
swimsuit. During the inquiry, RW. made statements which could have been construed
by the Grand Jury as evidence of the defendant committing lewd acts upon RW.
However, on page 7, line 12 of the Grand Jury transcript, the Prosecuting
Attorney asks, "When was the last time this [the alleged lewd conduct] happened?" The
response by R.W. in the next line of the transcript was, "It happened when I was four."
The same question is asked and the same answer is given in lines 19 and 20 of page 7 of
the transcript.

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS THE INDICMENT
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happened only a week ago, asks on page 8, lines 9 through 10, and 12 of the Grand Jury
Transcript, "Did you tell Shannon [an employee of the Department of Health and
Welfare] or Don [the law enforcement officer] about the times it happened when you
were for your four years old or when you were - six? The reply by R.W. was, ''Yes. I
was four."
The Prosecuting Attorney, on page 9 of the Grand Jury Transcript, goes on to try
and lead R. W. into saying the lewd acts occurred much more recently. Referring to when
it happened, R.W. states that it happened in kindergarten (Pg 9, line 10), then in
preschool (Pg 9, line 13). Finally, the Prosecutor asks, "Has it happened since you were
in first grade?" (Pg 9, lines 14-15). R.W. nods her head and then, at the prompting of the
Prosecuting Attorney, says ''Yes.'' (pg 9, line 18).
The responses by R. W. to questioning about events that supposedly occurred on
Novmeber 30 and December 1, 2004, draw into question the competency ofR.W. at the
time she testified before the Grand Jury. Competency to testifY to a particular occurrence
depends on ability of witness to perceive, recollect and communicate with reference to
the occurrence. State v. Johnson, 447 P.2d 10(1968).
In this case, even though the Prosecuting Attorney attempted to guide R.W. into
telling the Grand Jury the acts she was describing occurred a little over a week prior to
the hearing, R.W. persisted in saying they happened when she was four years old, which
would have been two years prior. It was only after the Prosecuting Attorney lead R. W. to
the point where R.W. had to answer in a particular way, did R.W. affirm that lewd
conduct occurred against her while she was in first grade. The need to have R. W. say

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS THE INDICMENT
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lewd acts occurred more recently was in order to bring R.W. 's testimony in conformity
with the charges in the Superceding Indictment.
Because R.W. 's ability to recollect past events (supposedly happening only a little
over a week ago) was severely diminished, and she only provided testimony that lewd
acts occurred "in fIrst grade" after an enormous about of leading by the Prosecuting
Attorney, then insufficient evidence was presented to support a fInding ofprobable cause.
Therefore, the Amended Superceding Indictment should be dismissed.
Testimony of Don Peck
Detective Don Peck of the Nampa Police Department testifIed about the
investigation that his department had conducted in relation to this matter. However,
statements were made by Detective Peck which were either hearsay statements, not
relevant, statements about illegally seized items, or presented without proper foundation.
First in lines 2 through 3 on page 12 of the Grand Jury Transcript, the Prosecutor
asked, "And where did you receive the complaint or the allegations Mr. Watkins? How
did that happen? The question in itself is not relevant to begin with.

Don Peck's

responded by saying, "I was contacted by ShannonWatts with the Department of Health
and Welfare. She had been contacted by the school counselor a Iowa Elementary Schoo~
stating that [R.W.] had disclosed sexual abuse." (pg 12 lines 4-7). The portion about
R.W. disclosing sexual abuse is clearly double hearsay. The fact that Detective Peck
mentioned the Department of Health and Welfare and the school counselor was a clear
attempt to give legitimacy and support to R.W.'s claims by suggesting that the school
counselor and Health and Welfare would not pursue false allegations made by a six year
old.

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS THE INDICMENT
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Second, from line 10 through 24 of page 12 of the Grand Jury, the Prosecuting
Attorney asks questions about, and Detective gives answers to, what else was done to
investigate RW.'s allegations. This included testimony of at least two other interviews
and two physical exams done at CARES.

Once again, because no substantive

information was presented by Detective Peck from any of these interviews or exams,
simply asking about them is not relevant. However, as alleged above, the mere mention
of all these interviews and exams can have only one purpose and that is to give more
legitimacy to RW. 's testimony. The unstated but clear argument is that the State would
not be seeking a Grand Jury Indictment unless they had done extensive investigation and
we were sure that the defendant had committed a crime.
Third, on page 13, lines 11 through 15 of the Grand Jury Transcript, Detective
Peck talks about items seized during a search of Defendant's apartment. He included in
that list a "used condom", which the police did not have authority to seize. He also
mentions a Japanese animated video, which by itself had no relevancy to the Grand Jury.
However, Detective Peck goes on to say". . . that they contain nudity and talk about
school girls." (pg 13, lines 14-15). That last statement was hearsay. Moreover, even if it
was not hearsay, it was 404(b) evidence that was not appropriate to be presented to the
Grand Jury.
Fourth, on page 13, lines 17-23 ofthe Grand Jury Transcript, Detective Peck talks
about using an alternative light source and seizing seven pairs ofRW.'s panties. Neither
the Prosecuting Attorney nor Detective Peck lays nearly enough foundational testimony
to allow him to testify about the alternative light source. Furthermore, Detective Peck
said that when the police find a different wave of light on a garment, ''We don't know

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS THE INDICMENT
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what that means." (pg 13, lines 21-22). But, he then goes on to say, ''Typically, it means
either bodily fluid or something of that nature." (pg 13, lines 22-23). On that same page,
and on page 14 of the transcript, Detective Peck admits that they don't have the lab
results back yet on the panties.
Once again, because Detective Peck was no qualified as an expert in alternative
light sources, and there were no conclusive results from the testing on the panties at that
time, this testimony should not have been presented to the Grand Jury. Frankly, it was
speculative at best. The only purpose in presenting it to the jury was to bolster the
testimony ofR.W. who appears had difficulty recollecting what had happened to her.
Fifth, on page 14, lines 8 and 9, the Prosecuting Attorney asked, "Did you have an
opportunity to talk to Mr. Watkins about the allegations [R.W.] had made?" Detective
Peck eventually says, "He didn't want to speak very much." (pg 14, lines 11-12). The
Prosecutor then asks, "Did he make any admissions about touching [R.W.]" (pg 14, line
13).

The reply was, ''No. The closest he came was in an interview with Detective

Sutherland." (pg 14, lines 14-15).
This is a situation where Detective Peck violates Defendant's Fifth Amendment
Right under the United States Constitution and the rules of evidence by commenting
defendant's right to remain silent. The insinuation to the jury is that Defendant had
something to hide. Furthermore, by talking about possible admissions made to Detective
Sutherland by Defendant, which Detective Peck did not witness first-hand and thus is
hearsay, he is also suggesting that the Defendant almost confessed to committing the
alleged crime but is still trying to hide his culpability.
In summary, nearly all of Detective Peck's testimony should not have been

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS THE INDICMENT
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presented to the Grand Jury. It was full of hearsay, incomplete information, improper
comments about the defendant, or testimony that was not relevant at the time of the
Grand Jury. Futhermore, all of these errors were conducted in front of the prosecutor
who did not object or limit the scope of impermissible evidence being heard and
considered by the grand jury. Taking each impermissible portion of Detective Pecks's
testimony individually, the effect may not be significant. However, considering all the
inappropriate evidence together, it demonstrates improper conduct by the prosecutor in
the presentation of the evidence in this case to the grand jury in violation of Defendant's
due process rights. Therefore, therefore the Amended Superceding Indictment should be
dismissed.
Generally, prosecutorial misconduct will require dismissal only when it reaches the
level ofa constitutional due process violation. Maldonado v. State, 93 N.M. 670, 604
P.2d 363 (1979); State v. Hall, 235 N.W.2d 702 (Iowa 1975), appeal after remand, 249
N.W.2d 843 (Iowa 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 822,98 S.Ct. 66, 54 L.Ed.2d 79 (1977).
In order to be entitled to dismissal of an indictment on due process grounds, the
defendant must affirmatively show prejUdice caused by the misconduct. State v. Kruse,
100 Idaho 877,606 P.2d 981 (1980); Hall, supra. "A dismissal is a drastic remedy and
should be exercised only in extreme and outrageous situations, and therefore, the
defendant has a heavy burden."
"In the sense of a grand jury proceeding, ''prejudicial effect" means the defendant
would not have been indicted but for the misconduct. Hall, supra; People v. Jackson, 64
I11.App.3d 307,21 I11.Dec. 238, 381 N.E.2d 316 (1978). To determine whether
misconduct gives rise to a dismissal, a reviewing court will have to balance the gravity

BRIEF 1N SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S
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and the seriousness of this misconduct with the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the
probable cause finding. At one extreme, the misconduct can be so outrageous that
regardless ofthe extent of probable cause evidence, dismissal will be required. At the
other extreme, the misconduct may be so slight, that it becomes unnecessary to question
the independent judgment of the grand jury. In the middle of these extremes, the court
must examine the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the indictment
should be dismissed. As stated above, the burden rests with the criminal defendant to
make an initial showing that the misconduct rises to the level ofprejudice. Absent the
showing ofprejudice, a reviewing court will not second guess the grand jury. However,
once the defendant does afftrmatively prove prejudice, the court must dismiss." State v.
Edmonson, 113 Idaho at 237 (1987).
Tbnelinessof~otion

As stated earlier in this brief: although due process concerns related to a charging
document may be valid, they are waived unless raised before trial. State v. Jones, 101
P.3d 699 (2004). The first trial in this particular case was held in August and September
of 2005.

However, because of defects in that first trial proceeding, this matter was

remanded for a new trial. It should also be noted that the Court allowed an Amended
Superceding Indictment in this matter on May 18, 2010.
Defense counsel argues that because a new trial has been set in this matter, then
all time limits and deadlines related to this matter begin anew as well. By vacating the
outcome of the previous trial and remanding this matter for a new trial, the Idaho
Supreme Court has essentially caused both parties and the Court to conduct a completely
new trial.

Thus, in the second trial scheduled for June of this year, the State is not
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MonON TO DISMISS THE INDICMENT

10

000022

allowed to simply rely on the transcript of the first jury trial. It must call all of its desired
witnesses again and even though they will most likely testify consistently with their
previous trial testimony. Also, if appropriate, the State may add witnesses to testify at
trial. It is not merely bound by the persons who testified in the first trial. The same goes
for the defense in this matter.
Also, because Defendant's trial will be a new trial, it is the belief of defense
counsel that any stipulations between the parties at the previous trial are not binding. In
addition, any evidentiary rulings by the previous trial court are not binding as well.
Since the entire trial must be redone, then it stands to reason that any deadlines
associated with the trial must be redone as well. If that is not the case, then the time
limits for having legitimate arguments about evidentiary issues, whether or not defendant
has received due process, amending witness lists or exhibits, etc. have already expired 5
years ago. Ifwe take this to the ultimate degree, then the Plaintiff should not have been
allowed to amend its Supreceding Indictment because it rested its case in September of
2005.
Because Defendant has filed this Motion prior to his retrial, and it raises issues of
the due process in the grand jury proceedings in this case, defense argues that it is timely
a Motion and should not be dismissed due to lack of timelines.

CONCLUSION
In summary, Defendant's due process rights were violated when the Plaintiff
presented R.W. as a witness because she was unable to recollect with a certain degree of
accuracy alleged lewd acts committed upon her by Defendant. As far as is known, the
Prosecuting Attorney did not advise the Grand Jury about the standards for a witness to
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be competent.

Furthermore, Detective Peck presented, in five different instances,

testimony at the Grand Jury Proceedings that was completely inappropriate. The net
effect of this inappropriate testimony was that Defendant's due process rights were
violated. Now, Defendant has filed a timely Motion to Dismiss the Indictment in this
matter in order to remedy the situation.
Defendant respectfully requests that the Court find its favor and issue an Order
Dismissing the Grand Jury Indictment with prejudice.
DATED this

2 J1"day of May, 201

Assistant Public Defender

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE:
I hereby certify that on the Ufday of May 2010, I served a true and correct copy
of the within Motion for Modification ofa No Contact Order and Notice of Hearing upon
the individual(s) names below in the manner noted:

)!.. By hand delivering copies of the same to the office(s) of the attomey(s) indicated below.
o
John Bujak
Canyon County Prosecutors Office
1115 Albany St.
Caldwell, ID 83605

Assistant Pub ic Defender
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MOTION TO DISMISS THE INDICMENT
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1=- 9.M
- F____A.M.
MARK J. 'MIMURA
CANYON COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER

MAY 2 5 20tO
CANYON COUNTY CLERK

LARY G. SISSON
510 Arthur Street
Caldwell, Idaho 83605
Telephone; (208) 639-4610
Facsimile: (208) 639-4611
Idaho State Bar No. 6072

J DRAKE. OEPuiY

Attorneys for Defendant

IN rHE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
STATE OF IDAHO,
Case No. CR-2004-26831-C
Plaintiff:
AFFIDAVIT OF VANCE A.
WATKINS IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S FIRST MOTION
TO SUPPRESS

vs.
VANCE A. WATKINS,
Defendant.

STATE OF IDAHO
ss.
County of Canyon

)
)

I, Vance A. Watkins, being first duly sworn, upon oath, deposes and says:

1.

I am making this affidavit based upon my personal knowledge and/or belief.

2.

I am the defendant in this matter.

3.

On December 1, 2004, I was placed in handcuffs and taken into custody by a
member of the Nampa Police Department at my residence located at 1717
Sunnyridge, Building 1, Apartment B in Nampa, Idaho.

AFFIDAVIT OF VANCE A. WATKINS IN
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S FIRST
MOTION TO SUPPRESS

000025

4.

1 was then transported to the Nampa Police Department and placed into an
interrogation room.

5.

While in the interrogation room a female detective, whose name 1 do not
remember, read me my Miranda rights and then asked me if 1 understood them.

6.

1 said, "Yes and 1 want a lawyer. "

7.

The detective then threw a phone book on the table in front of me.

8.

1 looked at the phone book and then 1 looked at her and said, "What you just read
said that if 1 can't afford a lawyer one would be appointed. Well, 1 can't afford
one, so 1 need one appointed."

9.

The detective ignored my second request for an attorney and began to interrogate
me. 1 was eventually interrogated by two other detectives before being forced by a
court order to provide a DNA sample.

10.

While 1 was being interrogated, 1 did not feel free to leave the Nampa Police
Department. 1 also felt that 1 had no choice but answer the questions of the police.

11.

On December 2, 2004, 1 was brought back to the same police station by a member
of the Nampa Police Department for the purpose of taking a polygraph test.

12.

1 was once again read my Miranda rights and 1 said, "I asked for a lawyer when 1
was here last night and was denied. What makes today any different?"

13.

The law enforcement officer, who 1 believe was the polygrapher, asked me, "So,
you want a lawyer." 1 replied, "Yes."

14.

At that point the polygraph test was not continued and the police sent me home
with Detective Terry.

AFFIDAVIT OF VANCE A. WATKINS IN
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S FIRST
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
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15.

On the ride home, Detective Terry asked me questions, particularly about my sex
life.

16.

Because I was confmed to a police car during my ride home and that the Nampa
Police Department was my only ride to get home at that point, I felt as I was
being subjected to a custodial interrogation and did not have the ability to refuse to
answer Detective Terry's questions.

FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
DATED this

~

day of May, 2010.

Ik~

VANCE A. WA

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

:<<f

NS

day of May 2010.

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at: CtA~U'c::' C eN N~
My Commission EXires: I"" 3.-

Oiy
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

'S"~ayofMay,

I hereby certifY that on theZ
2010, I served a true and correct copyofthe within and
foregoing document upon the individual(s) named below in the manner noted:

~y delivering copies of the same to the courthouse box of the attomey(s) indicated below.
Canyon County Prosecutor's Office
1115 Albany Street
Caldwell, Idaho 83605

AFFIDAVITOFVANCEA. WATKINS IN
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S FIRST
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
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F
MAY 2 5 2010

MARK J. MIMURA
CANYON COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER

CANYON COUNTY CLERK
J DRAKE, DEPUTY

LARY G. SISSON
510 Arthur Street
Caldwell, Idaho 83605
Telephone: (208) 639-4610
Facsimile: (208) 639-4611
Idaho State Bar No. 6072
Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
STATE OF IDAHO,
Case No. CR-2004-26831-C
Plaintiff:
vs.
VANCE A. WATKINS,

AFFIDAVIT OF VANCE A.
WATKINS IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S SECOND
MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Defendant.

STATE OF IDAHO
ss.
County of Canyon

)
)

I, Vance A. Watkins, being ftrst duly sworn, upon oath, deposes and says:
1.

I am making this affidavit based upon my personal knowledge and/or belief.

2.

I am the defendant in this matter.

3.

On and/or between October ( 2004 and December

~ 2004, my residence was

1717 Sunnyridge, Building 1, Apartment B in Nampa, Idaho.
4.

On or about December 1, 2004, members of the Nampa Police Department

AFFIDAVIT OF VANCE A. WATKINS IN
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S SECOND
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
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searched my aforementioned residence and seized a number of items that were
located in my apartment.
5.

Prior to their search, I did not give consent to the Nampa Police Department, or
any law enforcement officer, to search my residence located at 1717 Sunnyridge,
Building 1, Apartment B in Nampa, Idaho.

6.

Also, prior to their search, I did not give consent to the Nampa Police Department,
or any law enforcement officer, to seize any item from my residence located at
1717 Sunnyridge, Building 1, Apartment B in Nampa, Idaho.

7.

I have never given consent for any law enforcement officers to search 1717
Sunnyridge, Building 1, Apartment B in Nampa nor to seize any item therefrom.

8.

My belief that law enforcement officers searched my residence located at 1717
Sunnyridge, Building 1, Apartment B in Nampa, Idaho is supported by Search
Warrant number SW-1847, a copy ofwhich is marked and attached to this affidavit as
Exlubit A and incorporated herein.

9.

My belief that law enforcement officers seized items without my permission from my
residence is supported by Return to Search Warrant number SW-1847, a copy of
which is marked and attached to this affidavit as Exlubit B and incorporated herein.

FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
DATED this

?4 day of May, 2010.

~L-f/~~2-

VAN2f3 A. W~S
AFFIDAVIT OF VANCE A. WATKINS IN
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S SECOND
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

c'f

day of May 2010.

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at: ~~~CN COJt=~
My Commission Expi es: I" 3,- (:) I Y

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Z

I hereby certifY that on the
'S'tyofMay, 2010, I served a true and correct copy of the within and
foregoing document upon the individua1(s) named below in the manner noted:

¢BY

delivering copies of the same to the courthouse box ofthe.attomey(s) indicated below.

Canyon County Prosecutor's Office
1115 Albany Street
Caldwell, Idaho 83605

Assistant Public Defender

AFFIDAVITOFVANCEA. WATKINS IN
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S SECOND
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
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EXHIBIT A
DAVID L. YOUNG
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
Canyon County Courthouse
1115 Albany Street
Caldwell, ID 83605
Telephone: (208) 454-7391

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE TInRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
MAGISTRATE DIVISION
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION )
)
FOR A SEARCH WARRANT OF THAT
CERTAIN efPm.-TM:eN\ ,1l> LV tT!fr; )
bP: V,LDC5. \
)

CASENO.SW- 1~7

=s

----------------------------------=------)
LOCATEO .M " .. nil S'ut-l .... j It DC:s6) "Ft-QEs-. )
'

I} /sff5,.

SEARCH WARRANT

)

----------~~-----------------------------------------))

IN CANYON COUNTY, IDAHO.

-------------------------------------------------------------)

CANYON COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO

'....-~ I:>
TO: "Jj""
,. ~tC...
, OR ANY SHERIFF, CONSTABLE, MARSHAL,
POLICEMAN, PEACE OFFICER OR LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER IN CANYON
COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO

tJ'-'4 I~'w
· ~s
SEARCH ARRANT

~
~

.&..:::.f:~~_ _ _ _.to-wit:S:-"0V-~

fovv

Canyon County, State of Idaho.
YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED at any time of the day or night to
make immediate search of the above described premises for the property described above and to
seize the property described above.
Return to this Warrant is to be made to the above entitled Court within ten (10)
days from the date hereto.
GWEN UNDER MY HAND AND DATED this

SEARCH WARRANT
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I
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....

ADDRESS
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OTHER (
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DATE
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OFFICER
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~
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MARK J. MIMURA
CANYON COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
LARY G. SISSON
510 Arthur Street
Caldwell, Idaho 83605
Telephone: (208) 639-4610
Facsimile: (208) 639-4611
Idaho State Bar No. 6072

MA~ 2' 20\0
OANYQN COUNTY OL.!RK
M lUSH, OEPUTY

Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
STATE OF IDAHO,

Case No. CR-2004-26831-C

Plaintiff,
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS
TO SUPPRESS AND MOTIONS IN
LIMINE

vs.
VANCE A. WATKINS,
Defendant.

COMES NOW Defendant, by and through his attorneys of record, the Canyon
County Public Defender's Office and hereby provides the following legal and factual
support and argument in support of Defendant's First Motion to Suppress, Defendant's
Second Motion to Suppress, Defendant's First Motion in Limine and Defendant's Second
Motion in Limine in this matter
THIS MOTION is based on the pleadings, papers, records and files in the above
entitled action including the transcript from the Grand Jury Proceedings.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On December 1, 2004, R.W., the six year old daughter of Defendant, went to
school to her elementary school and disclosed to a school counselor that she had been
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S
MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS AND MOTIONS
IN LIMINE

1
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sexually abused by her father. R W. was later that same day interviewed by a case
worker from the Department of Health and Welfare while a law enforcement officer from
the Nampa observed the interview through a one-way mirror.
In short, during her interviews RW. stated that Defendant had vaginal and/or anal
contact with R W. using his penis on November 30, 2004. She also stated that Defendant
caused her to have oral contact with Defendant's penis on the morning of the December
1, 2004. Finally, R W. indicated that this type of sexual contact had been occurring for
the last two years - since she moved to Idaho. On the other hand, during her interviews
RW. did not disclose the use ofa condom, an eye dropper, or any type of numbing
substance by Defendant when these sexual encounters occurred.
Based on the disclosures by R W., the Nampa Police Department sought for, and
was given, Search Warrant number SW-1847 in order search Defendant's residence and
seize potential evidence. The Search Warrant was issued and executed on December 1,
2004. The Nampa Police seized a number ofitems from Defendant's residence. This
included a used condom found in a trash can in the kitchen as well as an eye dropper and
a bottle of Anbesol l from a drawer in Defendant's night stand. These three items were
not on the list of items in the Search Warrant that were to be seized from Defendant's
residence.
Also, on December 1, 2004, Defendant was placed in handcuffs and transported
to the Nampa Police headquarters for interrogation. While in the interrogation room a
female detective, whose is believed to be Brandy Sutherland, read Defendant his
Miranda rights and then asked me if he understood them. Defendant replied by saying,

1 Anbesol

is an oral pain relief medicine for such things as toothaches, canker sores, cold sores, etc.

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S
MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS AND MOTIONS
IN LIMINE
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"Yes and I want a lawyer." The detective then threw a phone book on the table in
front of Defendant.

Defendant looked at the phone book and then looked at the

detective and said, "What you just read said that if I can't afford a lawyer one would be
appointed. Well, I can't afford one, so I need one appointed." The detective ignored
Defendant's second request for an attorney and began to interrogate him. Defendant
was eventually interrogated by two other detectives before being forced by a court
order to provide a DNA sample.
On December 2, 2004, Defendant was brought back to the same police station
by a member of the Nampa Police Department for the purpose of taking a polygraph
test. He was once again read his Miranda rights. In response, Defendant said, "I asked
for a lawyer when I was here last night and was denied.

What makes today any

different?" The law enforcement officer, who Defendant believes was the polygrapher,
asked him, "So, you want a lawyer." Defendant replied, "Yes." At that point the
polygraph test was not continued and the police sent Defendant home with Detective
Terry.

On the ride home though, Detective Terry continued to ask Defendant

questions, particularly about his sex life.
On December 8, 2004 a Criminal Complaint was filed against Defendant and an

Arrest Warrant issued. That same day, the alleged six year old victim in this case, plus
Detective Don Peck ofthe Nampa Police Department, testified during a Grand Jury
Proceeding. As a result the Grand Jury issued a one count Superceding Indictment for
Lewd Conduct with Minor Child Under Sixteen. The Arrest Warrant was returned on
December 10, 2004.
Defendant was arraigned in the District Court on the Superceding Indictment on
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S
MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS AND MOTIONS
IN LIMINE
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December 22, 2004. Presumably, Defendant entered a not guilty plea on the Superceding
Indictment. Eventually, a jury trial was held in this matter from August 30, 2005 thru
September 6,2005. A jury found Defendant guilty of Lewd Conduct with Minor Child
Under Sixteen. Defendant was sentenced on December 28,2005 to a minimum of fifteen
(15) years fixed and an indeterminate period oflife with the Idaho Department of
Corrections.
On January 27,2006, Defendant appealed his Judgment and Conviction to the

Idaho Supreme Court. On January 25,2010, the Canyon County District Court received
a Remittitur from the Idaho Supreme Court overturning Defendant's conviction and
remanding the matter back to the Canyon County District Court for a new trial. On
January 29, 2010, the Court scheduled a Scheduling Conference in front of Judge Hoff
for February 4,2010. However, on February 2,2010, Defendant's attorney filed a
Motion and Affidavit to Disqualify Judge Hoff. A hearing was held on the Motion on
February 9,2010. The next day the Court issued an Order disqualifying Judge Hoffand
assigning the case to Senior Judge Morfitt.
On February 11, 2010, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Disqualify Judge Morfitt. That

Motion was granted on February 17, 2010. Consequently, on February 19, 2010, District
Court Judge Thomas J. Ryan was assigned to preside over this case. A Status Conference
was held in the matter on March 8, 2010. On that date, a Pre-Trial Conference was set
for March 18, 2010 and a Jury Trial for June 21,2010.
On May 13,2010, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend Indictment and set a hearing

for the Pre-Trial Conference. Defense counsel did not take a position on Plaintiffs
Motion to Amend. Therefore, the Court allowed the filing ofthe Amended Indictment.

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S
MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS AND MOTIONS
IN LIMINE
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At the hearing, defense counsel stated its intention to file several pre-trial motions. The
Court stated it would hear pretrial Motions on May 27, 2010.
Subsequently, on May 21,2010, defense counsel filed, among other documents,
two Motions to Suppress and two Motions in Limine in this matter.

ARGUMENT
First Motion to Suppress
If a defendant in custody invokes his or her Fifth Amendment right to counsel
upon being read Miranda rights, police must cease the interrogation until an attorney is
present. Police may not re-initiate an interrogation with a defendant who has requested
counsel; this prohibition applies even if the interrogation is about an offense that is
unrelated to the subject ofthe initial interrogation. Interrogation, for Miranda purposes,
must reflect a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody itself; it
refers not only to express questioning but also to any words or actions on the part of the
police that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response. State v. Bagshaw, 141 Idaho 257, 108 P.3d 404 (Id App 2004).
Concerning the issue of whether a custodial interrogation took place, the United
States Supreme Court in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682,64 L.Ed.2d
297 (1980), set out the test for determining whether a suspect has been interrogated in
violation ofthe standards set out in Miranda, supra. The Court in Innis stated, ''the term
'interrogation' under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any
words or actions on the part ofthe police (other than those normally attendant to arrest
and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
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response from the suspect." State v. Monroe, 103 Idaho 129,645 P.2d 363 (1982) citing

Innis, 446 U.S., at 301, 100 S.O., at 1689,64 L.Ed.2d at 308.
Even though a defendant may waive his right to counsel and respond to interrogation,
the United States Supreme Court stated in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct.
1880,68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) that,
"We now ho Id that when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel
present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot
be established by showing only that he responded to further policeinitiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights.
We further hold that an accused, such as Edwards, having expressed his
desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further
interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to
him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication,
exchanges or conversations with the police." 451 U.S., at 484, 101 S.Ct.,
at 1884.
However, Edwards only deals with resumption ofvalid interrogations which have
been stopped by a request for counse1. It does not deal with the continuing effect ofa
denial of the right to counse1. That question is governed by the doctrine of fruit ofthe
poisonous tree. Under this doctrine, police may not benefit from the fruits of their illegal
conduct. The fruits ofthat conduct must be suppressed. State v. Smith, 119 Idaho 96, 803
P.2d 1002 (1990). See Taylor v. Alabama, 455 U.S. 1014, 102 S.Ct. 1707, 72 L.Ed.2d
131 (1982).
In this particular matter, on December 1, 2004, Defendant was taken from his home,
place in handcuffs, and driven to the Nampa Police Headquarters. He was then placed in
an interrogation room. Defendant was not given access to a telephone or any other means
by which he could communicate with anyone else. Later, after being read his Miranda
rights by one ofthe detectives, Defendant invoked clearly and unequivocally invoked his
right to speak with an attorney. That request was not honored. Instead, not only did the
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first detective continue to ask Defendant questions, but two other detectives also
questioned Defendant presumably because he was not giving them the answers they
wanted.
Clearly, based on the definition of a custodial interrogation found in State v.

Bagshaw, defendant was subject to a custodial interrogation. The fact that Defendant
was later released does not make the actual interrogation non-custodial. The questioning
tactics by the police, where they tell Defendant that they know what he supposedly did,
and their repeated accusations that he molested his daughter and was lying about it, and
the fact that they read to Defendant the Miranda warning in the first place, strongly show
that the police were acting and talking in a way to elicit a confession from Defendant.
Even ifthe Court does not believe that Defendant was subjected to a custodial
interrogation on December I, 2004, the ruling in Edwards v. Arizona is clear that if a
suspect expresses his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, he is not subject
to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him,
unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges or conversations
with the police." 451 U.S., at 484, 101 S.Ct., at 1884. The ruling does not distinguish
between custodial or non-custodial interrogations. According to Edwards, all
interrogations must stop until a suspect has had an opportunity to access legal counselor
he initiates further communications with the police.
Both on December I, 2004 and again on December 2, 2004, Defendant clearly
and unequivocally invoked his right to an attorney. Defendant's request was ignored on
December 1st and questioning by the police simply continued. On December 2 nd, the
Nampa police officer sent Defendant home with Detective Terry providing the
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transportation after Defendant invoked his right to an attorney. However, Defendant was
in a confined area with no one else to talk to but Detective Terry. More importantly,
Detective Terry began questioning Defendant about his sex life. This was a calculated
attempt by Detective Terry to elicit incriminating information about Defendant, which
was later used against Defendant at his first trial.
Because the Nampa Police violated Defendant's right to

counse~

the remedy for such

violations is clear. According to State v. Smith, 119 Idaho 96, 803 P.2d 1002 (1990). and
Taylor v. Alabama, 455 U.S. 1014, 102 S.Ct. 1707, 72 L.Ed.2d 131 (1982), the
continuing effect of denial of counsel is governed by the doctrine of fruit of the
poisonous tree. Under this doctrine, police may not benefit from the fruits of their illegal
conduct. The fruits of that conduct must be suppressed.
In short, Defendant was placed in two situations where he was the subject of a
custodial interrogation by police. In each instance, Defendant proclaimed his desire to
have legal counsel present during his questioning. Both times the police ignored his
requests and continued to interview Defendant anyway. Because Defendant's rights
under the 5th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 13 rights ofthe
Idaho Constitution were violated, the remedy for such violations is to not allow Plaintiff
to use during trial any statements made by Defendant during his interrogations on
December 1 and December 2, 2004.

Second Motion to Suppress
Search warrants must describe the evidence to be seized. State v. Fowler, 106
Idaho 3,11, 674 P.2d 432, 440 (Id App. 1983). See also U.S. Const. amend. IV; Marron
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v. United States, 275 U.S. 192,48 S.Ct. 74,72 L.Ed. 231 (1927); Idaho Const. art. I, §
17; State v. Wolf, 102 Idaho 789, 640 P.2d 1190 (Ct.App.1982).
The police, however, are not limited to seizing only those items specifically
described in the warrant, State v. Fowler, 106 Idaho 3,11, 674 P.2d 432, 440 (Id App.
1983); Johnson v. United States, 293 F.2d 539 (1961), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 888, 84

S.Ct. 167, 11 L.Ed.2d 118. See also State v. O'Campo, 103 Idaho 62, 644 P.2d 985
(Ct.App.1982). Instead, all that is required is that an item seized bear "a reasonable
relation to the purpose of the search." State v. Fowler, 106 Idaho 3,11, 674 P.2d 432, 440
(Id App. 1983); Mesmer v. United States, 405 F.2d 316, 319 (10th Cir.1969).
When a defendant challenges a seizure, he has the burden of showing that the
items seized were beyond the scope ofthe warrant. Once he has made an initial showing,
the burden shifts to the state to demonstrate a legal justification for the seizure. Ringel,
Searches & Seizures § 20.4. The most common legal justification for the seizure of items
not covered by the search warrant is that the items were in plain view. State v. Fowler,
106 Idaho 3,12, 674 P.2d 432, 441 (Id App. 1983).
The plain view doctrine consists ofthree elements: (1) at the time of the officer's
observation he must be in a place where he had a legal right to be; (2) the items seized
must be in "plain view"; and (3) the incriminating nature ofthe items must be
immediately apparent. State v. Fowler, 106 Idaho 3,12, 674 P.2d 432, 441 (Id App.
1983) citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022,29 L.Ed.2d 564
(1971); State v. Pontier, 95 Idaho 707, 518 P.2d 969 (1974). The third element of the

plain view doctrine requires that an officer ofreasonable caution, under the cumulative
facts of the case, recognize the items as probably being related to criminal activity. State
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v. Fowler, 106 Idaho 3,12, 674 P.2d 432, 441 (ld App. 1983) citing United States v.

Chesher, 678 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir.1982); United States v. Blake, 484 F.2d 50 (8th
Cir.1973).
In this particular case, while executing a search warrant, the Nampa Police
Department seized a used condom, an eye dropper and a bottle of Anbesol from
Defendant's place of residence. As shown by Defendant's Affidavit in Support of the
Second Motion to Suppress, and Exhibits A and B attached and incorporated into that
Affidavit, the three aforementioned items were not listed on the search warrant but
certainly seized by the police. In fact, the used condom was tested by Plaintiff for DNA
and the results became a major portion ofthe evidence against Defendant during his first
trial. Because the seizure ofthose three items was beyond the scope of the search
warrant, the State must demonstrate a legal justification for the seizure.
It is anticipated that Plaintiffwill argue that the "Plain View" doctrine justifies the
seizure of the condom, eye dropper, and Anbesol. The most problematic portion ofthe
plain view doctrine is the element that requires that the incriminating nature of the seized
items must be immediately apparent. In other words, an officer of reasonable caution,
under the cumulative facts ofthe case, must recognize the items as probably being related
to criminal activity.
Up to the point where the Nampa Police executed the search warrant in this
matter, they knew that R. W. had stated that Defendant had vaginal and/or anal contact
with R. W. using his penis on November 30, 2004. She also stated that Defendant caused
her to have oral contact with Defendant's penis on the morning ofthe December 1, 2004.
During her interviews with various agencies, R.W. even described what Defendant's
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penis looked like. On the other hand, during her interviews R.W. did not disclose the use
of a condom, an eye dropper, or any type of numbing substance by Defendant when these
sexual encounters occurred.
It is unclear whether the custodial interrogation of Defendant took place before or

after the execution of the search warrant. If execution ofthe search warrant occurred
after Defendant's interrogation, it also unclear if the officers executing the search warrant
were aware of any statements made by Defendant during the interrogation. It is certain
that officers executing the search warrant had no information about defendant's sex life
other than allegations made by R. W. In order words, law enforcement did not know if
Defendant had a female friend, or multiple female friends, with whom Defendant had
sexual relations, if he used a condom when he had sexual relations with others, ifit was
Defendant's practice to have sexual relations in his apartment or somewhere else, and so
forth.
Consequently, when the Nampa Police seized the used condom from the trash in
the kitchen of Defendant's residence, they were guessing as to whether the condom was
probably related to criminal activity. As stated earlier, the victim had, up to that point,
said nothing that would indicate a condom was used by Defendant. In fact, R.W.
strongly implied that a condom had not been used. The police knew nothing about
Defendant's sexual habits or preferences. For all they knew, the condom could have been
used during a consensual and legal sexual encounter between Defendant and someone
else. Based on those circumstances and cumulative facts (and missing facts), an officer
of reasonable caution could not have recognize the condom as probably being related to
criminal activity. Therefore, the plain view doctrine does not justify seizure of the
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condom and it, along with any DNA testing from the condom and any photographs or
mention of the condom during a trial in this matter, must be suppressed.
If seizure of the condom is untenable in this matter, then without a doubt seizure
of the eye dropper and Anbesol bottle were, without a doubt, improper. Once again,
R.W. in all of her interviews on December 1,2004, never mentioned the use ofan eye
dropper and/or Anbesol or some other numbing compound when she alleged lewd
conduct by Defendant. In differentiating from the condom, both eye droppers and
Anbesol have legitimate uses that are not sexually related. In fact, it is extremely
unusua~

perhaps even far-fetched, to even think or suggest that such items would be

related to lewd conduct. As stated before, the police also had no information from
Defendant as to why he might have such items in his nightstand drawer. Perhaps if the
police had asked him and Defendant was unable to come up with a plausible explanation
as to purpose of having those two items, then that would have given them justification for
seizing them.
However, based on those circumstances and cumulative facts (and missing facts),
an officer of reasonable caution could not have recognize the eye dropper and the
Anbesol as probably being related to criminal activity. Therefore, the plain view doctrine
does not justifY seizure ofthe eye dropper and the Anbesol. Thus, these two items, along
with any photographs or mention of them during a trial in this matter, must be
suppressed.

First Motion in Limine
A two-pronged analysis is applied to determine the admissibility of evidence of
prior bad acts. First, the evidence must be relevant to a material disputed issue
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concerning the crime charged, other than propensity. State v. Moore, 120 Idaho 743, 745,
819 P.2d 1143, 1145 (1991); State v. Medina, 128 Idaho 19,24,909 P.2d 637,642
(Ct.App.1996). "Relevant" evidence means evidence having a tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. I.R.E. 401. The second
step in the analysis is the determination of whether the probative value of the evidence is
substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. State v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816, 819, 864
P.2d 654,657 (Q.App.1993).
In State v. Cook, 144 Idaho 784, 171 P.3d 1282 (Id App 2007). the State sought to
introduce evidence that Cook had supplied two minors methamphetamine, more than one
year prior to the incidents he was actually charged with in his case before the court.
Cook had been charged with Statutory Rape and several counts of Delivery of a
Controlled substance in that matter.
The Idaho Court of Appeals determined that the 404(b) evidence was admissible
during trial. Its rationale is as follows:
"Cook's intent was not genuinely at issue in this case. In State v. Stoddard,
105 Idaho 533, 537, 670 P.2d 1318, 1322 (Ct.App.1983), this Court
discussed whether Rule 404(b) evidence that the defendant had previously
stolen a vehicle was admissible to prove intent in a case where he had
been charged with stealing a different automobile. In holding the evidence
inadmissible for this purpose, we noted it was the type of case where the
act charged against the defendant itself characterizes the offense; thus,
guilty intent was proven by proving the act, and evidence 0 f other crimes
was not necessary or admissible to establish the accused's intent. We cited
Fallen v. United States, 220 F.2d 946 (5th Cir.1955), where the court
therein stated that if the defendant had in fact altered the serial numbers on
two cars, there was "no real question of his criminal intent" in disposing of
them on the black market. Stoddard, 105 Idaho at 537,670 P.2d at 1322!.
See also State v. Alsanea, 138 Idaho 733, 740, 69 P.3d 153, 160
(Ct.App.2003) (citing Stoddard in concluding prior bad acts were not
relevant to prove the defendant's intent); State v. Roach, 109 Idaho 973,
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974-75, 712 P.2d 674, 675-76 (Ct.App.1985) (relying on Stoddard to
conclude intent was not at issue where Roach's defense was that he did not
commit the act, not that he committed the act with innocent intent)." State
v. Cook, 144 Idaho 784, 788-789, 171 P.3d 1282, 1286-1287 (Id App
2007).
In State v. Roach, 109 Idaho 973, 712 P.2d 674 (ld App 1985), the State sought to
introduce prior uncharged sexual crimes committed by Defendant upon the minor victim
and·sexual misconduct between Defendant and victim's mother. Cook was charged in his
case with Lewd and Lascivious Conduct. One of the State's arguments was that because
Lewd and Lascivious Conduct is a specific intent crime, the defendant's prior bad acts
should be allowed during Cook's trial to prove his specific intent. In that case, the Idaho
Court of Appeals held:
"It is not always easy to determine when intent is an issue. State v. Proud, 74
Idaho 429, 262 P.2d 1016 (1953). In the present case, applying the specific
intent label does not help the analysis. As in Stoddard, we believe the intent
is adequately shown by proof ofthe act. Roach's defense was that he did not
commit the act. He does not, as well he could not, contend that he committed
the act with innocent intent. See State v. Maylett, 108 Idaho 671, 701 P.2d
291 (Ct.App.1985) (Burnett, 1., specially concurring). The trial judge
impliedly recognized this when refusing to give lesser included offense
instructions to the jury. The judge stated that 'it's a question of whether they
believe the evidence. Not a question ofwhat-what it constitutes. Ifthey
believe it, that's what it is [Le., lewd and lascivious conduct] .... ' Roach never
contended that he committed the acts but with innocent intent or mental
defect, nor did he have an alibi defense. We do not believe that intent was
sufficiently at issue to allow the questioned evidence as probative of intent.
State v. Roach, 109 Idaho 973, 975, 712 P.2d 674, 676 (Id App 1985)

Plaintiffhas filed a Notice oflntent to use during trial what is believed to be prior
bad acts, wrongs, and/or crimes committed by Defendant. Briefly put, Plaintiff wants to
introduce into evidence the fact that workers from the Idaho Department of Health and
Welfare went to the residence of Defendant and R.W. and when they did so, they found
Defendant without a shirt on and R.W. wearing little or no clothing.
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First, Defendant contends that the evidence that Plaintiff seeks to introduce is not
relevant. If Defendant did in fact speak with two separate workers without a shirt on at
his own residence, does not by itself suggest any intent to commit lewd acts on R. W. or
any other child. Also, coupling that with testimony that R. W. was not completely dressed
when the workers made their visits is also not enough to show that Defendant had, or
intended to have, sexual conduct with R. W.
If the two employees from Health and Welfare had enough evidence to believe
that Defendant was committing lewd acts upon R. W. when each one visited, then they
could have sought the assistance oflaw enforcement andlor the courts to remove R. W.
from the home. They did not seek that remedy because they lacked enough to show that
such sexual misconduct. Consequently, these prior acts are not sufficient to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Hence, they are not
relevant.
This case is very similar to the situation in State v. Roach. Even though Lewd
Conduct with a Minor Under 16 is a specific intent crime, intent is not an issue in this
case. Based on the statements and previous testimony ofR. W., there is no legitimate way
that Defendant can claim that any contact he may have had with R. W. was a mistake or
an accident. His only real defense it that he did not do what R. W. and Plaintiff claims he
did. Therefore, because intent is not sufficiently at issue in this case, the probative value
ofthe 404(b) evidence sought by Plaintiff is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice. As a result, it must not be allowed to be presented to a jury during a
trial in this matter.
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Second Motion in Limine
"Relevant Evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the detennination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. LR.E.401.
All relevant evidence is admissible except as otherwise provided by these rules
or by other rules applicable in the courts of this state. Evidence which is not relevant is
not admissible. LR.E. 402.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations ofundue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence. LR.E. 403
Photographs showing the contemporaneous scene of a crime or appearance of
a person are generally admissible in the discretion of the trial court, unless the
photograph is so inflammatory that its probative value is outweighed by the prejudice
which might result from its inflammatory nature. State v. Carter, 103 Idaho 917, 655
P.2d 434 (1981).
It is believed that Plaintiff will seek to introduce during trial a picture ofR.W.

when she was six years old. Defendant seeks to exclude such a photograph on two
grounds. The first grounds is that the picture is not relevant.
It is conceded that in order to prove that Defendant committed Lewd Conduct

with a Minor Under 16, the State must prove that R.W. was under the age of16 at the
time the alleged acts occurred. R.W. is approximately 12 years old and still far from
being 16 years of age. Also, presumably R.W., or someone familiar with R.W.'s age
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or date ofbirth, will testify that R W. was six years old during the last three months of
2004. Therefore, unless R W. has matured in such a way that a jury would have
difficulty believing she was six years old in late 2004, then a picture of her at age 6 is
not relevant.
Such a picture does not have " ... any tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the determination ofthe action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence" (emphasis added). Evidence which
is not relevant is not admissible. I.RE. 402.
Even ifthe Court determines that a photo ofRW. when she was six years old
is relevant in this matter, it still must be excluded because its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. The photograph
that Plaintiff seeks to introduce does not purport to show accurately how R W. looked
shortly after the lewd acts were allegedly committed against her. The photograph also
does not purport to show physical injuries sustained by RW. at the hands of
Defendant.
What the picture does show is a typical, cute 6 year old girl. Undoubtedly,
Plaintiff desires to use that picture to make arguments that are designed to arouse the
passions and prejudices of the jury and to elicit their sympathy toward the alleged
victim. By using a photograph in such a way the danger of unfair prejudice
substantially outweighs the minimal probative value of the picture itself In addition,
dangers that the jury will be confused as to the real issues in the case, or they will be
mislead, increase dramatically. As stated above, a picture ofRW. at age 6 is also a
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needless presentation of cumulative evidence about her age at the time these events
allegedly occurred.
Because a photograph ofR.W. at age 6 is not relevant in this matter, and even
if it is relevant, its probative value is substantially outweighed by the dangers
associated with it being presented to a jury, Defendant requests that the Court issue an
order excluding its presentation during the jury trial in this case.
Timeliness of Motions to Suppress
Rule 12(d) ofthe Idaho Criminal Rules (ICR) states:
"Motion date. Motions pursuant to Rule 12(b) must be filed within twentyeight (28) days after the entry of a plea of not guilty or seven (7) days
before trial whichever is earlier. In felony cases,-such motions must be
brought on for hearing within fourteen (14) days after filing or forty-eight
(48) hours before trial whichever is earlier. The court in its discretion may
shorten or enlarge the time provided herein, and for good cause shown, or
for excusable neglect, may relieve a party of failure to comply with this
rule."
A court may not arbitrarily enlarge or shorten the filing requirements of the rule.
To permit a court to do so without the required exempting factors would emasculate the
intent of the rule. Pretrial motions are just that, motions to be disposed of prior to trial.
Bringing such motions at the last minute unfairly deprives the responding party
opportunity to gather evidence to meet the merits of the movant's arguments. State v.

Alanis, 109 Idaho 884, 712 P.2d 585 (1985).
A review ofthe limited Idaho case law regarding the filing of untimely pretrial
motions center around whether there was "good cause shown" or "excusable neglect" for
filing the late motions. Without such a presentation, then it is not proper for a trial court
to hear such motions. State v. Dice, 887 P.2d 1102 (Id App 1994).
First, this case was remanded back to the District Court in Canyon County for
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retrial after he successfully appealed his Judgment of Conviction issued in 2005. From
January 25,2010 (the date the Court filed the Remittitur) until February 19, 2010, this
case was assigned to three different judges. Two of the judges disqualified themselves as
a result of Motions to Disqualify filed by both the State and Defendant. From
approximately January 25,2010 until April 1, 2010, the attorney in the Canyon County
Public Defender's Office assigned to handle Defendant's case also changed three times.
As a result, Defendant's current attorney had only been working on Defendant's case for
approximately 50 days when before filing the two Motions to Suppress in this matter.
Second, during the process of preparing to represent Defendant, his current
counsel focused on getting up-to-speed with the facts and potential evidence in this
matter. Current defense counsel discovered that there were over 400 pages of discovery,
approximately 10 total audio and video recordings, four days of trial transcripts, and
approximately 20 exhibits entered into the first jury trial in this matter. Therefore,
reviewing the work that was done, or should have been done, by previous legal counse~
was not a priority. Current counsel did not initially review Defendant's case in order to
determine whether there were any viable suppression motions because it was assumed
that the three previous attorneys were thorough and had explored whether or not there
were any viable suppression motions.
Third, when defense counsel met with Defendant during the last week of April of
201 0, he discovered that there may be a viable suppression motion as to statements made
by defendant to law enforcement. Although Defendant denied any wrong doing during
two custodial interrogations, defense counsel discovered from Defendant that some of his
statements had been used against him at trial.· Defense counsel was not aware of that
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problem, and that potential suppression issue, prior to that meeting.
Fourth, sometime in 2005 the previous trial attorney received a copy ofthe search
warrant related to this matter. When current defense counsel found a copy of the search
warrant, which was buried among other pleadings in the case file he inherited, the search
warrant was illegible. After contact the deputy prosecuting attorney assigned to this case,
it became clear that neither party had a legible copy of the search warrant. Defense
counsel, on his own initiative, secured a copy ofthe search warrant on May 19, 2010. At
that time it was immediately clear that the officers executing the search warrant exceeded
their scope by seizing items not listed on the search warrant. As a result, defense counsel
filed Defendant's Second Motion to Suppress. Until May 19, 2010, defendant's attorney
did not know if he had a viable suppression motion with regards to items seized from the
defendant.
In summary, defense counsel believes that the information related to the four
points above demonstrate that there is good cause for the late filing of both Motions to
Suppress in this matter. At the very least, defense counsel argues that excusable neglect
has been shown. Therefore, Defendant and his attorney request that the Court listen to
and rule on both Motions to Suppress.

CONCLUSION
Defendant respectfully requests that the Court grant his two Motions to Suppress
and two Motions in Limine and issue Orders consistent with those pleadings.
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DATED this

#(P -{( day of May, 2010.

L

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE:
I hereby certify that on the

Zit t-day of May 2010, I served a true and correct copy

of the within Briefupon the individual{s) names below in the manner noted:
~ By hand delivering copies of the same to the office{s) ofthe attomey{s) indicated below.

John Bujak
Canyon County Prosecutors Office
1115 Albany St.
Caldwell, ID 83605

...
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bm
JOHN T. BUJAK
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
Canyon County Courthouse
1115 Albany Street
Caldwell, Idaho 83605
Telephone: (208) 454-7391

MAY 2 6 2010
CANYON COUNTY CLERK
S ROGERS, DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
THE STATE OF IDAHO
Plaintiff,
vs.

CASE NO. CR2004-26831

PROSECUTING ATTORNEY'S
FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR
DISCOVERY

VANCE WATKINS
Defendant

COMES NOW, the Plaintiff, the State of Idaho, and submits the following First
Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery:
That the Plaintiff, the State of Idaho, has complied with the Request by submitting the
following information, evidence and materials:
1.

Statement of Defendant; Statement of Co-Defendant; Defendant's Prior Criminal
Record; Documents and Tangible Objects; Reports of Examinations and Tests;
and Police Reports:
(a) Refer to photo attached numbered 424 ..

IN ADDITION TO THE ENUMERATED OR SPECIFIC ITEMS, THIS
RESPONSE INCLUDES ANY OTHER PHYSICAL EVIDENCE LISTED
IN THE REPORTS.

PROSECUTING ATTORNEY'S
1
FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY
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OR1Gfr~AL

2.

State Witnesses
Prior Felony Record
None
Unknown

Name and Address
Chris Rowe, Nampa Police Department
Claudia Currie-Mills, SANE Solutions

AND ANY OTHER WITNESS LISTED IN THE REPORTS
ANY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS LISTED AS POTENTIAL WITNESSES
WILL BE CALLED AS EXPERT WITNESSES HAVING SPECIALIZED TRAINING
AND EXPERIENCE IN LAW ENFORCEMENT. OFFICERS' EXPERT OPINIONS
AND ANY DATA SUPPORTING THE SAME IS CONTAINED IN THE POLICE
REPORTS PROVIDED IN DISCOVERY. A COPY OF A DISCLOSED OFFICER(S)'
QUALIFICATIONS, IN THE FORM OF A CURRICULUM VITAE, WILL BE
PROVIDED UPON REQUEST.
DATED This

6

day of May, 2010.
JOHN T. BUJAK
Prosecuting Attorney
Canyon County, Idaho
By:

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct
copy of the foregoing instrument was served
upon the attorney for the defendant, the Canyon
County Public Defender, by placing said
instrument in their basket at the Clerk's Office,
on or about the
day of May, 2010.

qs

PROSECUTING ATTORNEY'S
2
FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY

000060

F IA.k E

o

'P.M.

MAY 26 2010

bm
JOHN T. BUJAK
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
Canyon County Courthouse
1115 Albany&
Caldwell, Idaho 83606-0668

CANYON COUNTY CLERK
M BUSH, DEPUTY

Telephone: (208) 454-7391

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

THE STATE OF IDAHO
Plaintiff,

VANCE WATKINS,
Defendant.

)
)
)

CASE NO. CR2008-26831

)
)

STATE'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT
OF 404(b) EVIDENCE

)
)
)

----------------------------)
COMES NOW, Erica M. Kallin, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Canyon County, State
of Idaho, and hereby submits the following Brief in Support of 404(b) Evidence.
The State intends to present evidence that the Defendant engaged in sexual contact with
R.W., the named victim, while in Idaho. The State does not intend to introduce this evidence to
show the defendant's criminal propensity but rather to prove opportunity, intent, plan, common
scheme and absence of mistake pursuant to Rule 404(b) of the Idaho Rules of Evidence (I.R.E.)
I.R.E. Rule 404(b) states:
STATE'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT
OF 404(b) EVIDENCE
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Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to
prove the character of a person in order to show that the person
acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for
other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident, provided that the prosecution in a criminal case shall file
and serve notice reasonably in advance of trial, or during trial if the
court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the general
nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.
The use of 404(b) evidence has been upheld for years. In fact, the court, in State v.

Hammock, 18 Idaho 424, 110 P. 169 (1910), determined that the use of 404(b) evidence is often
necessary because the touching stems out of a common scheme.
Any evidence of other crimes which developed was so intimately
and inseparably connected with the circumstances of this specific
offense as to render it admissible as a part of the common criminal
design, all of which was necessarily admissible ... 18 Idaho at 429,
110 P. at 170. Cited in State v. Moore, 120 Idaho 743, 746, 819
P.2d 1143, 1146 (Idaho,1991)
The Idaho courts have routinely held that 404(b) evidence is relevant especially in sex
crime cases to show a common scheme, plan or common criminal design. State v. Tolman" 121
Idaho 899, 828 P.2d 1304 (1992).
In State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 205 P.3d 1185 (2009), the Idaho Supreme court ruled that
cases of a sexual nature are to be treated the same as all other types of cases when applying
I.R.E. 404(b) analysis. The court reiterated that a two-tiered analysis must be undergone to
determine if 404(b) evidence is admissible.
First, the trial court must deteI1J).ine if there is sufficient evidence to establish the other
.<l

crime or wrong as fact. The trial court must also determine whether the fact of another crime or
STATE'S OBJECTION TO
DEFENDANT'S MOTION
IN LIMINE

2
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wrong, if established, would be relevant. ... Second, the trial court must engage in a balancing
under LR.E. 403 and determine whether the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs
the probative value of the evidence. Grist 147 Idaho at 52.

Grist also reiterated the need for corroboration in sex crime cases. "Corroborative
evidence in sex crime cases involving youthful victims is often times necessary to establish the
credibility of a young child." Too often the determination of the case rests strictly upon
establishing that the victim's testimony is more credible then that of the alleged perpetrator." Id
53. However, corroborative evidence or evidence of a common scheme must go to
corroboration, not to establish propensity evidence.
Here the State is seeking to introduce all sexual acts between the victim, R. W. and the
defendant. The victim disclosed that the defendant engaged in touching outside of the time
alleged in the Indictment. Specifically, R.W. testified in front of the Grand Jury the touching
happened when she was four. Additionally, the Defendant did not make any admissions to
engaging in sexual touching with R.W. Proving the Defendant had the requisite sexual intent is
\ I

an essential element of the crime. To show that sexual intent, the State must rely, in part, on the
Defendant's common scheme, motive and opportunity to touch R.W. Additionally, the
Defendant told law enforcement that he has difficulty obtaining an erection and the only time he
has an erection is at night, when he might have touched R.W. The State further has to show that
the touching was not a mistake or accident. Falling within the 404b realm is the acts observed by
Department of Health and Welfare worker Kristi Moore. Ms. Moore went to the Defendant's
home on two separate occasions. On both occasions, R.W. was not dressed (she was instructed
STATE'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT
OF 404(b) EVIDENCE
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to get dressed by the Defendant) and the Defendant was wearing only shorts. This evidence goes
to the plan and opportunity of the Defendant to engage in sexual touching with R.W. None of
this evidence is too remote in time, as the State intends to focus on conduct between R.W. and
the Defendant after they moved to Idaho.
The second tier for the court to weigh is whether the probative value is substantially
outweighed by the unfair prejudice to the defendant. This balancing process is left to the sound
discretion ofthe trial judge. State v. Abel, 104 Idaho 865, 664 P.2d 772 (1983); State v. Roach,
supra. State v. Marks, 120 Idaho 727, 731,819 P.2d 581,585 (Idaho App., 1991). The mere fact
that evidence is probative makes it prejudicial to the defendant. As such, the question becomes
whether the prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value. Because of the similarities
between these incidents, i.e., time, place, opportunity and the fact it is the same victim, it has
been upheld by the courts of Idaho that the probative value of the evidence substantially
outweighs any danger of unfair prejudice. In fact, the Court in State v. Parmer, 147 Idaho 210,
207 P.3d 186 (Idaho App. 2009), indicated that often the prejudice can be cured with a limiting
instruction. The State would ask this court give a limiting instruction and has provided one in its
proposed jury instructions. As such, the danger of unfair prejudice would be minimized.
This court should hold that testimony of sexual acts with the alleged victim, as well as the
observations by Health and Welfare are admissible for 404b purposes.
DATED This

STATE'S OBJECTION TO
DEFENDANT'S MOTION
IN LIMINE

()~

day of May, 2010.
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Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Response To
Defendant's Second Motion in Limine was served upon the attorney for the Defendant, the
Canyon County Public Defender, by placing said instrument in their basket at the Clerk's Office
on or about this

Q5

day of May, 2010

Prosecuting Attorney

STATE'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT
OF 404(b) EVIDENCE
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Supreme Court ofIdaho,
Boise, June 2008 Term.
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.
Harold E. GRIST, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.
No. 33652.

Jan. 29, 2009.
Rehearing Denied April 20, 2009.

Background: Defendant was convicted in the District Court, Second Judicial District, Nez Perce County, Jeff M. Brudie, 1.,
of seven counts of lewd conduct with a minor under age 16, two counts of sexual battery of a minor, and one count of sexual
abuse of a child under age 16. Defendant appealed.

Holdings: The Supreme Court, Horton, J., held that:

ill trial court erred in admitting evidence of defendant's prior, uncharged sexual misconduct without making determination
that there was sufficient evidence to establ ish such prior misconduct, or articulating whether it deemed evidence admissible
as probative of common scheme or plan or as corroborative of victim's testimony; and

ru evidence of uncharged misconduct may not be admitted pursuant to the rule of evidence governing admission of other
crimes, wrongs, or acts when its probative value is entirely dependent upon its tendency to demonstrate the defendant's
propensity to engage in such behavior; overruling Slate v. Moore, 120 Idaho 743,819 P.2d 1143; Stale v. Tolman, 121
Idaho 899,828 P.2d 1304.
Vacated and remanded.
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Jones, J., concurred specially with opinion.

West Headnotes

ill Criminal Law 110 ~1153.1
ill Criminal Law
I I OXXIV Review

J IOXXIV(N) Discretion of Lower Court
11 Ok 1153 Reception and Admissibility of Evidence
II Ok 1153. J k. In general. Most Cited Cases
Supreme court reviews a trial court's decision to admit evidence for abuse of discretion, examining whether: (J) the trial
court correctly perceived the issue as discretionary; (2) the trial court acted within the outer bounds of its discretion and with
applicable legal standards; and (3) the trial court reached its decision through an exercise of reason.

ill Criminal Law 110 C;;:;>369.2(1)
JJ.Q Criminal Law
II OXVlI Evidence
J I OXVII(F) Other Offenses

I I 0k369 Other Offenses as Evidence of Offense Charged in General
I I 0k369.2 Evidence Relevant to Offense, Also Relating to Other Offenses in General
I JOk369.2(l) k. In general. Most Cited Cases

Criminal Law 110 ~374

ill Criminal

Law

II OXVlI Evidence
11 OXVII(F) Other Offenses
II 0k374 k. Proof and effect of other offenses. Most Cited Cases
In determining the admissibility of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts offered for a permitted purpose, the trial court
must first determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish the other crime or wrong as fact, and whether the fact of
another crime or wrong, if established, would be relevant. Rules of Evid .. Rule 404(b) .

.Ql Criminal Law 110 C;;:;>369.2(1)

ill Criminal Law
IIOXVII Evidence
II OXVII(F) Other Offenses
II 0k369 Other Offenses as Evidence of Offense Charged in General
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II Ok369 .2 Evidence Relevant to Offense, Also Relating to Other Offenses in General
II Ok369.2( I) k. In general. Most Cited Cases

Criminal Law 110 ~374

llQ Criminal Law
IIOXVTI Evidence
110XVII(F) Other Offenses
II 0k374 k. Proof and effect of other offenses. Most Cited Cases
Evidence oftmcharged misconduct must be relevant to a material and disputed issue concerning the crime charged, other than
propensity; such evidence is only relevant ifthe jury can reasonably conclude that the act occurred and that the defendant was
the actor. Rules ofEvid .. Rule 404(b) .

.w Criminal Law 110 ~369.2(1)
1 10 Criminal Law
II OXVTI Evidence
J I OXVII(F) Other Offenses

II Ok369 Other Offenses as Evidence of Offense Charged in General
II Ok369.2 Evidence Relevant to Offense, Also Relating to Other Offenses in General
II 0k369.2( I) k. In general. Most Cited Cases

In determining the admissibility of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts offered for a permitted purpose, after
determining that there is sufficient evidence to establish the other crime or wrong as fact, and that the fact of another crime or
wrong, if established, would be relevant, the trial court must engage in a balancing, and determine whether the danger of
unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence. Rules ofEvid.. Rules 403, 404{b).

1.£ Criminal Law 110 €;;;>369.2(1)

ill Criminal

Law

IIOXVII Evidence
I 10XVIf(F) Other Offenses
II 0k369 Other Offenses as Evidence of Offense Charged in General
) 10k369.2 Evidence Relevant to Offense, Also Relating to Other Offenses in General
11 0k369.2( I) k. In general. Most Cited Cases
Balancing necessary to determine whether the danger of tmfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of
evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is committed to the discretion of the trial judge. Rules of Evid., Rules 403, 404(b).

l.Ql Criminal Law ItO

~369.2(l)

i l l Criminal Law
IIOXVII Evidence
110XVJI(F) Other Offenses
11Ok369 Other Offenses as Evidence of Offense Charged in General
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IIOk369.2 Evidence Relevant to Offense, Also Relating to Other Offenses in General
I I0k369.2( I) k. In general. Most Cited Cases
Trial court must determine considerations of admissibility of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts on a case-by-case
basis. Rules ofEvid., Rules 403, 404(b).

ill Criminal Law 110 <C=:>374
ill Criminal Law
IIOXVIl Evidence

J JOXVII(F) Other Offenses
II 0k374 k. Proof and effect of other offenses. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 11 Ok695 .5)
Trial court erred in admitting evidence of defendant's prior, uncharged sexual misconduct with his ex-wife's daughter, in
prosecution for seven counts of lewd conduct with a minor under age 16, two counts of sexual battery of a minor, and one
count of sexual abuse of a child under age 16, without making determination that there was sufficient evidence to establ ish
such prior misconduct, or articulating whether it deemed evidence admissible as probative of common scheme or plan or as
corroborative of victim's testimony. Rules ofEvid., Rule 404(b).

rn Criminal Law 110 <C=:>369.2(S)
ill Criminal Law
llOXVTI Evidence
110XVTI(F) Other Offenses
110k369 Other Offenses as Evidence of Offense Charged in General
II Ok369.2 Evidence Relevant to Offense, Also Relating to Other Offenses in General
110k369.2(3) Particular Offenses, Prosecutions for
110k369.2(5) k. Sex offenses; offenses relating to children. Most Cited Cases

Criminal Law 110 <C=:>372(7)

ill Criminal Law
II0XVn Evidence
110XVII(F) Other Offenses
II 0k372 Acts Part of Series Showing System or Habit
II 0k372(7) k. Incest, rape, and other sex offenses. Most Cited Cases
Evidence offered for the purpose of corroboration in a prosecution involving a sex offense against a child must actually
serve that purpose; the courts must not permit the introduction of impermissible propensity evidence merely by relabeling it
as corroborative or as evidence of a common scheme or plan. Rules of Evid., Rule 404(b ).
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1 I OXVII(F) Other Offenses
11 Ok369 Other Offenses as Evidence of Offense Charged in General
II Ok369.8 k. In prosecutions for rape and incest. Most Cited Cases
Evidence of uncharged sexual misconduct may not be admitted pursuant to the rule of evidence governing admission of other
crimes, wrongs, or acts when its probative value is entirely dependent upon its tendency to demonstrate the defendant's
propensity to engage in such behavior; overruling State v. Moore. 120 Idaho 743. 819 P.2d 1143; Stale v. Tolman. 121
Idaho 899. 828 P.2d 1304. Rules of Evid., Rule 404(b).

1.!.Ql Criminal Law 11 0 ~369.2(5)
1J.Q Criminal Law
I 10 XVII Evidence
11 OXVII(F) Other Offenses
11Ok369 Other Offenses as Evidence of Offense Charged in General
II0k369.2 Evidence Relevant to Offense, Also Relating to Other Offenses in General
11 0k369.2(3) Particular Offenses, Prosecutions for
IIOk369.2(5) k. Sex offenses; offenses relating to children. Most Cited Cases
Rules of evidence require that trial courts treat the admission of evidence of uncharged misconduct in child sex crime cases
no differently than the admission of such evidence in other cases. Rules of Evid., Rule 404(b).

**1186 Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Justin Curtis argued.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Daniel Bower argued.

HORTON, Justice .

.... 50 This appeal arises from Harold Grist's conviction for seven counts of lewd conduct with a minor under the age of

sixteen, two counts of sexual battery of a minor, and one count of sexual abuse of a child under the age of sixteen. Grist
argues that the district court improperly admitted evidence relating to prior uncharged sexual misconduct. We vacate and
remand for further proceedings and a new trial.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A jury convicted Grist of sexually abusing his live-in girlfriend's daughter, J.M.O., over a period of eight years. The abuse
started shortly after Grist and J.M.O.'s mother moved in together when J.M.O. was ten years old. Grist would have lM.O. sit
on his lap while he rubbed his pelvis against her. The abuse progressed as J.M.O. grew older. Eventually, Grist started to
touch J.M.O.'s breasts, buttocks, and vagina. Grist would *51 **1187 also force J.M.O. to undress for him. The abuse
stopped when J.M.O. moved out of the house after she graduated from high school.

Prior to trial, the State filed a motion pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b) to admit evidence of prior uncharged acts of sexual
misconduct as evidence of a common scheme or plan. The evidence indicated that Grist previously sexually abused his
ex-wife's daughter, AW. The district court permitted A.W. to testify, finding the evidence to be relevant to Grist's "alleged
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. conduct." A. W. testified that she lived with Grist from ages eight until thirteen and that Grist would ask her to sit on his lap
or lay and cuddle with him During this time, Grist would touch A. W.'s breasts and buttocks. The jury convicted Grist of all
ten charged counts relating to his conduct with 1.M.O. Grist timely appealed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

ill We

review a trial court's decision to admit evidence for abuse of discretion. State v. Field. 144 Idaho 559, 564, 165

PJd 273,278 (2007) (citing State v. Robinett. 141 Idaho 110, 112, 106 P.3d 436, 438 (2005)). In this review, we examine
whether: (1) the trial court correctly perceived the issue as discretionary; (2) the trial court acted within the outer bounds of
its discretion and with applicable legal standards; and (3) the trial court reached its decision through an exercise of reason.

Sun Valle)' Shopping Ctr .. Inc. v. Idaho Power Co.. 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991) (citing State v. Hedger,
liS Idaho 598, 600. 768 P.2d 1331. 1333 ( 1989».

III. ANALYSIS

Grist asks this Court to overturn State v. Moore, 120 Idaho 743. 819 P.2d 1143 (] 991), and Stale v. Tolman. 121 Idaho 899,
828 P.2d 1304 (1992), which permit a trial court to admit evidence of uncharged sexual misconduct in child sex crime cases,
pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b ). Grist argues that Idaho courts have treated the admission of evidence pursuant to
I.R.E. 404(b) in child sex crime prosecutions differently than other cases under Rule 404{b). Grist argues that the admission
of evidence of uncharged sexual misconduct by a defendant has evolved into a blanket exception that turns on whether the
case involves allegations of sexual misconduct with a child. Grist asks this Court to hold that the admissibility of evidence
pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b) in child sex crime cases is subject to the same analysis under I.R.E. 404(b) as other cases.

We decline to overrule Moore and Tolman in their entirety. However, as these decisions have been interpreted as creating
an exception in child sex cases to the prohibition of character evidence, we find it necessary to revisit a theoretical
underpinning for the introduction of uncharged misconduct in cases involving the sexual abuse and exploitation of children.
We further clarifY that the admission of LR.E. 404(b) evidence in a child sex case is subject to the same analysis as the
admission of such evidence in any other case. Any decision from this Court or the Court of Appeals that suggests that
evidence offered in a case involving an allegation of sexual misconduct with a child should be treated differently than any
other type of case is no longer controlling authority in Idaho's courts.

Grist is not the first person to point out that Idaho courts appear to distinguish child sex crime cases from other cases for
purposes ofLR.E. 404(b). Professor Lewis notes the following in his treatise on trial practice in Idaho:

[I]n sex crime prosecutions, particularly those involving minors, the courts have used a variety of rationales to justifY the
admission of evidence of a defendant's uncharged deviant sexual misconduct, including admission on the issue of
credibility, to corroborate the victim's testimony, to show plan or intent, and on the issue of identity. Indeed, the evidence

has been held to have been properly admitted so often that it seems to constitute a special exception to the character
evidence prohibition.

D. CRAIG LEWIS, IDAHO TRIAL HANDBOOK 2D ED., § 13: I (2005) (emphasis added). Although this Court has not
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'expressly stated that there is a distinction between child sex crime cases and other cases for purposes ofI.R.E. 404(b), FNI
the Court of Appeals has *52 **1188 found that our decisions in Moore and Tolman create such a distinction. In State v.
Wood. 126 Idaho 241, 880 P.2d 771 (Ct.App.1994), the Court of Appeals stated "we understand our Supreme Court's rul ings
in Moore and Tolman to be limited in their application to sexual abuse cases where other similar incidents of sexual
misconduct by the defendant with the same or similar victims tends to corroborate a child victim's version of the charged
incident." [d. at 247. 880 P.2d at 777.

FN I. This Court acknowledged the apparently discrepant treatment of such cases in Field:

In sex crime prosecutions involving minors, the admission of uncharged deviant sexual misconduct has in many
cases been "difficult to square ... with the character evidence prohibition." D. Craig Lewis, Idaho Trial
Handbook, § 13.9 (1995). The explanation may "be found in the unstated belief that sexual deviancy is a
character trait of especially powerful probative value for predicting a defendant's behavior, and that relaxation of
the propensity evidence ban is warranted in these cases." [d.

144 Idaho at 569-70, 165 P.3d at 283-84.

A. I.R.E. 404(b) admissibility standard

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person to show action in conformity
therewith. LR.E. 404(b); Field 144 Idaho at 569, 165 P.3d at 283. This rule has its source in the common law. The common
law rule was that "the doing of a criminal act, not part of the issue, is not admissible as evidence of the doing of the criminal
act charged." See WIGMORE, CODE OF EVIDENCE, 3D ED., p. 81; see a/so, Old Chiefv. US.! 519 U.S. 172, 181-82,
I 17 S.C!. 644. 650-51. 136 L.Ed.2d 574. 588-89 (1997) (noting that Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) reflects the common
law).FN2

FN2. Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) is substantially identical to F.R.E. 404(b).

The policy underlying the common law rule was the protection of the criminal defendant. See 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE, § 5239. pp. 436-439. "The prejudicial effect of [character
evidence] is that it induces the jury to believe the accused is more likely to have committed the crime on trial because he is a
man of criminal character." Slate v. Wrenn, 99 Idaho 506, 510, 584 P.2d 123 I, 1235 (1978). Character evidence, therefore,
takes the jury away from their primary consideration ofthe guilt or innocence of the particular crime on trial. 1£1. The drafters
of I.R.E. 404(b) were careful to guard against the admission of evidence that would unduly prejudice the defendant, while
sti II allowing the prosecution to present probative evidence.

illlli Admissibility

of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts when offered for a permitted purpose is subject to a
two-tiered analysis. First, the trial court must determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish the other crime or
wrong as fact. M. CLARK, REPORT OF THE IDAHO STATE BAR EVIDENCE COMMITTEE, C 404, p. 4 (4th
Supp.1985) (citing us. v. Beechu/n. 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir.I978) (en banc), cert denied, 440 U.S. 920, 99 S.Ct. 1244, 59
L. Ed.2d 472 (1979); Us. v. O'Brien, 618 F.2d 1234, 1239 (]til Cir.1980», The trial court must also determine whether the
fact of another crime or wrong, if established, would be relevant. Jd, Evidence of uncharged misconduct must be relevant to
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·a material and disputed issue concerning the crime charged, other than propensity. Field 144 Idaho at 569. 165 P.3d at 283
(citing I.R.E. 404(b); Moore, 120 Idaho at 745,819 P.2d at 1145). Such evidence is only relevant if the jury can reasonably
conclude that the act occurred and that the defendant was the actor. Beechum. 582 F.ld at 912-13.

[4][5](6) Second, the trial court must engage in a balancing under I.R.E. 403 and determine whether the danger of unfair
prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence. M. CLARK, REPORT OF THE IDAHO STATE BAR
EVIDENCE COMMIITEE, C 404, p. 4 (4th Supp.1985); Stale v. Sheahan. 139 Idaho 267, 275, 77 P.3d 956, 964 (2003)
(citing State v. Law. 136 Idaho 721, 726, 39 P.3d 661, 666 (Ct.App.2002); State v. Cannady. 137 Idaho 67,72,44 P.3d
1122, 1127 (2002); I.R.E. 403). This balancing is committed to the discretion of the trial judge. Field. 144 Idaho at 569, 165
P.3d at 283. The trial court must determine each of these considerations of admissibility on a case-by-case basis. M.
CLARK, REPORT OF THE IDAHO STATE BAR EVIDENCE COMMIITEE, C 404, p. 4 (4th Supp.1985).

**1189 ill *53 In the instant case, the district court admitted evidence of Grist'S prior, uncharged sexual misconduct with his
ex-wife's daughter. When ruling on the admission of this evidence, the district court expressed discomfort with the status of
I.R.E. 404(b) jurisprudence in Idaho, stating:

Well, I have had the opportunity to review Moore along with a number of other cases that have addressed this issue and,
well, I'll tell [you] that I'm not really comfortable with the analysis of Moore. but I'm certain certainly I think stuck with the
state of appellate law regarding these kinds of issues.

I think that there has largely been a class of cases that have developed that are unique to sexual abuse cases. And I'm-I
think that I'm bound to follow that.

I think the evidence submitted to me by way of the offer of proof from the state is relevant to a material disputed issue in
this matter, that is, defendant's alleged conduct, and though certainly prejudicial to the defense, I believe that the probative
value would substantially outweigh the danger of that unfair prejudice.

In reaching this decision, the district court acted without benefit of our subsequent decision in Field, in which we cautioned
"there must be limits to the use of bad acts evidence to show a common scheme or plan in sexual abuse cases." 144 Idaho at
570. 165 P.3d at 284, The district court correctly observed that precedent from this Court and the Court of Appeals is
binding upon the district courts in Idaho. Slate v. Guzman. 122 Idaho 981. 986, 842 P.2d 660, 665 (1992). Although the
district court was applying controlling precedent from the appellate courts of this state, the district court did not determine
whether there was sufficient evidence to establish as fact Grist's prior uncharged sexual misconduct with A. W. nor did the
district court articulate whether the evidence was probative because it demonstrated the existence of a common scheme or
plan or because it tended to otherwise corroborate J.M.O.'s testimony.

As will be discussed in the following section, trial courts must carefully scrutinize evidence offered as "corroboration" or as
demonstrating a "common scheme or plan" in order to avoid the erroneous introduction of evidence that is merely probative
of the defendant's propensity to engage in criminal behavior. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of conviction and remand
for a new trial. We do not decide the admissibility of the evidence at issue in this case. The district court will make that
determination on remand in exerc ise of its discretion.
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.B. Corroboration

Prior to this Court's decision in State v. Byers. 102 Idaho 159, 627 P.2d 788 (198l), a defendant could not be convicted of a
sex crime unless other evidence corroborated the victim's allegations. In Bvers. we rejected the corroboration requirement in
sex crime cases. 102 Idaho at 165.627 P.2d at 793. Prior to

~

evidence of prior uncharged sexual misconduct was one

avenue of providing corroborating evidence. Moore, 120 Idaho at 745-46. 819 P.2d at 1145-46. Nevertheless, in Moore.
despite our abandonment of the corroboration requirement in prosecutions for sexual offenses, this Court held that although
corroborating evidence "is no longer mandatorily required in all sex crime cases, corroborating evidence may still be
relevant, particularly in sex crime cases involving minor victims." 120 Idaho at 746, 819 P.2d at 1146 (footnote omitted).

We explained this conclusion as follows: "Corroborative evidence in sex crime cases involving youthful victims is often
times necessary to establish the credibility of a young child. Too often the determination of the case rests strictly upon
establishing that the victim's testimony is more credible than that of the alleged perpetrator." 14

rn In this case, the State argues that Grist's prior acts of uncharged sexual misconduct corroborate J.M.O.'s testimony. This
is a legitimate argument under Moore and its progeny. However, we wish to emphasize that evidence offered for the purpose
of "corroboration" must actually serve that purpose; the courts of this state must not permit the introduction of impermissible
propensity evidence merely by relabeling it as ** 1190 *54 "corroborative" or as evidence of a "common scheme or plan."

The verb "corroborate" is defined as follows:

To strengthen; to add weight or credibility to a thing by additional and confirming facts or evidence. The testimony of a
witness is said to be corroborated when it is shown to correspond with the representation of some other witnesses, or to
comport with some facts otherwise known or established.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 31 I (5th ed.l979).

L2l Although we can envision instances in which evidence of uncharged misconduct will tend to reinforce the credibility of a
witness without reliance on the impermissible theory of the defendant's propensity to engage in such misconduct, we will not
attempt to identifY all circumstances in which such evidence properly may be admitted. Rather, we will identifY the instance
in which such evidence may not be admitted: Evidence of uncharged misconduct may not be admitted pursuant to I.R.E.
404(b) when its probative value is entirely dependent upon its tendency to demonstrate the defendant's propensity to engage
in such behavior.

Moore demonstrates the impermissible reasoning of which we warn. In Moore, this Court attempted to explain the manner in
which uncharged misconduct may serve as corroboration, quoting from a UCLA law review article:

[A]dmission of corroborative evidence serves the dual purpose of reducing the probability that the prosecuting witness
is lying, while at the same time increasing the probability that the defendant committed the crime.

Other Sex Offenses, 25 UCLA L.Rev. 261,286 (1977).
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In our view, the theoretical tmderpinning of the admissibility of uncharged misconduct for purposes of "corroboration" as
articulated in Moore is indistinguishable from admitting such evidence based upon the accused's propensity to engage in such
behavior based upon his or her past behavior. Although we have consistently stated that use of character evidence to
demonstrate a propensity to commit crime is impermissible, see, e.g. State

1'.

Yakovac. 145 Idaho 437. 445, 180 P.3d 476,

484 (2008), our explanation in Moore could have just as easily been stated as follows: "If the defendant has committed
another sex offense, it is more probable that he- committed the offense for which he is charged, thus reducing the probability
that the prosecuting witness is lying, while at the same time increasing the probability that the defendant committed the
crime." The tmstated premise in Moore is simply this: "If he did it before, he probably did it this time as well." This
complete reliance upon propensity is not a permissible basis for the admission of evidence oftmcharged misconduct.

We do not overrule Moore in its entirety. Moore correctly states: "Where relevant to the credibility of the parties, evidence
of a common criminal design is admissible." 120 Idaho at 746, 819 P.2d at 1146. This statement is consistent with I.R.E.
404(b)'s recognition that evidence may be admissible for certain purposes, including "preparation, plan, knowledge, [and]
identity," which purposes are most frequently grouped together tmder the rubric of "common scheme or plan." In Tolman, we
cautioned against an expansive interpretation of "common scheme or plan," stating: "We do not suggest today that any and all
evidence of prior sexual misconduct is admissible in sex crime cases merely by placing it tmder the rubric of corroborative
evidence of a common scheme or plan." 121 Idaho at 90S, 828 P.2d at 1310. In Field we again cautioned "there must be
limits to the use of bad acts evidence to show a common scheme or plan in sexual abuse cases." 144 Idaho at 570, 165 P.3d
at 284.

Although we have not done so recently, subsequent to our adoption of the Idaho Rules of Evidence in 1985, we provided
guidance as to when evidence of other bad acts may properly be admitted. In State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742, 810 P.2d 680

.L!.2W,

overruled on other grounds by State v. Card 121 Idaho 425, 825 P.2d 1081 (1991 ), we stated that such evidence

may be admissible "if relevant to prove ... a common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes so

related to each other that *55 **1191 proof of one tends to establish the other, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident." {d. at 750-S1, 810 P.2d 680,688-89 (1991) (emphasis added) (citing I.R.E. 404(b); State v. Wrenn. 99 Idaho
506,584 P.2d 1231 (I 978); State v. Walker. 109 Idaho 3S6, 707 P.2d 467 (Ct.App.1985)), FN3 We once again caution the
trial comts of this state that they must carefully examine evidence offered for the purpose of demonstrating the existence of a
common scheme or plan in order to the determine whether the requisite relationship exists,

FN3. The statement in Pizzuto identifYing the permissible use of evidence of tmcharged misconduct was first
articulated prior our adoption of the Idaho Rules of Evidence. However, the adoption of I.R.E. 404(b) was not
expected or intended to change existing Idaho law. M. CLARK, REPORT OF THE IDAHO STATE BAR
EVIDENCE COMMITTEE, C 404, p. 4 (4th Supp.198S).

Idaho Rule of Evidence 101(b) provides that the Idaho Rules of Evidence "govern all actions, cases and proceedings in the
courts of the State of Idaho." In our view, there is no principled basis for relaxing application of these rules to facilitate
prosecution of a single class of criminal offenses. We continue to recognize that, in appropriate cases, evidence of uncharged
misconduct may be probative as reflecting a common scheme or plan or to otherwise corroborate the testimony ofa witness.
However, the scope of evidence that may properly be admitted pursuant to I.R.E 404(b) is no greater in sex crime cases than
it is for any other type of case. The trial courts of this state must carefully scrutinize evidence offered under I.R.E. 404(b) for

ofl2
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.purposes of "corroboration" as demonstrating a "common scheme or plan" in order to determine whether such evidence
actually serves the articulated purpose or whether such evidence is merely propensity evidence served LIp under a different
name.

As the district court determined that the proffered evidence was governed by a body oflaw unique to sexual abuse cases, we
vacate the judgment and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

IV. CONCLUSION

Il.QJ

We clariJY that the Idaho Rules of Evidence require that trial courts treat the admission of evidence of uncharged

misconduct in child sex crime cases no differently than the admission of such evidence in other cases. Accordingly, we
vacate the judgment of conviction and remand for further proceedings and a new trial consistent with this opinion.

Chief Justice EISMANN, Justices BURDICK and J. JONES concur. W. JONES, J. specially concurring:
I concur with the majority opinion; however, I write separately because I fail to see the clariJYing picture that the majority
seeks to paint.

I completely agree that "complete reliance upon propensity [evidence] is not a permissible basis for the admission of
evidence of uncharged misconduct." But, I disagree that this Court's opinion in State v. Moore requires any clarification.
This Court in Moore clearly stated that I.R.E. 404(b) does not allow for the admission of "[o]ther crimes, wrongs or acts"
unless the evidence is offered for another purpose such as, "proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." State v. Moore, 120 Idaho 743. 745 n. 2. 819 P.2d 1143. 1145 n. 2

Ll2W; LR.E. 404(b). A very clear test was outlined in Moore:

A two-tiered analysis is used to determine the admissibility of evidence concerning uncharged misconduct. First, the
evidence must be relevant to a material and disputed issue concerning the crime charged. Second, the court must determine
whether the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant [pursuant to
I.R.E.403].

Stale v. Moore. 120 Idaho 743.745.819 P.2d 1143.1145 (1991). Therefore, the trial court is to engage in three steps: (I)
whether the evidence of another crime, wrong or act is being offered for a purpose other than to prove acting in conformity
therewith; (2) whether the evidence is relevant to a material*56 **1192 and disputed issue; FN-I and (3) whether the
probative value of the evidence is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. In Moore, the court did in fact engage in
such an analysis: (I) Moore had been accused of prior sexual misconduct by abusing other young females and it was being
offered to show a common scheme or plan to sexually exploit an identifiable group in an identifiable manner; (2) the
evidence was relevant because it corroborated the victim's story and the defendant had called the victim's credibility into
question; and (3) the probative value of offering the testimony outweighed any danger of unfair prejudice. FN5

FN4. In Moore, the Court found the evidence relevant because the defendant was contesting the victim's credibility.
The Court found that corroboration evidence that verifies the victim's story as relevant because of the degree of
corroboration. That is, the other crimes showed the defendant exploits "young female children living within his

"fl,)
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household." Moore, 120 Idaho at 745,819 P.2d at 1145.

FN5. As noted in the dissenting opinion, the majority in Moore only did a conclusory analysis of whether the
probative value of the evidence outweighs any danger of unfair prejudice. In most cases the probative value will be
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice; a court must engage in some form of analysis of how the probative
value outweighs the prejudice.

This Court has also cautioned against an overly broad reading or interpretation of the principles of I.R.E. 404(b) in relation
to child sex abuse cases. "We do not suggest today that any and all evidence of prior sexual misconduct is admissible in sex
crime cases merely by placing it under the rubric of corroborative evidence of a common scheme or plan." State v. To/man.
121 Idaho 899, 905, 828 P.2d 1304, 1310 (1992). The Court of Appeals heeded that cautionary statement and interpreted

Moore and Tolman "to be limited in their application to sexual abuse cases where other similar incidents of sexual
misconduct by the defendant with the same or similar victims tends to corroborate a child victim's version of the charged
incident." State v. Wood. 126 Idaho 241,247. 880 P.2d 771. 777 (Ct.App. 1994), This interpretation was made in error. The
evidence would be admissible under the test in any circumstance where evidence of other crimes, acts or wrongs is being
offered for a purpose other than to prove acting in conformity therewith. In instances of sexual abuse cases the court must
engage in the same analysis pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b) and I.R.E. 403. Therefore, I concur with the majority's conclusion that
"trial courts [must] treat the admission of evidence of uncharged misconduct in child sex crime cases no differently than the
admission of such evidence in [any] other case[ ]."

Idaho,2009.
State v. Grist
147 Idaho 49, 205 P.3d I 185

END OF DOCUMENT
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
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v.
James Zane PARMER, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 33721.
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Review Denied May 5, 2009.

Background: Defendant was convicted in a jury trial in the District Court, Fourth Judicial District, Ada County, .lQ.dJ2.
Horton, J., of lewd conduct with a minor child under 16. Defendant appealed.

Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Perry, J., held that:
ill district court made requisite findings on other crimes, wrongs, or acts evidence so as to support admission, and
(2} testimonial evidence from witnesses regarding inappropriate sexual contact by defendant with them in course of massage
was relevant.
Affirmed.

Gutierreb J., dissented.
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. II Ok369.1 Most Cited Cases

ill Criminal Law €=>369.2(1)
II0k369.2(I) Most Cited Cases
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove a defendant's criminal propensity; however, such
evidence may be admissible for other purposes. Rules of Evid" Rule 404(b).

ill Criminal Law €=> 1158.11
IIOk1158.11 Most Cited Cases
Appellate court will treat the trial court's factual determination that a prior bad act has been established by sufficient
evidence as it does all factual findings by a trial court; it defers to a trial court's factual findings if supported by substantial
and competent evidence in the record.

lJl Criminal Law €=> 1134.49(6)
I lOki 134.49(6) Most Cited Cases
Whether evidence is relevant is an issue of law; therefore, when considering admission of evidence of prior bad acts,
appellate court exercises free review of the trial court's relevancy determination.

til Criminal Law €=> 1147
1 10k 1147 Most Cited Cases
When a trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to
determine: (I) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted
within the botmdaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before
it; and (3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.

1£ Criminal Law €=>374
I I0k374 Most Cited Cases
(Formerly I IOk695.5)
In considering the admissibility of other crimes, wrongs, or acts evidence, a trial court must determine that there is sufficient
evidence to support a reasonable conclusion that the act occurred and that the defendant was the actor; and a trial court must
articulate a separate finding that sufficient evidence exists to support a reasonable conclusion that the act occurred. Rules of
Evid., Rule 404(b) .

.w Criminal Law ~374
I I0k374 Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 110k695.5)
District court made requisite findings on other crimes, wrongs, or acts evidence so as to support admission in prosecution for
lewd conduct with minor child tmder 16; court made finding that there was adequate showing that defendant committed prior
bad acts of engaging in inappropriate sexual contact tmder guise of legitimate massage techniques, court articulated purpose,
other than propensity, for admission of evidence, to show common scheme or plan, absence of mistake or accident, and
intent, and court fotmd that probative value was not substantially outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice because any
prejudicial effect could be cured by limiting instruction. Rules ofEvid .. Rule 404(b).
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~1030(1)

IIOkl 030( 1) Most Cited Cases
Appellate court will not address an issue not preserved for appeal by an objection in the trial court; however, it may
consider fundamental error in a criminal case, even though no objection was made at trial.

ill Criminal Law ~1036_J(8)
II Okl 036.1 (8) Most Cited Cases
Defendant failed to preserve for appellate review claim regarding any variances between actual testimony of some of other
bad acts witnesses and content of their testimony alleged in state's notice of intent, where no contemporaneous objection was
raised by trial cOlUlsel at time that any deviations became apparent in testimony. Rules ofEvid .. Rule 404(b) .

.I..2l Criminal Law ~374
11Ok374 Most Cited Cases
It is not the district court's burden to sua sponte strike the testimony when any variances between the actual testimony of some
of the other bad acts

witnesses and the content of their testimony alleged in the state's notice of intent become apparent; rather, the trial court must
strike the testimony in response to objections raised by opposing counsel that such testimony varied from the offer of proof
upon which the district court previously relied in its other bad acts admissibility determination. Rules of Eyid .. Rule 404(b).

illl Criminal Law €:;:;:::;>371 (9)
II0k371(9) Most Cited Cases
Testimonial evidence from witnesses regarding inappropriate sexual contact by defendant with them in course of massage
was relevant to show that his contact with victim was not by accident or mistake and that he had requisite intent to sexually
gratifY either victim or himself. Rules ofEvid., Rule 404(b).

ll1l Criminal Law ~371 (9)
110k371(9) Most Cited Cases
prostitution,
Testimony of prior bad acts witnesses in trial for lewd conduct with minor under 16 years of age was not rendered irrelevant
for purpose of showing absence of mistake or accident by fact they were allegedly assaulted by defendant as adults.

I.J1l Criminal Law ~l036.1(8)
110kI036.1(8) Most Cited Cases
Defendant failed to preserve for appellate review claim regarding consensual nature of some of contact during course of
massage testified to by two witnesses in prosecution for lewd conduct with minor child under 16 which also occurred during
massage by defendant; one witness was subject of state's second motion in limine prior to retrial, at hearing on motion, trial
counsel made no objection to, nor any mention of, witness' testimony being inadmissible because it related to consensual
activity, and, during witness' testimony during retrial, no objection was made when testimony was elicited regarding these
encounters.

1..Ul Criminal Law ~1043(1)
1 10k 10430) Most Cited Cases
When a trial court unqualifiedly rules on the admissibility or inadmissibility of evidence prior to trial, no further objection at
trial is required in order to preserve the issue for appeal.
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1!.:!l Criminal Law ~I030(1)
II Ok I 030( I) Most Cited Cases
Appellate court will not address an issue not preserved for appeal by an objection in the trial court.

Uil Criminal Law ~369.2(5)
110k369.2(5) Most Cited Cases

Uil Criminal Law <£:;=>673(5)
IIOk673(5) Most Cited Cases
Testimonial evidence from witnesses regarding inappropriate sexual contact by defendant with them in course of massage
was not substantially outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or waste of time in prosecution for
lewd conduct with minor child under 16 which also occurred during massage by defendant; district court's findings
demonstrated its conscious regard that such evidence inherently ran risk of becoming improper propensity evidence, court
found that limiting instruction hel ped to ensure that jury considered evidence only for its proper purposes, and district court
reiterated instruction again at conclusion of trial. Rules ofEvid., Rules 403, 404(b).

l.!M Criminal Law ~1130(5)
1 lOki 130(5) Most Cited Cases
Defendant waived for appellate review claim that district court abused its discretion by refusing trial counsel's request for
additional time to prepare for two witnesses added prior to retrial; no argument was made or authority presented supporting
proposition that nearly one month of time was inadequate for defense counsel to prepare for testimony of two additional
witnesses.

1111 Criminal Law C:;::::>1130(5)
1 1OkI130(5) Most Cited Cases
A party waives an issue on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking.

J.!!J. Criminal Law C:;::::>665(3)
I IOk665(3) Most Cited Cases
Allowing one of two additional witnesses to testifY at retrial after witness had attended portions of first trial did not violate
district court's exclusionary order entered before first trial prohibiting all prospective witnesses from being present in
courtroom or otherwise receiving any information pertaining to testimony of other witnesses; witness who was source of
allegation of error was not included as potential witness in first trial, thus witness was not subject to district court's
exclusionary order and order was not violated by witness' presence at that proceeding.

.l.!.2J. Criminal Law ~1036.1(9)
I lOki 036. 1(9) Most Cited Cases
Defendant failed to preserve for appellate review claim that district court abused its discretion by sustaining state's hearsay
objection to testimony concerning statements he made during police interrogation or publishing of recording to jury; at
hearing on state's motion in limine prior to defendant's retrial, district court ruled that evidence of defendant's statements
would not be admissible by defense, defense counsel made no specific objection at that time, only argument raised by trial
counsel as to admissibility of statements concerned rule governing admission by party-opponent hearsay exception, and
district court properly denied admission of statements on this basis, and no other argument was made by trial counsel
regarding rule governing remainder of or related writings or recorded statements or rule governing prior statement by
witness hearsay exception. Rules ofEvid., Rules 106, 80 I (d)( I, 2).
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JlQl Criminal Law ~1036.1(9)
IIOkl 036.1(9) Most Cited Cases
Error, if any, by district court sustaining state's hearsay objection to testimony concerning statements defendant made during
police interrogation or publishing of recording to jury, was not fundamental error as defendant testified at trial and had
adequate opportunity to explain or put statements in proper context.
**189 Jones & Swartz, PLLC, Boise, for appellant. Darwin Overson argued.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued.

PERRY, Judge.

*213 James Zane Parmer appeals from his judgment of conviction for lewd conduct with a minor child under sixteen. For the
reasons set forth below, we affirm.

I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURE
Parmer provided massage services to K.R., a fourteen-year-old female, to treat her for migraine headaches and leg pain.
K.R. reported that, at one session, Parmer was using a vibrating device to relieve tension in the muscles of her inner thigh
when he placed the device in a position to cause her sexual arousal. Additionally, she reported that Parmer had also engaged
in manual-genital contact. Parmer was arrested and charged with lewd conduct with a minor child under sixteen. I.e. §
18-1508.

The state filed a notice of intent, pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b), to use evidence in the form of testimony from eight witnesses
regarding similar inappropriate sexual touching during massages provided by Parmer. The state then filed a motion in limine
for the district court to rule on the admissibility of the witnesses' testimony under I.R.E. 403 and 404Cb). After a hearing, the
district court held that the testimony of seven of the eight witnesses would be admissible for the purposes of showing a
common scheme or plan, intent, or absence of mistake or accident and that any prejudicial effect of such testimony could be
cured by a limiting jury instruction. Six of the witnesses testified at Parmer's trial. Counsel for Parmer also attempted to
elicit testimony from a police officer regarding statements that Parmer made during an interrogation, and the district court
sustained the state's hearsay objection. The trial resulted in a hungjury.

In preparation for Parmer's retrial, the state then filed another notice of intent to use Rule 404(b) evidence in the form of
testimony from two additional witnesses regarding inappropriate sexual contact by Parmer with them in the course of a
massage. A second motion in limine was filed and after a hearing, the district court ruled that the testimony would be
admissible on the same grounds as the six witnesses who testified at the first trial. Additionally, the district court held that
counsel for Parmer could not make any reference to nor publish the recording of statements made by Parmer during a police
interrogation because the statements were hearsay. The district court had previously sustained the state's hearsay objection to
these statements in the first trial.

**]90 *214 At the retrial, testimony was presented from the eight witnesses. The jury found Parmer guilty, and the district
court sentenced him to a unified term of twenty years, with a minimum period of confinement of seven years. Parmer appeals,
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• challenging the district court's orders granting the state's motions in limine as to the Rule 404(b) witnesses and prohibiting
Parmer's counsel from presenting any evidence of Parmer's statements during the police interrogation.

n.
ANALYSIS
A. Rule 404(b) Evidence

Parmer raises several issues concerning the admission of testimony regarding his prior bad acts. First, Parmer alleges that
the district court abused its discretion by determining that the Rule 404(b) witnesses could testifY based only on the state's
offer of proof to the court concerning the subject matter of the proposed witnesses' testimony. Second, Parmer alleges that the
Rule 404(b) evidence was irrelevant. Third, he alleges that the prejudicial effect of the testimony of eight prior bad acts
witnesses substantially outweighed any probative value of the evidence. Fourth, he alleges that the district court abused its
discretion by refusing trial counsel's request for additional time to prepare for the two Rule 404(b) witnesses added prior to
the retrial. Lastly, he alleges that the district court abused its discretion by allowing one of the two additional Rule 404(b)
witnesses to testifY at the retrial after that witness had attended portions of the first trial.

[1][2](3] Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove a defendant's criminal propensity. L.R£.,
404(b); State v. Needs. 99 Idaho 883, 892, 591 P.2d 130, 139 (1979); State v. Winkler, 112 Idaho 917, 919, 736 P.2d 1371.
1373 (Ct.App.1987). However, such evidence may be admissible for a purpose other than that prohibited by I.R.E. 404(b).
Stale v. Avila, 137 Idaho 410, 412, 49 PJd 1260,1262 (Ct.App.2002). In determining the admissibility of evidence of prior
bad acts, the Supreme Court has utilized a two-tiered analysis. The first tier involves a two-part inquiry: (I) whether there is
sufficient evidence to establish the prior bad acts as fact; and (2) whether the prior bad acts are relevant to a material
disputed issue concerning the crime charged, other than propensity. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49,52,205 P.3d t 185, 1188
(2009). We will treat the trial court's factual determination that a prior bad act has been established by sufficient evidence as
we do all factual findings by a trial court. We defer to a trial court's factual findings if supported by substantial and
competent evidence in the record. State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 789, 948 P.2d 127, 144 (1997). Whether evidence is
relevant is an issue of law. State v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816, 819, 864 P.2d 654, 657 (Ct.App.1993). Therefore, when
considering admission of evidence of prior bad acts, we exercise free review of the trial court's relevancy determination. Id
The second tier in the analysis is the determination of whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially
outweighed by unfair prejudice. Grist, 147 Idaho at 52, 205 P.3d at 1188. When reviewing this tier we use an abuse of
discretion standard. Id.

[:ll When a trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to
determine: (I) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted
within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before
it; and (3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Hedger. 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768
P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989).

l. State's offer of proof

Parmer alleges that the district court abused its discretion by determining that the Rule 404{b) witnesses could testify based
only on the state's offer of proof to the court concerning the content of the proposed witnesses' testimony. He argues that there
must be a factual predicate established on the record before a ruling on admissibility is made. Furthermore, he argues that,
even if the district court correctly relied on the *215 **191 state's offer of proof, the district court erred by failing to strike
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.portions of witness testimony which varied from the alleged testimony purported in the offer of proof The state responds that
this issue was not preserved for appeal by timely objection, it is unsupported by legal authority, or that it is an incorrect
statement of the law because the very purpose of the offer of proof is to enable the district court to rule on the admissibility
of proffered evidence.

Recently, the Supreme Court in Grist, reviewed a district court's admission of Rule 404(b) evidence in a trial for lewd
conduct with a minor under sixteen. In that case, the district court found:
"I think the evidence submitted to me by way of the offer of proof from the state is relevant to a material disputed
issue in this matter, that is, defendant's alleged conduct, and though certainly prejudicial to the defense, I believe
that the probative value would substantially outweigh the danger of unfair prejudice."

Grist, 147 Idaho at 53, 205 P.3d at 1189. The Supreme Court held that the district court did not make a proper
determination as to whether there was sufficient evidence to establish the prior bad acts as fact but did not specifically
identi1)t a proper method for establishing prior bad acts as fact. The quoted language from the district court in that case
referred to a reliance on an offer of proof concerning the proffered testimony. However, the Supreme Court did not condemn
the reliance on an offer of proof in the initial presentation of the testimony to be elicited at trial for purposes ofa Rule 404(b)
determination. In that case, the district court failed to make such a finding at all and, instead, ruled only on the relevance and
the balancing of the prejudicial effect and probative value.

ru Reliance on an oral or written offer of proof in determining the admissibility of Rule 404(b) evidence is one way that a
district court can make the requisite initial finding that a prior bad act is established as fact. A trial court may also rely on
affidavits, stipulations by the parties, live testimony, or may hold more extensive evidentiary hearings for each witness in
advance of trial. In any event, the Supreme Court has held that these considerations of admissibility must be made on a
case-by-case basis by the trial court. Ttl. at 52, 205 P.3d at 1188. The Supreme Court has not articulated what standard of
proof is required for the trial court to factually establish the prior bad acts. However, the Court did hold that such evidence
would only be relevant if the jury could reasonably conclude that the act occurred and that the defendant was the actor. /d. at

52, 205 P.3d at 1188. It would be illogical to place a higher burden on the trial court's preliminary analysis of the
admissibility of the proffered evidence under Rule 404(b). Therefore, in considering the admissibility of evidence under
Rule 404(b), a trial court must determine that there is sufficient evidence to support a reasonable conclusion that the act
occurred and that the defendant was the actor. The holding of Grist also disfavors an implied acceptance that sufficient
evidence exists to establish a prior bad act as fact by mere virtue of the trial court's determination of the probative value of
the evidence. Rather, a trial court must articulate a separate finding that sufficient evidence exists to support a reasonable
conclusion that the act occurred.

Wlln this case, the state filed a notice of intent to use Rule 404(b) evidence before each trial in which it identified the
potential witnesses and to what each would testi1)t. The district court then held a hearing at which time counsel for both
parties had an opportunity to argue the content of the witnesses' testimony, the relevance, and the prejudicial effect. Based on
the information contained in the state's notice of intent as well as the argument heard at both hearings, the district court ruled
on the admissibility of the evidence. The district court was acting without the benefit of the Grist opinion which, as we have
noted above, requires a trial court to articulate a separate factual finding that sufficient evidence exists to support a
reasonable conclusion that the act occurred. Nevertheless, we conclude that the district court made the required findings in
this case. Following argument at the hearing on the state's motion in limine prior to the first trial, the district court, after *216

* * 192 excluding the testimony of one witness that did not pass Rule 404(b) muster,

found:

As to the remainder of the testimony--that is, the testimony of [the seven remaining witnesses]--l am satisfied that, based
upon the State's offer that there's more than adequate showing that, under the guise of whether it was characterized as a
massage or physical therapy, that the defendant is engaging in otherwise legitimate contact with the apparent purpose of
engaging in inappropriate sexual contact.
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I am satisfied, based upon the showing, that the testimony of those individuals is admissible under [404] for purposes of
showing a common scheme or plan, or absence of mistake, or absence of accident. And significantly, I find that it would be
relevant as to the requisite intent to gratifY the sexual desires of either the purported victim or of the accused.
My requirement then is to step to the 403 analysis. The danger of the 403 concern that I have is the propensity concern, of
course, the very real concern is that a jury might hear such evidence and take the inappropriate logical step of: Well, ifhe
did it before, then he did it in this instance.
However, I am satisfied that those concerns about inappropriate use of the evidence for propensity purposes can be
addressed by a limiting instruction instructing the jury that the testimony of [the seven witnesses] is only admissible for the
Iimited purposes of showing a common scheme or plan, absence of mistake or accident, or the requisite intent.

First, the district court made the required finding that there was an adequate showing that Parmer had committed the prior
bad acts of engaging in inappropriate sexual contact under the guise of legitimate massage techniques. Second, the district
court articulated the purpose, other than propensity, for admission of the evidence--to show common scheme or plan, absence
of mistake or accident, and intent. Thus, the district court satisfied the two steps of the first tier in the Rule 404(b)
admissibility analysis. Next, the district court satisfied the second tier of the analysis by finding that the probative value was
not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice because any prejudicial effect could be cured by a limiting
instruction.

At the hearing on the state's motion in limine prior to the second trial, the district court also made the requisite findings
relative to the two additional Rule 404(b) witnesses.
As to the offer of [the two additional witnesses'] testimony, I am satisfied that this evidence is probative. There is a danger
of unfair prejudice, but I think that unlike a sexual relationship with a minor child, that this testimony is capable of being
addressed by means of the limiting instruction of the form that was given to the jury as it related to the six 404(8)
witnesses in the first case.
As to the probative value, I am satisfied that allegations by these individuals, if bel ieved by a trier of fact that the
defendant engaged in inappropriate sexual contact in the context of physical therapy, is relevant to those issues that I
previously admitted .... in terms of demonstrating motive, opportunity, intent or absence of mistake or accident.
Again, the district court was acting without the benefit of the Supreme Court's recent holding in Grist which disfavors the
implied acceptance that sufficient evidence exists to establish a prior bad act as fact by mere virtue of the trial court's
determination of the probative value of the evidence. However, while the quoted language may appear to make the
disfavored implication, we conclude that the district court adequately made the requisite factual findings in this case, unlike
the district court in Grist.

First, the district court satisfied the first tier of the analysis in finding that the testimony, if believed by the jury, demonstrated
that Parmer engaged in inappropriate sexual contact. The district court then referenced the proper purposes, other than
propensity, to be served by the admission of the Rule 404(b) evidence--namely, motive, opportunity, intent, or absence of
mistake or accident. Second, the district court again satisfied the second tier of the analysis by weighing the probative value
versus the danger of unfair *217 **193 prejudice and determining that any danger of unfair prejudice could be mitigated by a
1i miting instruction.

Parmer contends, in effect, that the district court should have held a mini-trial for each witness to determine whether Parmer
was, in fact, guilty of such offense based on a prescribed standard of proof. This option was available to the district court if
it was not satisfied through other methods that sufficient evidence existed to establish the prior bad acts as fact. However, the
district court was satisfied by the state's offer of proof and the argument presented at the hearings on the state's motions in
Iimine that such evidence existed to support a reasonable conclusion that the acts occurred. To require the district court to
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. conduct further intensive inquiry when the evidence presented had already sufficiently met the court's satisfaction would be
an unnecessary waste of judicial time and resources. The required factual predicate can be adequately met initially by
representations of counsel in the offer of proof Thereafter, if the actual testimony of the witness fails to comport with the
standards of the Rules of Evidence and with the content upon which the district court made its admissibility determination,
the district court may instruct the jury to disregard all or any part of the witness' testimony.

IlJIBl Parmer points to several variances between the actual testimony of some of the Rule 404(b) witnesses and the content
of their testimony alleged in the state's notice ofintent. However, no contemporaneous objection was raised by trial counsel
at the time that any deviations became apparent in the testimony. This Court will not address an issue not preserved for
appeal by an objection in the trial court. Slale v. Rozajewski, 130 Idaho 644. 645. 945 P.2d 1390. 1391 (Ct.App.1997).
However, we may consider fundamental error in a criminal case, even though no objection was made at trial. fcl
Fundamental error has been defined as error which goes to the foundation or basis of a defendant's rights, goes to the
foundation of the case or takes from the defendant a right which was essential to his or her defense and which no court could
or ought to permit to be waived. State v. Babb, 125 Idaho 934, 940, 877 P.2d 905, 911 (1994).

f2l

This Court has held, regarding an allegation of prosecutorial misconduct, that an error only rises to the level of

fimdarnental error if it is "so egregious or inflammatory that any ensuing prejudice could not have been remedied by a
curative jury instruction." State v. Timmons. 145 Idaho 279. 287. 178 PJd 644. 652 (Ct.App.200n In this case, had trial
counsel objected to the testimonial variances and a curative instruction been given by the district court, any alleged prejudice
could have been averted. Parmer argues that the district court, in its gatekeeper function, should have struck any testimony
that varied from the offer of proof when such variances became apparent. However, the United States Supreme Court has
held, regarding evidence which is preliminarily admitted conditional to the proving ofa fact at trial:
Often the trial court may decide to allow the proponent to introduce evidence concerning a similar act, and at a later point
in the trial assess whether sufficient evidence has been offered to permit the jury to make the requisite finding. If the
proponent has failed to meet this minimal standard of proof, the trial court must instruct the jury to disregard the evidence.
Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 690, 108 S.Ct. 1496, 150 I, 99 L.Ed.2d 771, 782 (1988) (footnote omitted). The
Court then clarified that it is "not the responsibility of the judge sua sponte to insure that the foundation evidence is offered;
the objector must move to strike the evidence if at the close of the trial the offeror has failed to satisfY the condition." Id. at n.

L. quoting 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5054 (1977). Thus, it was not
the district court's burden to sua sponte strike the testimony when any variances became apparent. Rather, the trial court must
strike the testimony in response to objections raised by opposing counsel that such testimony varied from the offer of proof
upon which the district court previously relied in its Rule 404(b) admissibility determination.

Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the Rule *218 ** 194 404(b) witnesses could
testilY based only on the state's offer of proof to the court concerning the content of the proposed witnesses' testimony.
Furthermore, we conclude that the district court was not required to sua sponte strike portions of testimony that varied from
the state's offer of proof and that any error caused by the variances in testimony was not properly preserved for appeal and
does not rise to the level of fundamental error.

2. Relevance of Rule 404(b) evidence

LL.Ql Parmer argues that the district court erred by determining that the Rule 404(b) evidence was relevant for the purpose of
showing a common scheme or plan, intent, and absence of mistake or accident. He contends that the prior bad acts were too
dissimilar to the present offense to be admissible for that purpose. Specifically, Parmer contends that all but one of the
witnesses was allegedly victimized as an adult and the method of each alleged assault varied from case to case, including

.... f ' I L
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• some consensual encounters. Additionally, Parmer argues that absence of mistake or accident was not at issue until after he
testitied and therefore, it was error to allow the state to present this evidence in its case-in-chief.

The state responds that the evidence was relevant to show a common scheme that, during the course of therapeutic massages,
Parmer would sexually assault female victims. Therefore, this evidence made it more probable that Parmer possessed the
required sexual intent when he allegedly inappropriately touched K.R. and the touching was not a result of accident or
mistake. The state further argues that age differences and variances in the manner by which Parmer inappropriately touched
his victims do not make the evidence irrelevant. As to any consensual encounters, the state responds that they were initiated

by Parmer during the course of a therapeutic massage and, therefore, are still relevant to show that he possessed the requisite
state of mind when he committed the alleged acts in this case.

liU As

stated above, we exercise free review over a district court's relevancy determination. Atkinson, 124 Idaho at 819,

864 P.2d at 657. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that age differences between adult and child victims at the time of a
sexual battery does not render the evidence of prior bad acts irrelevant. State v. Cardell. \32 Idaho 217,220, 970 P.2d 10,
13 () 998). The facts of Cardell are nearly indistinguishable from this case. Cardell was a masseuse who was accused of
committing a sexual battery on a sixteen-year-old client. The district court in that case allowed testimony from other former
clients of Cardell who testified to similar inappropriate touching during massages given to them. On appeal, Cardell argued
that the prior bad acts witnesses were all adults at the time that he allegedly committed a battery upon them and, therefore,
their testimony was irrelevant in a prosecution for sexual battery ofa minor. The Supreme Court held:
The testimony of the adult massage clients was relevant to whether Cardell's touching of R.S.'s vaginal area was
accidental. These women were asked at trial whether they believed that the touching of their vaginal areas by Cardell was
accidental. The adult clients testified that they did not believe the touching was accidental during their massages. This
testimony was relevant under I.R.E. 404(b) because it tends to show that any touching of R.S.'s vaginal area by Cardell
during massage therapy was not a mistake or accident, since other clients testified to similar touching.
Cardell argues that the testimony does not fit within the exceptions in I.R.E. 404(b) because the testimony was not from
women in the same age category as R.S. Although these women were older than R.S., their testimony was of events during
a massage given by Cardell which was similar to the testimony ofR.S. The age difference between the victim R.S. and the
adult massage clients does not render the adults' testimony regarding absence of mistake or accident irrelevant.
{d. Therefore, the testimony of prior bad acts witnesses in a trial for lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen years of age is
not rendered irrelevant for the purpose of showing absence of mistake or accident by the fact *219 **195 they were
allegedly assaulted by Parmer as adults.

Parmer additionally argues that the variances in the manner by which the Rule 404(b) witnesses were assaulted render their
testimony irrelevant in the present case. In the context of showing a common plan or scheme, the Supreme Court in Grist
cautioned that trial courts must carefully examine evidence to determine whether the charged conduct and the prior bad acts
are so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the other, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident. Grist, 147 Idaho at 54-55, 205 P.3d at 1190-91. Such careful examination for the requisite factual similarities is
not just limited to cases where Rule 404(b) evidence is offered to show a common scheme or plan, but must be conducted
when evidence is offered for any purpose under Rule 404(b). This ensures that the evidence actually serves the purpose for
which it is offered.

During the hearing on the state's motion in limine prior to the first trial, [FN 1] the district court found the testimony to be
relevant:

FN I. The district court employed similar reasoning in its analysis of the admissibility of the two additional Rule

I
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404(b) witnesses who were allowed to testifY at the retrial.

I am satisfied that, based on the State's offer that there's more than adequate showing that, under the guise of whether it was
characterized as a massage or physical therapy, that the defendant is engaging in otherwise legitimate contact with the
apparent purpose of engaging in inappropriate sexual contact.
The manner of offensive touching among the Rule 404(b) witnesses varied from kissing, digital-genital and oral-genital
contact, other touching of the breast and genital areas, as well as Parmer stimulating himself by rubbing or pressing his groin
against a victim's body. Parmer's argument that the evidence of alleged inappropriate touching in this case is irrelevant
because it was not accomplished through exactly the same manner is lUlpersuasive. It makes no difference that K.R. alleged in
this case that Parmer used a massage tool to sexually arouse her and that he digitally penetrated her. Even if, as Parmer
contends, the prior bad acts are too factually or temporally remote to show a common plan or scheme to victimize massage
clients, the prior misconduct can still be indicative of an absence of accident or mistake or of Parmer's intent to sexually
gratifY himself or others through inappropriate sexual touching lUlder the guise of proper massage techniques. The evidence
was relevant, as fOlUld by the district court, to show that Parmer's contact with K.R. was not by accident or mistake and that
he had the requisite intent to sexually gratifY either K.R. or himself.

Parmer attempts to distinguish Cardell from this case. Parmer argues that, in Cardell. the testimony of prior bad acts was
only allowed in rebuttal after the defendant had testified and placed accident, mistake or lack of intent at issue, not in the
state's case-in-chief. Idaho Code Section 18-1508 defines lewd conduct with a minor lUlder sixteen:
Any person who shall commit any lewd or lascivious act or acts upon or with the body or any part or member thereof of a
minor child lUlder the age of sixteen (16) years, including but not limited to, genital-genital contact, oral-genital contact,
anal-genital contact, oral-anal contact, manual-anal contact, or manual-genital contact, ... when any of such acts are done
with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifYing the lust or passions or sexual desires of such person, such minor
child, or third party, shall be guilty of a felony ....
The section establishes a specific intent crime requiring the prosecution to prove that Parmer acted with the intent of arousing
or gratifYing sexual desires within K.R. or himself. Therefore, it was necessary for the state to introduce evidence in its
case-in-chiefproving that Parmer acted with the requisite sexual intent.

This Court has previously held that intent is not always sufficiently at issue in a specific intent crime so as to justifY the
admission of prior bad acts evidence. State v. Roach, 109 Idaho 973, 974-75, 712 P.2d 674, 675-76 (Ct.App.1985)
("Further, if we were to conclude that intent is always at issue in a trial for a charged specific intent crime, then other crime
evidence would always be admissible, *220 **196 subject, of course, to the balancing process. We do not believe the intent
exception goes that far."). In Roach. this Court held that intent was not sufficiently at issue because the defendant contended
that he did not commit the act in question. The defendant did not contend that he committed the act with innocent intent. In this
case, however, Parmer's intent to gratifY either the sexual desires of K.R. or himself was squarely at issue. As summarized

by trial cOlUlSel during closing argument at Parmer's retrial:
Our main contention ... is that he didn't do this to sexually gratifY himself. He didn't do this to sexually gratifY [K.R.l. Did
he make a mistake? Did he make a mistake by using that vibrator? ... It's stupid ....
I am sorry. Any time that you are going to get a vibrator and put it near this area, you are going to get results of stimulation
going into the groin. It is going to happen.
Did he intend the results of that? Did he intend to gratifY her? No. Did he intend to sexually gratifY himself? No. That is
what the case is all about. That's it.... The instruction you get as far as if you find that and you find that he did do it with the
intent to sexually gratifY himself or her, yeah, you gotta find him guilty.
Therefore, Roach can be distinguished from this case. The Rule 404(b) evidence was relevant to show absence of mistake or
accident or Parmer's intent, which was squarely at issue in this case. Accordingly, the evidence was properly admitted, and
the district court did not err in allowing it to be presented in the state's case-in-chief.
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to Parmer's arguments regarding the consensual nature of some of the contact testified to by two of the Rule 404(b)

witnesses, this issue has not been properly preserved for appeal. Parmer argues that two of the witnesses testified to
consensual encounters. One of the witnesses was a subject of the state's second motion in limine prior to the retrial. At the
hearing on the motion, trial counsel made no objection, nor any mention, of the witness' testimony being inadmissible because
it related to consensual activity. During the witness' testimony during the retrial, no objection was made when testimony was
elicited regarding these encounters. This Court will not address an issue not preserved for appeal by an objection in the trial
court. Rozaiewski, 130 Idaho at 645.945 P.2d at 1391.

[I 3][ 14J The second witness who Parmer argues testified to consensual encounters was a subject of the state's first motion in

limine prior to the first trial. At the hearing on the motion, trial counsel made the following blanket statement regarding
consensual activities:
And then I encourage the Court to look at the adult women. I don't know how some of these incidents with adult women
could be anything other than consensual behavior. I am not saying all of them are that way, but they are claiming, one of
them is claiming that he crawled up on the therapy table, was kissing them, was fondling them. One claims that he sucked
her toes; another claims that they French-kissed.
I don't know how this could be other than consensual behavior, and it is c1early--1 mean, if they are claiming somehow it
wasn't consensual, I'm not sure how they can make that claim. But if they do, I think the 404 weighing process certainly
comes into play.
Trial counsel made no other statement specifically objecting to what encounters were consensual. The witness of whom
Parmer now complains is not even mentioned. When a trial court unqualifiedly rules on the admissibility or inadmissibility
of evidence prior to trial, no further objection at trial is required in order to preserve the issue for appeal. State v. Baer. 132
Idaho 416. 418. 973 P.2d 768. 770 (CtApp.1999). However, in Baer, this Court held that a defendant's motion in limine
does not preserve an objection for appeal regarding anything related to the subject matter of his motion. In this case, the state

fi led the motion in limine, but the analysis of Baer is still applicable. Parmer's broad, generalized argument at the hearing on
the motion in limine did not preserve for appeal his specific objections to the alleged consensual encounters testified to by an
identified witness. To properly preserve the issue *221 **197 trial counsel had to raise the objection at trial. Not only was
no objection made, but trial counsel often himself inquired as to the consensual encounters during cross-examination.
Therefore, the issue was not properly preserved for appeal. This Court will not address an issue not preserved for appeal

by an objection in the trial court. Rozajewski. 130 Idaho at 645.945 P.2d at 1391.

We may consider ftmdamental error in a criminal case, even though no objection was made at trial.

l4 However, we

conclude that this allegation of error does not rise to the level offtmdamental error.

3. Prejudice of Rule 404(b) evidence under .. R.E. 403

I..Lll Parmer argues that the district court abused its discretion by ruling that the probative value of the Rule 404(b) evidence
was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or waste of time. Specifically,
Parmer contends that the admission of testimony from eight Rule 404(b) witnesses as compared to only six other witnesses in
the state's case-in-chiefwas unduly cumulative and confused the issue for which he was on trial. The state responds that the
district court properly acted within its discretion when it acknowledged the potential danger of prejudice and held that any
prejudice could be minimized by a limiting instruction to the jury. A lower court's determination under I.R.E. 403 will not be
disturbed on appeal unless it is shown to be an abuse of discretion. State v. Enno, 119 Idaho 392, 406, 807 P.2d 610, 624

Ll..22.D; Slate 1'.

Clark, 115 Idaho 1056, 1059. 772 P.2d 263. 266 (Ct.App.1989). When a trial court's discretionary decision

is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court correctly
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. perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and
consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the lower court reached its
decision by an exercise of reason. Hedger. 115 Idaho at 600, 768 P.2d at 1333.

The question of the number of witnesses testifYing to prior bad acts is a matter of concern under Rule 403 analysis. Since the
testimony is inherently prejudicial, at some point the number of such witnesses can become excessive and overwhelm the
probative value of the evidence. This determination is left to the discretion of the trial court. The number of witnesses
appropriate to establish a common scheme or plan, absence of accident or mistake, or intent will vary with each case. Thus,
the issue cannot be resolved by drawing an arbitrary line. The Supreme Court in Grist held that trial courts must make such
admissibility determinations on a case-by-case basis while remaining cognizant of the potential cumulative effect of the
evidence and its tendency toward proving propensity and bad character. Grist, 147 Idaho at 52, 205 P.3d at 1188. The
Court warned against the admission of propensity evidence merely under the auspices of an acceptable purpose under Rule
404(b). Id. at 52, 205 P.3d at 1188. The Supreme Court held that the ultimate risk of such evidence was: "If he did it
before, he probably did it this time as well." Id. at 54, 205 P.3d at 1190. Therefore, when reviewing the district court's
discretionary determination we will consider whether the court properly weighed these considerations in its Rule 403
analysis.

At the hearing on the motion in limine prior to Parmer's first trial, the district court held:
The danger of the 403 concern that I have is the propensity concern, of course, the very real concern is that a jury might
hear such evidence and take the inappropriate logical step of: Well, ifhe did it before, then he did it in this instance.
However, I am satisfied that those concerns about inappropriate use of the evidence for propensity purposes can be
addressed by a limiting instruction instructing the jury that the testimony of [the Rule 404(b) witnesses] is only admissible
for the limited purpose of showing a common scheme or plan, absence of mistake or accident, or the requisite intent.
The district court followed a similar analysis for the two additional Rule 404(b) witnesses *222 **198 who testified at the
retrial. The district courfs findings demonstrate its conscious regard that such evidence inherently runs the risk of becoming
improper propensity evidence. The district court's language even refers to the same flawed logic of which the Supreme Court
expressed concern in Grist. The district court was aware of the concern regarding the admission of propensity evidence
under a different name. The district court also treated the Rule 404(b) evidence no differently than with any other crime--the
kind of disparate treatment which was condemned by the Supreme Court in Grist. In addition, the district court found that a
Jimiting instruction would help to ensure that the jury considered the Rule 404(b) evidence only for its proper purposes.
Prior to the testimony of the first Rule 404(b) witness, the district court instructed the jury:
Ladies and gentlemen, during the course of this trial evidence will be introduced for purpose of showing that the defendant
committed acts other than that for which the defendant is on trial. Such evidence, if believed, is not to be considered by
you to prove the defendant's character, or that the defendant has a disposition to commit crimes.
Rather, such evidence may be considered by you only for the limited purposes of proving the defendant's motive,
opportunity, intent, plan, or absence of mistake or accident.
The district court reiterated this instruction again at the conclusion of the trial. We conclude that the district court made a
reasonable determination within the applicable legal standards.

Parmer argues why he believes the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice. However, he fails to explain how the district court's decision to remedy the danger through a curative instruction
was inadequate. In his reply brief, Parmer asserts "a curative instruction to the jury can only go so far to avoid prejudicing
the defendant when there are so many 404(b) witnesses." No argument is made as to why the instruction fails other than the
number of Rule 404(b) witnesses made it impossible for the jury to follow the court's instruction. However, we presume that
the jury followed the district court's instructions. See State v. Kilby, 130 Idaho 747,751,947 P.2d 420, 424 (Ct.App.1997);

St ate v. Hudwn, 129 Idaho 478, 481, 927 P.2d 451, 454 (Ct.App.1996). Therefore, the district court did not abuse its
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• discretion when it found that any prejudice could be cured by a limiting instruction to the jury and that the probative value of
the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

4. Inadequate time to prepare for additional witnesses before retrial

[161[ 171 Parmer alleges that the district court abused its discretion by refusing trial counsel's request for additional time to
prepare for the two 404(b) witnesses added prior to the retrial. Specifically, Parmer argues that "denial of the motion to
vacate significantly prejudiced the defense's ability to investigate and prepare to meet the testimony of [the additional
witnesses] and amounted to an abuse of discretion." That is the extent of Parmer's argument and authority on this issue. The
state filed the second notice of intent to use Rule 404(b) evidence on July 28, the hearing was held on August 2, and trial was
set to begin on August 22. Other than the conclusory statement quoted above, no argument is made or authority presented
supporting the proposition that nearly a month oftime was inadequate for defense counsel to prepare for the testimony of two
additional witnesses. A party waives an issue on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking. State v. Zichko. 129 Idaho
259,263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996). Accordingly, we do not further address this issue.

5. Testimony of witness at retrial after attending first trial

L.Lru Parmer alleges that the district court abused its discretion by allowing one of the two additional

Rule 404(b) witnesses

to testity at the retrial after that witness had attended portions of the first trial. Specifically, Parmer contends that this was a
violation of the district court's exclusionary order entered before the first trial and prohibiting all prospective witnesses from
being present *223 **199 in the courtroom or otherwise receiving any information pertaining to the testimony of other
witnesses. Additionally, Parmer argues that this should have been a heavily-weighted factor in the district court's balancing
of unfair prejudice and probative effect under Rule 403.

The cases and authority cited in support of Parmer's argument refer to situations where a district court's sequestration or
exclusionary order has actually been violated. However, the witness who is the source of Parmer's allegation of error was
not included as a potential witness in the first trial. Therefore, the witness was not subject to the district court's exclusionary
order and that order was not violated by the witness' presence at that proceeding. Parmer cites no authority for the argument
that a witness who rightfully attends trial proceedings, which later result in a hung jury, is prohibited from testitying at a
retrial. Additionally, Parmer cites no authority for his contention that the district court was required to consider the
possibility of tainted testimony in its Rule 403 analysis. Furthermore, Parmer cites no authority for the proposition that he is
relieved of his burden of demonstrating how the presence of this witness at the first trial resulted in tainted testimony because
he brought the matter to the district court's attention prior to the retrial. A party waives an issue on appeal if either authority
or argument is lacking. Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263,923 P.2d at 970. Accordingly, we do not further address this issue.

B. Parmer's Statements During Police Interrogation

JJ..2J.

Parmer next argues that the district court abused its discretion by sustaining the state's hearsay objection to testimony

concerning statements that he made during a police interrogation or the publishing of the recording to the jury. He alleges that
the statements were necessary for the jury to understand other statements that he had made during a confrontation call with
K.R. and to put them in context. Additionally, he argues that the confrontation call and the interrogation were close in time
and similar in content. Therefore, he contends that, pursuant to I.R.E. 106, the statements made during the interrogation must
be considered contemporaneously with the confrontation call recording which had been admitted into evidence. [FN21
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• Furthermore, Parmer contends that the statements fall under the I.R.E. 801 (d)( I)(8) exclusion from the hearsay rule. [FN3]

FN2. Idaho Rule of Evidence 106 provides:
When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party may require that
party at that time to introduce any other part or any other writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be
considered contemporaneously with it.

FN3. Idaho Rule of Evidence 801 (d)( 1) provides that a statement is not hearsay if:
The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the
statement is ... (8) consistent with declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against
declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive ....

Parmer's arguments concerning the applicability of Rules 106 and 80ICd)(J)(8) are not properly preserved for appeal. At
Parmer's first trial, defense counsel attempted to elicit testimony from the interrogating officer regarding Parmer's statements
made during the interrogation. After the state objected on hearsay grounds, trial counsel responded that the statements should
be allowed because they were Parmer's own statements or admissions. The district court sustained the hearsay objection
because the Rules of Evidence provide that only admissions of a party-opponent are subject to the exception to the hearsay
rule. After trial counsel attempted to elicit testimony regarding the interrogation by another method--a DVD recording of the
interrogation--the state again objected on hearsay grounds and the district court held a bench conference outside of the
presence of the jury. The district court sustained the state's hearsay objection and later gave its reason for sustaining the
objection on the record:
When counsel came forward, I asked for an explanation of a non-hearsay purpose, or an exception to the hearsay rule for
which the evidence was attempting to be elicited as to the substance of the defendant's *224 **200 interview, or as
foundational for the defendant's interview with law enforcement officers.
Counsel was not able to identifY anything beyond that which was stated in terms of: It is a statement of the defendant. In a
criminal trial, a defendant's statement may be offered by the State under Rule [80J](d)(2), but there is no corresponding
right for a defendant to introduce his own statements. It was clearly offered for a hearsay purpose.

At the hearing on the state's motion in limine prior to Parmer's retrial, the district court likewise ruled that evidence of
Parmer's statements would not be admissible by the defense. Trial counsel for Parmer made no specific objection at that
time. The only argument raised by trial counsel as to the admissibility of Parmer's statements during the police interrogation
concerned Rule 801Cd)(2). The district court properly denied the admission of the statements on this basis. No other
argument was made by trial counsel regarding Rules 106 or 80 ICd)(1 ). Therefore, any argument that the statements were
admissible under those rules has not been properly preserved, and we will not address it on appeal. See Roza;ewski. 130
Idaho at 645,945 P.2d at 1391.

[20] We may consider fundamental error in a criminal case, even though no objection was made at trial. fd. However, even
were we to assume error, this does not rise to the level of fundamental error as Parmer testified at the trial and had an
adequate opportunity to explain or put the confrontation call statements in proper context.

III.
CONCLUSION
The district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing Rule 404(b) witnesses to testifY based only on the state's offer of
proof to the court concerning the content of the proposed witnesses' testimony. Trial counsel failed to object to any variances
between the Rule 404(b) witnesses' actual testimony and the state's offer of proof, and the district court was not required to
sua sponte strike all or any part of the varying testimony. The testimonial variances do not rise to the level of fundamental
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error. The testimony of the Rule 404(b) witnesses was relevant and the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding
that the probative value was not substantially outweighed by the prejudicial effect. Parmer presents inadequate argument and
authority to support his argument of inadequate time to prepare for additional Rule 404(b) witnesses prior to his retrial.
Likewise, Parmer presents inadequate argument or authority to support his argument that the district court abused its
discretion by allowing a witness to testity at the retrial who had been present at the first trial, when that witness rightfully
attended portions of the first trial.

The district court also did not abuse its discretion by denying the admissibility of Parmer's statements made during the police
interrogation on hearsay grounds when trial counsel argued their admissibility as admissions of a party-opponent. Parmer's
contention that admission of the statements was justified under other Rules of Evidence is not properly preserved for appeal
and does not rise to the level of fundamental error. Because we have found no errors that were properly preserved for
appellate review, the harmless error and cumulative error doctrines do not apply. Therefore, Parmer's judgment of
conviction for lewd conduct with a minor child under sixteen is affirmed.

Judge GRATTON, concurs.

Judge GUTlERREZ, dissents.

147 Idaho 210, 207 P.3d 186
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JOHN T. BUJAK
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
Canyon County Courthouse
1115 Albany&
Caldwell, Idaho 83606-0668
Telephone: (208) 454-7391

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

THE STATE OF IDAHO
Plaintiff,

)
)
)
)
)

VANCE WATKINS,

)

Defendant.

)
)

CASE NO. CR2008-26831

RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS

---------------------------)
COMES NOW, Erica M. Kallin, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Canyon County, State
ofIdaho, and hereby submits the following Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
The Defense attorney, through verbal communication with the State, indicated the
grounds for the motion to dismiss the indictment is the testimony regarding when the crime
occurred was not consistent with the time period the victim testified to at Grand Jury. Since the
Motion to Dismiss is silent as to which part of the Indictment is being challenged, the State is
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relying upon oral conversations with Defense counsel to file its Response to the Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss.

The Defendant is time barred from raising a motion to dismiss
Idaho Criminal Rule 12(d) states:
Motions pursuant to Rule 12(b) must be filed within twenty-eight
(28) days after the entry of a plea of not guilty or seven (7) days
before trial whichever is earlier ... The court in its discretion may
shorten or enlarge the time provided herein, and for good cause
shown, or for excusable neglect, may relieve a party of failure to
comply with this rule.

A motion to dismiss is a 12(b) motion. Idaho Criminal Rule 12 requires that a motion to
dismiss be filed within twenty-eight days of the entry of a plea of not guilty, or seven days before
trial, whichever is earlier. I.C.R. 12(b), I.C.R. 12(d). A party's failure to meet the deadline
constitutes a waiver of the motion. I.C.R. 12(f). A court may relieve a party's failure to comply
with the rule only if the party shows good cause or excusable neglect for the failure. I.C.R.
12(d); See State v. Gleason, 130 Idaho 586 (Ct. App. 1997); see also State v. Dice, 126 Idaho
595,597 (Ct. App. 1994). A court may not "arbitrarily enlarge or shorten the filing requirements
of the rule"; to "permit a court to do so ~ithout the required exempting factors would emasculate
the intent of the rule." State v. Alanis, 109 Idaho 884, 888 (Idaho 1985). If a party has failed to
meet the deadline, a court may not hear a motion simply because it appears meritorious. State v.
Dice, 126 Idaho 595, 597 (Idaho App. 1994). To do so would "eviscerate the purpose of the

rule." Id. Consequently, if good cause or excusable neglect is not shown by the moving party,
the court may not hear the motion. Id.
STATE'S OBJECTION TO
DEFENDANT'S MOTION
IN LIMINE
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In this case, the Defendant entered a plea of not guilty on December 22, 2004. His case
proceeded to Jury Trial on August 20,2005. Thus, the deadline for the Defendant to file a
motion to dismiss was January 19,2005, twenty-eight days after the entry of his plea, because
January 19, 2005 is earlier than seven days prior to the trial. The Defendant has filed a Motion
to Dismiss the Indictment on May 21,2010. Even if the Defendant was allowed to file any and
all motions again after remand (which is not consistent with case law), the Defendant was
arraigned on February 4, 2010 and the time to file motions lapsed on March 4, 2010. Now the
Defendant is trying to get another bite at the apple 2020 days (5 Yz years) after his first
arraignment, and 106 days after his arraignment after remand. This is well beyond the time
proscribed by the statute. Furthermore, a failure to object to defects in an indictment must be
'l

raised prior to trial. A failure to raise the issue constitutes a waiver of the issue. Noel v. State,
113 Idaho 92, 741 P.2d 728 (Ct. App. 1987)
The Court should thus deny the motion to dismiss for failure to comply with the Idaho
Criminal Rules.

Sufficient evidence was presented to the Grand JUry for purposes of probable cause.
Even if the Court does not find the Motion to Dismiss is barred under ICR 12b, not only
was there sufficient testimony presented to the Grand Jury but the law does not require as an
essential element of the crime the State prove when the crime occurred. Idaho Code § 19-1414
states that "the precise time at which the offense was committed need not be stated in the
indictment; but it may be alleged to have been committed at any time before the finding thereof,
except where the time is a material ingredient of the offense." In order for an indictment to be
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS
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sufficient, the State needs only to present evidence that the offense occurred before the
indictment was found. I.e. § 19-1418. In State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 41,899 P.3d 881 (Idaho
App. 2003), the Court addressed this very issue. The Court determined that time is not a material
element of the crime of Lewd Conduct. 140 Idaho at 887. See also State v. Coleman 128 Idaho
466, 915 P.2d 29 (Ct. App. 1996). Furthermore, corroboration of a child's testimony is not
required for purposes of probable cause; rather the State must simply show substantial evidence
on every material element of the offense charged. See Coleman 128 Idaho at 472 and ICR

5. 1(b).
At Grand Jury, RW. testified. She was asked when the touching occurred. She did
initially say it happened when she was four. She was then later questioned about other times
when the touching occurred. RW. testified she was in first grade at the time she testified. The
prosecutor inquired about touching that occurred since she started first grade. The prosecutor
asked, "Has it happened since you were in first grade?"(page 9 line 15.) RW. did not make an
audible response. "You're nodding your head yes? Say yes or no." RW. responded, "Yes." As
such, it can be implied that school year: starting in August or September, would have been
during October-December 2004, the time period alleged. RW. also testified as to genital-genital
touching, genital-oral touching and genital-anal touching occurring at her home. Detective Peck
testified as to the location of the house and that it is in Canyon County. Because corroboration
ofR.W.'s statements regarding the touching is not required for purposes of probable cause, there
was sufficient evidence to support the Indictment for both the essential and non-essential
elements of the crime.
STATE'S OBJECTION TO
DEFENDANT'S MOTION
IN LIMINE
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Furthermore, motions to challenge indictments which are tardily filed are liberally
construed in favor of being valid. State v. Robran, 119 Idaho 285,805 P.2d 491 (Ct. App. 1991.)
Because the motion to dismiss was filed so far beyond the ICR 12b timeline, the Court should
construe the indictment as valid. Without any sufficient showing by the defense the indictment
is not supported by probable cause, the Court should deny the Defendant's motion.

CONCLUSION
As such, the State requests the Court deny the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the
Indictment as time barred or in the alternative, that sufficient evidence was submitted to the
Grand Jury on the issue of when the offense occurred.

DATED This

&

RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS

day of May, 2010.
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Response To
Defendant's Motion To Dismiss was served upon the attorney for the Defendant, the Canyon
County Public Defender, by placing said instrument in their basket at the Clerk's Office on or
about this

()[j

day of May, 2010
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MOTION TO DISMISS

6

H:\Watkins Vance_Resp to DefMO to DM.doc

000099

http://web2.westla

aspx?sv=Split&vr=2.0& ...

Westlaw Delivery Summary Report for KALLIN,ERICA

Your Search:

corroboration not required in lewd conduct

Date/Time of Request:

Monday, May 24, 20 10 13: 14 Central

Client Identifier:

ERICAKALLIN

Database:

JD-CS

Citation Text:

915 P.2d 28

Lines:

458

Documents:

I

Images:

o

The material accompanying this swnrnary is subject to copyright. Usage is governed by contract with Thomson Reuters, West
and their affi liates.

VVestlaw,
915 P.2d 28
128 Idaho 466,915 P.2d 28
(Cite as: 128 Idaho 466, 915 P.2d 28)

H

Court of Appeals ofldaho.
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.
Barry Ellis COLEMAN, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 21388.

March 7, 1996.
Petition for Review Denied May 13, 1996.

Defendant was convicted in the District Court, Madison County, Brent Moss, J., on two counts of lewd conduct with minor,
and he appealed. The Court of Appeals,

~

J., held that: (I) statute tolling limitations period while defendant was out of

state applied even though defendant was not out of state at time of offense; (2) statute prohibiting commission of any lewd or
lascivious act upon minor under 16 is not unconstitutionally vague; (3) information was sufficiently specific regarding time

of alleged offenses; and (4) there was no requirement that victims' testimony be corroborated at preliminary hearing.

Affirmed.
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**30 *468 Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, Madison County; Brent Moss, District Judge.W.
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Derden argued.

PERRY, Judge.

In this appeal from his judgment of conviction of two counts of lewd conduct with a minor, Barry Ellis Coleman challenges
the district court's denial of three separate motions to dismiss. For the reasons explained below, we affirm.

I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Coleman was charged with two counts of lewd conduct with a minor, I.C. § 18-6607, and one count of infamous crime
against nature, I.e. § 18-6605. The information, which was filed in October 1993, alleged that Coleman had committed the
crime of lewd conduct with a minor against one of his daughters between January I, 1977, and February 20, 1979 (Count I).
As to another minor daughter, Coleman was alleged to have committed the crime of lewd conduct between August 8, 1975,
and February 20, 1979 (Count II), and infamous crime against nature between June 5, 1976, and February 20, 1979 (Count
JII). Each count of the information also recited circumstances allegedly toll ing the statute of Iimitation and authorizing the
1993 prosecution.

Coleman, through his counsel, moved the district court for dismissal of the charges, claiming that the prosecution of the
offenses against him was barred by the statute of limitation, I.C. § 19-402, and was not within the exceptions outlined in ~
§ 19-404. Coleman filed a second motion for dismissal wherein he asserted that the statutes criminalizing lewd conduct with
a minor and infamous crime against nature, as they existed at the time of the alJeged offenses, were unconstitutionalJy vague,
and that the information suffered from indefiniteness as to the dates when the offenses were committed. Coleman also sought
dismissal based on the state's failure to present corroborating evidence at the preliminary hearing. All three of the dismissal
motions were denied.

Thereafter, Coleman entered a conditional plea of guilty to the two lewd conduct counts, and the infamous crime against
nature charge was dismissed. As part of the plea agreement, Coleman reserved his right to appeal the denial of his motions to
dismiss. A judgment of conviction on the two counts of lewd conduct was entered, and Coleman filed a timely appeal.

11.

ANALYSIS
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I. ToIling of the Statute of Limitation

ill On appeal,

Coleman asserts that because the filing of the complaint in his case came more than thirteen years after the

alleged crimes were committed, it fell outside **31 *469 of the five-year statute of limitation. FNI Coleman argues that his
case is not governed by I.C. § 19-404, which authorizes a toll ing of the statute of Iimitation period and which operates as a
bar against prosecution unless the statute has been tolled. This issue of the applicability of I.e. § 19-404, therefore, raises
questions of statutory construction, over which we exercise free review. Sun Valley Co. v. Citv o[Sun Valley. 109 Idaho
424,428, 708 P.2d 147, 151 (1985); State v. Nelson, 119 Idaho 444, 446, 807 P.2d 1282, 1284 (Ct.App.1991 ).

FN I. Idaho Code Section 19-402, entitled "Commencement of prosecutions for crimes against children and other
felonies," states:

A prosecution for any felony other than murder or any felony committed upon or against a minor child must be
commenced by the filing of the complaint or the finding of an indictment within three (3) years after its
commission. A prosecution for any felony committed upon or against a minor child must be commenced within
five (5) years after the commission of the offense by the filing of the complaint or a finding of an indictment.

[2][3][4] The task of the court in interpreting the meaning of language contained in a statute is to give effect to the
legislature's intent and purpose. Sweitzer v. Dean, I 18 Idaho 568, 798 P.2d 27 (1990). It is incumbent upon the court to
interpret the statute in a manner that will not nullifY it, and it is not to be presumed that the legislature performed an idle act
of enacting a superfluous statute. ld In construing a statute, the court may examine the language used, the reasonableness of
proposed interpretations and the policy behind the statute. Umphrey v. Sprinkel, 106 Idaho 700, 682 P.2d 1247 (1983); State

v. Seamons. 126 Idaho 809, 892 P.2d 484 (CLApp. 1995).

Ulldaho Code Section 19-404 reads as follows:

If, when the offense is committed, the defendant is out of the state, the indictment may be found within the term herein
limited after his coming within the state, and no time during which the defendant is not an inhabitant of, or usually resident
within, the state is part of the limitation.

Described as an exception to the limitation period governed by I.C. § 19-402, I.C. § 19-404 provides for tolling of the statute
of limitation where the defendant is out of the state. See State v. Steens/and, 33 Idaho 529, 195 P. 1080 (1921). "The
exception being for the benefit of the state, it is incumbent upon the state to show that it obtains." fd., at 533, 195 P. at 1081.
The state must prove the commission of the offense within the statutory period, or the existence of conditions which preserve
the right in the state to prosecute after the time limited by the statute of limitation. fel, at 534, 195 P. at 1082.

Claiming that his alleged crime of lewd conduct with a minor was not committed while he was out of the state, Coleman
advocates an interpretation of I.e. § 19-404 which would bar a prosecution against him. Coleman asserts that commission of
the crime while he was out of the state, in col1iunction with a subsequent absence from the state, is required for the five-year
statute of limitation to be tolled. Such a reading of I.C. § 19-404, however, would render a portion of the statute meaningless.
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construing a statute, the court has the express duty to give effect to all sections of the statute and not to deprive any

statutory provisions of their meaning. See George W. Watkins Fami/}' v. lvlessenger. I 18 Idaho 537. 797 P.2d 1385 (1990).
The Idaho Supreme Court, in Steens/and, recognized the two situations in

I.e. §

19-404 which trigger a tolling of the

limitation of time within which to bring a complaint as "cases where a defendant was absent from the state when the crime
was committed and when the accused was absent or not usually resident within the state during a portion of the time."

Steensland, 33 Idaho at 533. 195 P. at 1081. Furthermore, the courts in California have interpreted their identical statute FN2
to hold that the exception tolling the limitation period "includes the case of the defendant leaving the State after the
commission of the crime as [well as] the case of his absence at the time of its perpetration, and that it applies to all
offenses." **32*470Peopte v. McGill, 10 Cal.App.2d

155, 51 P.2d 433, 434 (1935), quoting People v. Monteio, 18 Cal.

38(1861).

FN2. Cal.Penal Code § 802 (1872), recodified as § 803 (1981).

Accordingly, we reject the application onc. § 19-404 in the manner suggested by Coleman. The complaint against Coleman
alleges that he was in the state at the time he perpetrated the lewd conduct on his young daughters. The allegations also
indicate that in 1979, Coleman and his family left the state of Idaho. Although by 1993 the five-year period commencing at
the time of the alleged lewd conduct had passed,

I.e.

§ 19-404 operated to extend the limitation period during the time

Coleman was "not an inhabitant of, or usually resident within, this state." We conclude, therefore, that the application of.u:;"
§ 19-404, under the facts of Coleman's case, brought the state's prosecution of Coleman for the lewd conduct charges within

the parameters of the statute oflimitation set forth in

I.e. § 19-402.

2. Void for Vagueness Challenge

III Coleman asserts

that the substantive criminal statutes under which he was charged were unconstitutionally vague. He

argues that Idaho Code Section 18-6607, which prohibits the commission of any lewd or lascivious act upon a minor under
sixteen, is not sufficiently definite, or understandable by the average person, to provide reasonable notice of the conduct
being proscribed. Making the same argument with respect to I.C. § 18-6605 forbidding infamous crimes against nature,
Coleman insists that both statutes leave the general public to guess at their meaning and to speculate as to the conduct which
the statutes seek to punish.

00 The doctrine

of void for vagueness is derived from the due process clause and prohibits holding a person "criminally

responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed." State v. Lopez. 98 Idaho 58 I. 590. 570
P.2d 259. 268 (1976), quoting United Stqtes v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612. 74 S.Ct. 808,98 L.Ed.989 (1954). Due process is
violated when a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act is written in terms so vague that people of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. ld, citing Connallv v. General
Cons/I'. Co .. 269 U.S. 385.46 S.Ct. 126, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926).

In 1952, the Idaho Supreme Court held:

Lewd and lascivious are words in common use and the definitions indicate with reasonable certainty the kind and
character of acts and conduct which the legislature intended to prohibit and punish, so that a person of ordinary
understanding may know what conduct on his part is condemned .... [Therefore,] the certainty required by due process is

fl?
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present.

State v. Evans. 73 Idaho 50,57,245 P.2d 788, 791-92 (1952). After Evans, the Court concluded that the statute was
sufficiently certain to convey to a person of ordinary understanding an adequate description of the evil intended to be
proscribed, State v. Harmon. 107 Idaho 73, 78. 685 P.2d 814, 819 (1984); State v. Shannon. 95 Idaho 299.302.507 P.2d
808. 81 I (1973 ), and was not unconstitutionally vague. State v. SchwartzmWer. 107 Idaho 89. 94, 685 P.2d 830. 835
(1984 ). We therefore find Coleman's challenge to the constitutional validity ofl.e. § 18-6607 to be unavai ling.

L2l

We also conclude that this appeal with respect to Count III of the information, charging Coleman with infamous crime

against nature, is not predicated upon either a final order or a judgment of conviction. See State v. Garner. 103 Idaho 468,
471, 649 P.2d 1224, 1227 (Ct.App.1982). The charge in Court III, which was based upon a violation one. § 18-6605, was
dismissed as part of the plea arrangement. Accordingly, we decline to review Coleman's challenge to the constitutionality of
I.C. § 18-6605.

3. Sufficiency of the Information

.liQ1

Coleman argues that the information was not sufficiently specific because the offenses charged as Counts I and II

purportedly took place within a twenty-five-month period and a forty-two-month period, respectively. Further, Coleman
asserts that his ability to mount a defense was impaired by the delayed filing of the information which resulted from the
disclosure of these criminal acts only after the victims had become adults. He claims, because the information **33 *471
was so flawed, that his motion to dismiss should have been granted on this ground.

[ I J][ 121 Sufficiency of an information ultimately depends on whether it fulfills the basic functions of the pleading instrument.
S/ate v. Robran. 119 Idaho 285. 805 P.2d 491 (Ct.App.1991 ). Because time is not a material element of the offense oflewd
and lascivious conduct with a minor, the offense may be alleged to have been committed at any time before the filing of the
information. State v. Roberts. 101 Idaho 199,200, 610 P.2d 558, 559 (J980). See also I.C. § 19-1414; I.C.R. 7.
Specifically, in child sexual abuse cases involving evidence of a number of secretive offenses over a period of time, detailed
specificity in the information as to the times of the offenses is not required. State v. Tavlor. I 18 Idaho 450, 797 P.2d 158
( Ct.App.1990).

Il1.l

It is generally agreed that the issue is not whether the alleged offense could be described with more certainty, but

whether there is "sufficient particularity" to enable the accused to "prepare a proper defense." W.R. LAFAVE and J.H.
ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 19.2 (1991), citing State v. Gumm. 99 Idaho 549, 585 P.2d 959 (1978). An
information need only be specific enough to enable a defendant to prepare a defense and to protect him or her from being
subsequently prosecuted for the same offense. Roberts. 101 Idaho at 200, 610 P.2d at 559; State v. Banks. I 13 Idaho 54, 740
P.2d 1039 (Ct.App.1987). The test with regard to latter concern is whether the record shows with accuracy to what extent a
defendant may plead a former acquittal or conviction. Gumm. 99 Idaho at 555. 585 P.2d at 965. citing State v. O'Neil. 24
Idaho 582.592. 135 P. 60. 63 (1913).

As noted above, the charge of lewd conduct with a minor does not contain time as a material element. Roberts. 101 Idaho at
200,610 P.2d at 559. The information in this case clearly apprised Coleman of the statute he had alJegedly violated and that
he was charged with lewd and lascivious act or acts with each of his two daughters, between 1976 and 1979, at which time
his daughters were minors. The information contained every element of the offense charged. Accordingly, the allegations are
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such that Coleman cannot be charged with the same acts committed during the same time period at issue. Moreover, Coleman
never suggested any defense of alibi or asserted any prejudice occasioned by the information as drafted. We conclude,
therefore, that the information was sufficiently specific as to time and protects Coleman's plea of former jeopardy in any
future prosecution for lewd conduct with his daughters.

4. Corroboration

[HJ Finally, Coleman asserts that his motion to dismiss should have been granted by the district court in that neither the
information nor the state's case at the preliminary hearing included any corroboration evidence of the complaining
witnesses' testimony, as was required in sex crime cases at the time Coleman committed these offenses. Coleman claims
there was no other evidence or testimony corroborating the allegations made by his two daughters. Therefore, he argues that
the charges against him should have been dismissed in response to his pre-trial motion.

The district court, however, concluded that the corroboration requirement in lewd conduct cases dealt with the level of
evidence necessary to support a jury verdict and was inapplicable to pre-trial proceedings. In its order, the district court
denied the motion as being premature. The district court also held that there existed corroborating evidence available for
presentation by the state at trial.

The Idaho Supreme Court acknowledged in 1924:

[M]ost courts have laid down the rule that in the trial o/prosecutions under this statute a person may be convicted of rape
upon the testimony of the prosecutrix where there is no direct evidence corroborating her testimony only when her
reputation for truth and chastity are unimpeached and the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense are
clearly corroborative of her statements.

State v. Bowker, 40 Idaho 74, 78,231 P. 706, 707 (1924) (emphasis added). Coleman's reliance on Bowker, however, does
not support **34 *472 his contention that corroboration is required at the pre-trial stages of the proceedings. The state's
reliance on State v. Bvers, 102 Idaho 159, 627 P.2d 788 (1981), which abolished the corroboration requirement
prospectively to all criminal trials commenced thereafter, is also unavailing in its failure to address the issue of
corroboration at a preliminary hearing.

[151(161 Whether there is sufficient corroboration is a question for the jury. Slate v. Adair. 99 Idaho 703,707,587 P.2d
1238, 1242 (I978), overruled on other grounds by Slate v. Bvers. 102 Idaho 159, 627 P.2d 788 (1981 ). The required
corroboration need only tend to support the victim's testimony that the offense was committed and make it appear probable

that the accused was the perpetrator. td. at 707, 587 P.2d at 1242, citing State v. Elsen. 68 Idaho 50, 55, 187 P.2d 976, 978
( 1947),

ll1l

A finding of probable cause, which is to be initially determined at a preliminary hearing, shall be based upon

substantial evidence upon every material element of the offense charged. I.C.R. 5.lfb). The state, at a preliminary
examination, is not required to show the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; it need only prove that a crime was
committed and that there is probable cause to believe the accused committed it. State v. Greensweig, [02 Idaho 794, 64 [
P.2d 340 CCt.App. [982). The long-held justifications for the corroboration requirement in sex crime cases emphasized

elf [2
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protection against unjust convictions. See generally Bvers. 102 Idaho 159. 627 P.2d 788. We have uncovered no case law
mandating corroborative evidence at the preliminary hearing stage of a prosecution, where the burden of proof is probable
cause, not a reasonable doubt standard. Had Coleman's plea of guilty not forestalled a trial, the state's potentially
corroborative evidence would have been tested as it was presented to the jury. We uphold the district court's denial of
Coleman's motion to dismiss on corroboration grounds.

m.

CONCLUSION

Coleman does not prevail in seeking to overturn the district court's denial of his motions to dismiss. We conclude that the
statute of limitation was tolled during the time Coleman was living outside of Idaho after committing the alleged crimes in
Idaho. Idaho Code Section 19-404, therefore, as applied in Coleman's case, did not operate to bar the 1993 prosecution for
crimes committed between 1976 and 1979. We are bound by Idaho precedent holding that the statute defining lewd and
lascivious conduct is not unconstitutionaily vague. We conclude that the charging information was not flawed in specitying
the time of occurrence of the crimes. We also conclude that there exists no requirement of corroboration at preliminary
hearings.

The judgment of conviction is affirmed.

WALTERS, C.]., and LANSING, 1., concur.
Idaho App.,1996.
State v. Coleman
128 Idaho 466, 915 P.2d 28
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STATE ofIdaho, Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.
Bobby Dean JONES, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 28715.

Oct. 8, 2003.
Rehearing Denied Dec. I, 2003.
Review Denied May 12, 2004.

Defendant was convicted in the District Cow1 of the Fifth Judicial District, Gooding County, R. Barry Wood, J., of lewd
conduct with minor child under 16, and he appealed. The Cow1 of Appeals, Lansing, C.J., held that: (I) in charging two
counts oflewd conduct with minor using identical language, State was not charging defendant twice for one single act or for
continuous course of conduct, but, instead, State was charging defendant for two separate and distinct acts that occurred in
same manner and during same span of time, and because these events were distinguishable as distinct crimes, each incident
was properly charged as independent offense; (2) as matter of apparent first impression, State's notice to defendant of its
intent to offer evidence of other crimes was sufficient to alert the defense to the general nature ofthe additional testimony and
to thereby avoid surprise; and (3) pattern credibility instructions in the Idaho Civil Jury Instructions (IDJI) and Idaho
Criminal Jury Instructions (IeJI) did not violate equal protection.

Affirmed.
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ill Indictment and Information 210 C;::::>7I.4(12)
210 Indictment and Information
21 OV Requisites and Sufficiency of Accusation
210k71 Certainty and Particularity
21 Ok71.4 Particular Allegations and Offenses
21 Ok71.4( 12) k. Rape and Other Sex Offenses; Offenses Relating to Minors. Most Cited Cases
Although general, allegations of the information charging lewd conduct with a child were sufficient, and since preliminary
hearing eliminated any uncertainty and gave defendant notice of details of charges against him, defendant suffered no
prejudice from manner in which information pleaded the charges; defendant was fully apprised of the acts he was charged
with committing at the prel iminary hearing, and during that hearing, the State presented victims' testimony about the
surrounding circumstances and manner in which offenses were alleged to have been committed. I.C. § 19-1409; Criminal
Rule 7(b).

ill Indictment and Information 210 C;::::>87(7)
210 Indictment and Information
21 OV Requisites and Sufficiency of Accusation
2JOk87 Time of Offense
21 Ok87(7) k. Certainty. Most Cited Cases
Information which alleged that offenses of lewd conduct with minor occurred between the spring of one year and the spring
of the following year, during the fall of that year, and during a 7 year period was proper; time was not material element of
crime oflewd conduct with minor, victim was between eight and ten years old and it was unrealistic to expect her to be able
to recall dates specifically given her age and time span over which acts were alleged to have occurred, defendant did not
show that lack of greater specificity in dates inhibited his ability to defend against charges, and victim's testimony narrowed
time frame and prevented any prejudice to defendant from lack of specificity in pleading. I.C. §§ 19- 1409, 19- 14 14; Criminal
Rule 7.

lJl Criminal Law 11 0 ~ 1134.36
110 Criminal Law
I IOXXIV Review
1IOXXIV(L) Scope of Review in General
I IOXXIV(L)4 Scope of Inquiry
I lOki 134.36 k Grand Jury and Indictment. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly I lOki 134(3»
The sufficiency of an information is a question oflaw over which appellate court exercises free review.

1±l Indictment and Information 210 ~71.2(2)
2 10 Indictment and Information
210V Requisites and Sufficiency of Accusation

f21
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::: IOk71 Certainty and Particularity
::: I Ok71.2 Purpose of Requirement and Test of Compliance
21 Ok71. ?(2) k Informing Accused of Nature of Charge. Most Cited Cases

Indictment and Information 210 ~71.2(4)

210 Indictment and Information
21 OV Requisites and Sufficiency of Accusation
210k71 Certainty and Particularity
21 Ok71.2 Purpose of Requirement and Test of Compliance
21 Ok71.2( 4) k Protection Against Subsequent Prosecution. Most Cited Cases
Sufficiency of the information depends upon whether it fulfills the basic functions of a pleading instrument by informing the
defendant of the charges against which he must defend and enabling him to plead an acquittal or conviction in order to avoid
reprosecution for the same offense.

ill Indictment and Information 210 ~65
210 Indictment and Information
21 OV Requisites and Sufficiency of Accusation
210k58 Subject-Matter of AlIegations
2) Ok65 k. Matters of Evidence. Most Cited Cases
Although an information must contain the essential facts, the State is not required to disclose in the information the evidence
which it relies upon to prove its case .

.l§l Criminal Law 110 (,:;::;;>1167(1)

i l l Criminal Law
110XXIV Review
I IOXXIV(Q) Harmless and Reversible Error
II Okl167 Rulings as to Indictment or Pleas
I 10k I 167( I) k Indictment or Information in General. Most Cited Cases
Defendant generally cannot be prejudiced by the absence of specific details in the information when those details are either
already known to the defendant or are provided to him by means other than the information, such as through preliminary
hearing testimony.

11llnfants 211

~13

i l l Infants
11111 Protection
211 kl3 k. Protection of Health and Morals. Most Cited Cases
Time is not a material element of the crime oflewd and lascivious conduct with a minor.
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ill Indictment and Information 210 €;::::;:>71.3
210 Indictment and Information
21 OV Requisites and Sufficiency of Accusation
210k71 Certainty and Particularity
2 IOk71.3 k. Acts Constituting and Elements and Incidents of Offense, Allegations as To. Most Cited Cases
Although the alleged incident that constitutes an offense should be set forth with as much specificity as possible, the charges
may be pleaded generally when the record shows that the State could not plead with any more specificity.

llilndictment and Information 210 (;:::;;:;>7l.I

210 Indictment and Information
21 OV Requisites and Sufficiency of Accusation
210k71 Certainty and Particularity
21 Ok7 I .1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Vagueness in the allegations of an information may be cured through preliminary hearing testimony that informs the defendant
of the details of the State's allegations .

.l.!Q1lndictment and Information 210 €;::::;:>71.2(4)

210 Indictment and Information
2IOV Requisites and Sufficiency of Accusation
210k7] Certainty and Particularity
21 Ok7!.2 Purpose of Requirement and Test of Compliance
2IOk7J.2(4) k. Protection Against Subsequent Prosecution. Most Cited Cases
The test in determining whether an information is sufficient to protect a defendant from reprosecution is whether the record
shows with accuracy to what extent a defendant may plead a former acquittal or conviction.

11ll Indictment and Information 210 (;:::;;:;>71.4(12)
2 10 Indictment and Information
21 OV Requisites and Sufficiency of Accusation
2) Ok71 Certainty and Particularity
21 Ok71.4 Particular Allegations and Offenses
21 Ok71.4( 12) k. Rape and Other Sex Offenses; Offenses Relating to Minors. Most Cited Cases
Defendant did not show that the general nature of the information's allegations left him exposed to reprosecution for alleged
crimes involving lewd conduct with a minor; transcripts of defendant's preliminary hearing and trial identified the acts that
were the basis for the charges, and if a second prosecution were ever attempted, defendant could rely upon the record to
establish that he had already been convicted or acquitted of the crimes.

ll11lndictment and Information 210 (;:::;;:;>130
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210 Indictment and Information
21 OVI Joinder
21 Ok 126 Joinder of Counts; MUltiplicity
21 Ok 130 k. Distinct Offenses in General. Most Cited Cases
In charging two counts of lewd conduct with minor using identical language, State was not charging defendant twice for one
single act or for continuous course of conduct, but, instead, State was charging defendant for two separate and distinct acts
that occurred in same manner and during same span of time, and because these events were distinguishable as distinct crimes,
each incident was properly charged as independent offense; victim testified to two incidents of manual-genital touching that
occurred within that time period, victim said that first incident occurred when she was staying overnight at defendant's
trailer, and victim then described another incident that occurred on another trip to defendant's trailer.

J.!Jllndictment and Information 210

~128

210 Ind ictment and lnformati on
21 OVI Joinder
2 10k 126 Joinder of Counts; Multiplicity
21 Ok 128 k. Same Offense. Most Ci ted Cases
Multiplicity may occur if a defendant is charged with a single offense in more than one count of the information or the
indictment.

Jl.illndictment and Information 210 ~128

210 Indictment and Information
21 OVI Joinder
21 Okl26 Joinder of Counts; Multiplicity
21 Okl28 k. Same Offense. Most Cited Cases
The danger ofmultiplicitous charging is that a defendant could be subjected to mUltiple punishments for a single offense .

.L!.2.l. Criminal Law 110 ~29(1)
UQ Criminal Law
llQl Nature and Elements of Crime
II0k29 Different Offenses in Same Transaction
1I0k29( I ) k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Whether course of criminal conduct encompasses a single offense or multiple offenses depends upon whether there were
separate and distinct prohibited acts, and this determination requires an inquiry into the circumstances of the conduct, and
consideration ofthe intent and objective of the actor.

11§l Criminal Law II 0 ~29(l2)

I 10 Criminal Law
JJQ! Nature and Elements of Crime
II0k29 Different Offenses in Same Transaction
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II Ok29(5) Particular Offenses
I I 0k29( 12) k. Sex Offenses; Obscenity. Most Cited Cases
Although a series of sexual contacts which occur as part of a single incident constitute only one count of lewd conduct with a
minor chi Id, a number of sexual acts occurring on separate occasions constitute multiple offenses. I.e. § 18-1508.

llZllndictment and Information 210

~12S(4.1)

210 Indictment and Information
21 OVI Joinder
21 Ok 125 Duplicity
21 Ok 125(4) Series of Acts Constituting One or Same Offense
210kI25(4. J) k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Count of information charging that defendant engaged in lewd conduct with a minor between 1993 and August 2000 did not
charge defendant with more than one offense and therefore count was not duplicitous; rather, the count referred to the
commission of one single act, and while it was true that the evidence presented at trial described multiple such offenses
occurring within the alleged time frame, this did not create a duplicitous charge ..

@ Indictment and Information 210 ~125(1)

£lQ Indictment and Information
210VI Joinder
2 10k 125 Duplicity
21 Ok 125( I) k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Duplicity refers to the charging of more than one offense in a single count of the charging document.

J.l.2J.lndictment and Information 210 €==>125(1)

2 ] 0 Indi ctment and Information
21 OVI Joinder
210k125 Duplicity
21 Ok125( I) k. In General. Most Cited Cases
A duplicitous charge can prejudice the defendant in the shaping of evidentiary rulings, in producing a conviction on less than
a unanimous verdict as to each separate offense, in sentencing, in limiting review on appeal, and in exposing the defendant to
double jeopardy.

/201 Indictment and Information 210 ~125(4.1)

2 I 0 Indictment and Information
210VI Joinder
21Okl25 Duplicity
21 OkI25(4) Series of Acts Constituting One or Same Offense
21 Ok 125( 4.1) k. In General. Most Cited Cases
One instance of duplicity occurs when the prosecution fails to recognize that each repetition of an act constitutes a separate
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olfense and therefore includes a series of acts in one count.

illl Criminal Law 110 C=:>1l67(1)
ill Criminal Law
II OXXIV Review
IIOXXIV(Q) Harmless and Reversible Error
IIOkl167 Rulings as to Indictment or Pleas
II Ok1167( I) k. Indictment or Information in General. Most Cited Cases

Criminal Law 110 ~1l72.6

ill Criminal Law
II OXXlV Review
IIOXXlV(Q) Harmless and Reversible Error
II Ok 1172 Instructions
II Okll72.6 k. Inapplicable to Issue or Evidence. Most Cited Cases
A variance between the information and the evidence presented at trial or between the information and the jury instructions
requires reversal of the conviction only when the defendant was deprived of fair notice of the charge against which he must
defend or was left open to the risk of double jeopardy. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5.

1llJ. Criminal Law 110 ~814(1)
i l l Criminal Law
IIOXX Trial
IIOXX(G) Instructions: Necessity, Requisites, and Sufficiency
II Ok814 Application of Instructions to Case
II Ok8 14( I ) k. In General. Most Cited Cases

Indictment and Information 210

~171

210 Indictment and Information
210XIl Issues, Proof, and Variance
21 Okl70 Variance Between Allegations and Proof
210kl71 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Not all variances between the information and the evidence presented at trial or between the information and the jury
instructions are fatal; there is a marked distinction between a mere variance and a variance which is automatically fatal
because it amounts to an impermissible constructive amendment.

1231 Criminal Law 110 C;:::::>1167(1)
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ill Criminal Law
11OXXIV Review
I 10XXIV(Q) Harmless and Reversible Error
I IOkl167 Rulings as to Indictment or Pleas
I 10k 1167( I) k. Indictment or Information in General. Most Cited Cases

Indictment and Information 210 €;:;::>161 (5)

210 Indictment and Information
21 OX} Amendment
2 10k 161 Information
21 Okl61 (5) k. Accusation in General. Most Cited Cases
Law bars any amendment of the information that would charge the accused with a crime of a greater degree or a different
nature than that for which the defendant was bound over by the magistrate, and accordingly, where a variance alters the
information to the extent that the defendant is tried for a crime of a greater degree or a different nature, relief will be
warranted. I.C. § 19-1420.

Uillndictment and Information 210 €;:;::>176

210 Indictment and Information
2 lOX II Issues, Proof, and Variance
21 Ok 170 Variance Between Allegations and Proof
2 I Ok 176 k. Time of Offense. Most Cited Cases
In prosecution of defendant for lewd conduct with minor, fact that victim testified at the preliminary hearing that the two
events occurred approximately two weeks apart, but did not refer to that same time frame in testimony at trial was not a fatal
variance between the allegations of the information and the trial evidence; there was no inconsistency in victim's testimony,
victim was not required to testifY at trial as to the time lapse between the two incidents, and defendant was not subjected to a
possible conviction ofa different crime or a crime ofa different nature than that alleged in the information.

1251 Criminal Law 110 ~374

ll.Q Criminal Law
II0XVn Evidence
II0XVIl(F) Other Offenses
II 0k374 k. Proof and Effect of Other Offenses. Most Cited Cases

Infants 211

~20

£ll Infants
111 II Protection
211k20 k. Criminal Prosecutions Under Laws for Protection of Children. Most Cited Cases
There was no fatal variance between allegations of the information, charging defendant with lewd conduct with minor, and
the trial evidence when State presented evidence of two incidents of improper touching of victim that were not the bases of
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the charges and were not described at preliminary hearing; this testimony was admitted as evidence of other misconduct, and
after presentation of this evi dence, trial court gave limiting instruction, informing jury that they had just heard evidence that
defendant committed wrongs other than those for which he was on trial and that this evidence was presented only for limited
purpose of proving motive or opportunity. Rules of Evid., Rule 404(b).

llil Criminal Law 110 ~814(7)
llQ Criminal Law
IIOXX Trial
IIOXX(G) Instructions: Necessity, Requisites, and Sufficiency
IIOk814 Application oflnstructions to Case
II Ok814(7) k. Time and Place of Offense. Most Cited Cases
There was no fatal variance between the allegations of the information and the jury instructions because the court added "on
or about" to the time frame of the offenses alleged in the information, charging defendant with lewd conduct with minor; this
slight expansion of the time frame did not allow the jury to find defendant guilty of a different offense than that alleged in the
information.

1111 Criminal Law 110 ~374
l.J.Q. Criminal Law
I I OX VII Evidence
I 10XVI[(F) Other Offenses
II Ok374 k. Proof and Effect of Other Offenses. Most Cited Cases
State's notice to defendant of its intent to offer evidence of other crimes was sufficient to alert the defense to the general
nature of the additional testimony and to thereby avoid surprise; witnesses were identified in the notice, general type of
conduct alleged to have been committed was revealed in notice, and this information was sufficient to allow the
admissibility issue to be raised by defendant, no greater specificity was required, and defendant did not show that more
specific information would have aided in his defense. Rules of Evid., Rule 404(b).

1281 Constitutional Law 92 ~3806

92 Constitutional Law
92XXVI Equal Protection
92XXVI(F) Criminal Law
92k3802 Trial
92k3806 k. Instructions. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 92k250.2(5»

Criminal Law 110 ~785(3)

ill

Criminal Law

Il0XX Trial
IIOXX(G) Instructions: Necessity, Requisites, and Sufficiency
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110k785 Credibility of Witnesses
I IOk785(3) k. Sufficiency in General. Most Cited Cases
Pattern credibility instructions in the Idaho Civil Jury Instructions (LOJI) and Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions (lCJI) did not
violate equal protection; although the IDJI credibility instruction was longer and more detailed than the IC]I instruction, in
substance the two were alike, and defendant did not demonstrate that there was such a substantive difference between the two
instructions that criminal defendants were disadvantaged, and as a result, defendant showed no disparate treatment of
criminal defendants. U.S. CA. Const.Amend. 14; Const. Art. I, § 2.

1l2J. Constitutional Law 92 {:;:;:;;:>3041
92 Constitutional Law
92XXVI Equal Protection
92XXVI(A) In General
92XXV/(A)5 Scope of Doctrine in General
92k3038 Discrimination and Classification
92k3041 k. Similarly Situated Persons; Like Circumstances. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 92k2II(I»
The principle underlying equal protection is that all persons in like circumstances should receive the same benefits and
burdens of the law. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14; Const. Art. I. § 2.

UQJ. Constitutional Law 92 {:;:;:;;:>3041

92 Constitutional Law
92XXVI Equal Protection
92XXVI(A) In General
92XXVJ(A)5 Scope of Doctrine in General
92k3038 Discrimination and Classification
92k3041 k. Similarly Situated Persons; Like Circumstances. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 92k211 (I»
No equal protection analysis is required and no violation of equal protection will be found in situations where the State has
not engaged in the disparate treatment of similarly situated individuals. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14; Const. Art. I, § 2.

Lllllnfants 211 {:;:;:;;:>20

211 Infants
211 Il Protection
211 k20 k. Criminal Prosecutions Under Laws for Protection of Children. Most Cited Cases
Charge of lewd conduct with minor was supported by sufficient evidence as to the material elements of the crime, and thus,
defendant was not entitled to judgment of acquittal; the only allegation that defendant claimed the State failed to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt was the time at which the offense occurred, but time was not a material element to the crime of
lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor, slight variance between the charge and the evidence as to speci fic date of offense
was not material, and defendant did not show that lack of notice of specific date prejudiced his defense.
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1lli Criminal Law 110 ~753.2(5)
ill Criminal Law
110XX Trial
1 IOXX(F) Province of Court and Jury in General
I IOk753 Direction of Verdict
II Ok753.2 Of Acquittal
IIOk753.2(3) Insufficiency of Evidence
II Ok753.2(5) k. Sufficiency to Warrant Conviction or to Present Jury Question. Most Cited Cases

A motion for a judgment of acquittal must be granted if there is insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction on the challenged
offense. Criminal Rule 29.

UJl Criminal Law 1 10 ~1l34.70
llQ Criminal Law
II OXXIV Review
I IOXXIWL) Scope of Review in General
II OXXIWL)7 Nature of Decision Appealed from as Affecting Scope of Review
II Okl134.70 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 1 IOkI134(8»
Upon review of the denial of motion for judgment of acquittal, appellate court independently reviews the evidence in the
record to determine if reasonable minds could conclude that the defendant's guilt on each material element was proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.

1341 Infants 211

~20

211 Infants
211 II Protection
lli.k2.Q k. Criminal Prosecutions Under Laws for Protection of Children. Most Cited Cases

Sentencing and Punishment 350H ~102

350H Sentencing and Punisiunent
350HI Punishment in General
350HI(E) Factors Related to Offender
350Hk93 Other Offenses, Charges, Misconduct
350HkJ02 k. Lack of Significant Prior Record. Most Cited Cases

Sentencing and Punishment 350H (;:;:;:>116

350H Sentencing and Punishment
350HI Punishment in General
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350HUE) Factors Related to Offender
350Hkl16 k. Dangerousness. Most Cited Cases
Sentence oflife imprisonment, with five years determinate, for lewd conduct with a minor under 16 was proper; although this
was defendant's first felony conviction, there was evidence that the abuse of victims occurred over a number of years, and
according to a psychosexual evaluation, defendant presented a high risk of reoffending.

.l.J.2l Criminal Law 110 C=:>1l56.2
ill Criminal Law
II OXXIV Review
IIOXXIV{N) Discretion of Lower Court
I 10k 1156. I Sentencing
II Ok1156.2 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly I IOkl14 7)
When a sentence is imposed within the maximum permitted for the offense, appellate court reviews the sentence for an abuse
of discretion.

lJ§l Criminal Law 110 C=:>1141(2)

lJ..Q Criminal Law
I 1OXXIV Review
1 IOXXIV(M) Presumptions
11Ok 1141 In General
1lOki 141 (2) k. Burden of Showing Error. Most Cited Cases
If the sentence is not illegal, the appellant has the burden to show that it is unreasonable, and thus a clear abuse of discretion.

1371 Sentencing and Punishment 350H C=:>31
3 SOH Sentencing and Punishment

350HI Punishment in General
350HI(B) Extent of Punishment in General
350Hk31 k. Discretion of Court. Most Cited Cases
A sentence may represent an abuse of discretion if it is shown to be unreasonable upon the facts of the case.

(381 Sentencing and Punishment 350H C=:>40

3 SOH Sentencing and Punishment

350HI Punishment in General
350HI(C) Factors or Purposes in General
350Hk40 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
A sentence of confinement is reasonable if it appears that the confinement is necessary to accomplish the primary objective
of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution applicable to a
given case.
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**885 *45 Michael J. Wood, Twin Falls, for appellant.

Han. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Lori A. Fleming. Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Lori A.
Fleming argued.

LANSING, Chief Judge.

Bobby Dean Jones appeals from the judgment of conviction entered after he was found guilty by a jury of lewd conduct with
a minor child under sixteen. On appeal, Jones contends that the information filed by the State was defective in several
respects, that there was a fatal variance between the information**886 *46 and the evidence, and that the prosecutor gave
insufficient notice of intent to offer evidence of uncharged incidents of inappropriate touching. Jones also asserts that the
district court erred by using a pattern criminal jury instruction on credibility rather than Jones's proposed instruction, by
denying Jones's motion for ajudgment of acquittal, and by imposing an excessive sentence.

I.

BACKGROUND

Jones was charged with five counts oflewd conduct with a minor child under sixteen, Idaho Code § 18-1508, for acts he was
alleged to have committed with two of his granddaughters. Before trial, Jones moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that the
information failed to alleged sufficient facts to meet the due process requirement of adequate notice and protection against
double jeopardy, that counts one and two were duplicitous because they charged identical and indistinguishable crimes, and
that count five was unconstitutional because it charged defendant with multiple criminal acts in one count rather than a single
criminal act. The district court denied the motion.

After a trial, a jury found Jones guilty on four of the five counts. The court sentenced Jones to concurrent unified terms of life
imprisonment, with five years determinate. Jones now appeals.

II.

ANALYSIS

A. Sufficiency of the Information

L.ll.Ul Jones argues, as he did in his pretrial motion, that the information was insufficient to apprise him of the nature of the
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charges against him and to protect him from a second prosecution for the same crimes. More specifically, he argues that the
information identified no particular time, no location, no information on the presence of other witnesses, or any other
information which might have aided him in identitying the particular incidents for which he was charged.

Wl±l

The sufficiency of an information is a question of law over which we exercise free review. Stale

I'.

Holcomb, 128

Idaho 296, 300, 912 P.2d 664, 668 (Ct.App.1995); Stale v. Robran. 119 Idaho 285, 287, 805 P.2d 491. 493 (Ct.App.1991).
An information is legally sufficient if it contains "a plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts
constituting the offense charged." Idaho Criminal Rule 7(b). See also I.C. § 19-1409; State v. Owen, 129 Idaho 920, 926,
935 P.2d 183, 189 (Ct.ApD.1997). Ultimately, the sufficiency of the information depends upon whether it fulfills the basic
functions of a pleading instrument by informing the defendant of the charges against which he must defend and enabling him to
plead an acquittal or conviction in order to avoid reprosecution for the same offense. State v, Coleman. 128 Idaho 466,471,
915 P.2d 28,33 (Ct.App.1996); Holcomb. 128 Idaho at 300,912 P.2d at 668.

liJ.[QJ We first address Jones's argument concerning the lack of specific details in the information regarding how the criminal
acts were alleged to have been committed. Although an information must contain the essential facts, the State is not required
to disclose in the information the evidence which it relies upon to prove its case. State v. McKeehan, 91 Idaho 808, 815,430
P.2d 886, 893 (1967). In addition, a defendant generally cannot be prejudiced by the absence of specific details in the
information when those details are either already known to the defendant or are provided to him by means other than the
information, such as through preliminary hearing testimony. Owen. 129 Idaho at 927,935 P.2d at 190. See also Holcomb.
128 Idaho at 300,912 P.2d at 668. Here, the allegations of the information, though general, are sufficient.

In addition, Jones was fully apprised of the acts he was charged with committing at the preliminary hearing. During that
hearing, the State presented the victims' testimony about the surrounding circumstances and the manner in which the offenses
were alleged to have been committed. The preliminary hearing eliminated any uncertainty and gave Jones notice of the
details of the charges against him. Therefore, Jones has suffered **887 *47 no prejudice from the manner in which the
information pleaded the charges.

LZJl8J Jones's next argument,

that the information was insufficient for failure to allege a specific time of the offenses, is also

without merit. Under I.C. § 19-1414, the "precise time at which the offense was committed need not be stated in the
indictment; but it may be alleged to have been committed at any time before the finding thereof, except where the time is a
material ingredient in the offense." Time is not a material element of the crime of lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor.

State v, Roberts, 101 Idaho 199,200,610 P.2d 558, 559 (1980); State v. Marks, 120 Idaho 727, 729, 819 P.2d 581, 583
(Ct.App.1991 ). The Idaho Supreme Court has stated that "[a]ny other rule would too often preclude prosecutions in this type
of case where the victims are minors and where the crimes are not discovered until some time after their commission."

Roberts, I 0 I Idaho at 200, 610 P.2d at 559. Although the alleged incident should be set forth with as much specificity as
possible, the charges may be pleaded generally when the record shows that the State could not plead with any more
specificity. Marks, 120 Idaho at 729, 819 P.2d at 583.

In the instant case, the information alleged that the offenses occurred between the spring of 1999 and the spring of 2000
FNI

(counts I and II), during the fall 0[2000 (count IV), and between 1993 and August 2000 (count V),- The record shows that
as to counts I, II and IV, the State could not have pleaded the charges with any greater particularity, The victim, L.J., was
young, between eight and ten years old, at the time these lewd acts were alleged to have been committed. She frequently
visited Jones at his home, where the abuse was alleged to have occurred. It is unrealistic to expect her to be able to recall
dates specifically given her age and the time span over which the acts were alleged to have occurred. Jones has not shown
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that the lack of greater specificity in the dates somehow inhibited his ability to defend against the charges or subjects him to
the risk of another prosecution for the same offenses.

FN I. Jones was found not guilty of count III, so any argument regarding the sufficiency of that charge is moot.

L2l As

to count V, however, the allegation of a seven-year span is not explained by the record, and it appears that the State

could have narrowed that allegation considerably. This pleading deficiency does not, however, entitle Jones to relief. As
noted above, vagueness in the allegations of an information may be cured through preliminary hearing testimony that informs
the defendant of the details of the State's allegations. Here, the victim referenced in count V testified at the preliminary
hearing, when she was twelve years old, that the offense occurred about three years earlier, when she was eight or nine. This
testimony narrowed the time frame and prevented any prejudice to Jones from the lack of specificity in the pleading.

{I 0][ II] Lastly, Jones contends that the information was insufficient to protect him against suffering a second prosecution for
the same offenses. The test in determining whether an information is sufficient to protect a defendant from reprosecution is
"whether the record shows with accuracy to what extent a defendant may plead a former acquittal or conviction." Coleman,
128 Idaho at 471, 9 I 5 P.2d at 33. Transcripts of Jones's preliminary hearing and trial identitY the acts that are the basis for
the charges in this case. If a second prosecution were ever attempted, Jones could rely upon the record to establish that he
had already been convicted or acquitted of the crimes. See State v. Windsor. 110 Idaho 410.418 n. I. 716 P.2d 1182. 1190
n. I (1985). Accordingly, Jones has not shown that the general nature of the information's allegations leaves him exposed to
reprosecution for these crimes.

B. Multiplicity of Counts I and II

LUl Jones next argues that he was

improperly charged in counts I and II because those counts are multiplicitous. He contends

that because the counts are worded identically, they improperly charge him with two counts for what is actually a single
offense.

**888 [13][14] *48 Idaho Code § 19-1432 allows for the charging of two or more offenses in the same indictment or
information if the offenses charged "are of the same or similar character or are based on the same act or transaction or on
two (2) or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan." However,
multiplicity may occur if a defendant is charged with a single offense in more than one count of the information or the
indictment. Sanchez v. State. 127 Idaho 709. 713-14. 905 P.2d 642. 646-47 (Ct.App.1995). The danger ofmultiplicitous
charging is that a defendant could be subjected to multiple punishments for a single offense. State v. A5Jl1ilar, 135 Idaho 894.
897.26 P.3d 1231. 1234 (Ct.App.2001).

[ I 5)[ 16] Whether a circumstance encompasses a single offense or multiple offenses depends upon whether there were
separate and distinct prohibited acts. Miller v. Stare. 135 Idaho 261. 267. 16 P.3d 937. 943 (Ct.App.2000); Sanchez. 127
Idaho at 713- 14, 905 P.2d at 646-47. This determination requires an inquiry into the "circumstances of the conduct, and
consideration of the 'intent and objective of the actor.' " State v. Major. III Idaho 410,414,725 P.2d 115, 119 (1986)
(quoting In re Ward. 64 Cal.2d 672,51 Cal. Rptr. 272, 414 P.2d 400 (1966». Thus, although a series of sexual contacts
which occur as part of a single incident constitute only one count of lewd conduct under

I.e. § 18-1508, a number of sexual

acts occurring on separate occasions constiMe multiple offenses. Miller. 135 Idaho at 266-67, 16 P.3d at 942-43.
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In the instant case, counts I and II both alleged that:

Bobby Dean Jones, during the Spring of 1999 to the Spring of2000, in the County of Gooding, State of Idaho, did willfully
and lewdly, commit a lewd and lascivious act upon and/or with the body of a minor, L.J., under the age of sixteen years,
to-wit: eight or nine (8 or 9) years of age, by manual-genital contact, to-wit: by touching L.J. in or upon her vagina with his
finger, with the intent to arouse, appeal to or gratifY the lust, passion or sexual desire of the defendant and/or said minor
child.

In charging counts I and II using identical language, the State was not charging Jones twice for one single act, nor were they
charging him for a continuous course of conduct. Rather, the State was charging Jones for two separate and distinct acts that
occurred in the same manner and during the same span of time. L.J. testified to two incidents of manual-genital touching that
occurred within that time period. She said that the first incident occurred when she and her brother were staying overnight at
Jones's trailer while A.J. (L.J.'s sister) attended a birthday party. L.J. stated that she was sleeping in the back bedroom when
Jones came in the room and put his hand on L.J.'s vagina. L.J. then described another incident that occurred on another trip to
Jones's trailer, this time with A.J. L.J. said that Jones again came into the bedroom, got into the bed with her, and fondled her
vagina. Because these events were clearly distinguishable as distinct crimes, each incident was properly charged as an
independent offense.

C. Count V

Il1l Jones also contends that the charge contained in count V was "fatally duplicitous"

because, at trial, the victim testified
about mUltiple acts that matched the allegations in the information and that occurred during the time period charged in the
jnformation.

[ 18)[ 19][20J Duplicity refers to the charging of more than one offense in a single count of the charging document. Major, III
Idaho at 414. 725 P.2d at 119; State v. Chapa. 127 Idaho 786. 789. 906 P.2d 636, 639 (Ct.App.1995). See also WAYNE R.
LA FA VE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 19.3(c), at 775 (2d ed. I999). A duplicitous charge can prejudice the
defendant "in the shaping of evidentiary rulings, in producing a conviction on less than a unanimous verdict as to each
separate offense, in sentencing, in limiting review on appeal, and in exposing the defendant to double jeopardy." Major. III
Idaho at 414, 725 P.2d at 119 (quoting WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 19.2(e)
(1984». One instance of duplicity occurs when the prosecution fails to recognize that each repetition of an act constitutes a
separate offense and therefore includes a **889 *49 series of acts in one count. See Bins v. United Stales, 331 F.2d 390 (5th
Cir.1964); LAFAVE, CRlMINAL PROCEDURE § 19.3(C), at 776 n. 81.

Contrary to Jones's assertion, the charge in count V is not duplicitous because the count does not charge him with more than
one offense; rather, the count refers to the commission of one single act. While it is true that the evidence presented at trial
described multiple such offenses occurring within the alleged time frame, this does not create a duplicitous charge. FN2

FN2. When the evidence describes several distinct criminal acts of the type charged, but the defendant is charged
with only one count, the defendant is entitled to a jury instruction informing the jury that they must agree upon one
single act committed by the defendant in order to find him guilty. Miller, 135 Idaho at 268, 16 P.3d at 944. Such an
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instruction was given in this case.

D. Variance in the Evidence and the Jury Instructions

[21 ][22][23] Jones also contends that there were fatal variances between the allegations of the information and the trial
evidence and jury instructions, which resulted in a constructive amendment of the charges. A variance between the
intormation and the evidence presented at trial or between the information and the jury instructions requires reversal of the
conviction only when the defendant was deprived offair notice of the charge against which he must defend or was left open
to the risk of double jeopardy. Slare v. Windsor, 110 Idaho 410, 417-18, 716 P.2d 1182, 1189-90 (1985); Slale v. Brazil,
136 Idaho 327, 330, 33 P.3d 218, 221 (Ct.App.2001); Stale v. Colwell, 124 Idaho 560,565-66,861 P.2d 1225, 1230-31
(Ct.App.1993 ). Not all variances are fatal because "there is a marked distinction between a 'mere variance' and a variance
which is automatically fatal because it amounts to an impennissible 'constructive amendment.'" Colwell, 124 Idaho at
565-66,861 P.2d 1225, 1230-31 (quoting WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 19.2
(1984)). Idaho law bars any amendment of the information that would charge the accused with a crime of a greater degree or
a different nature than that for which the defendant was bound over by the magistrate. Colwell, 124 Idaho at 566, 861 P.2d at

l2.ll" See also

I.C. § 19-1420. Accordingly, where a variance alters the information to the extent that the defendant is tried

for a crime of a greater degree or a different nature, reliefwill be warranted.

L21l Jones

first claims that there is a variance with respect to the first two counts of the information, both alleging offenses

against L.J., because L.J. testified at the preliminary hearing that the two events occurred approximately two weeks apart but
she did not refer to that same time frame testimony at trial. Contrary to Jones's assertion, this is not a variance, nor is there
any inconsistency in her testimony. L.J. was not required to testifY at trial as to the time lapse between the two incidents.
Jones was not subjected to a possible conviction of a different crime or a crime of a different nature than that alleged in the
information.

[25] Second, Jones claims there was a variance because the State presented evidence of two incidents of improper touching
of LJ. that were not the bases of the charges and were not described at the preliminary hearing. He contends that this amounts
to a fatal variance because the jury could have used this evidence to convict him, thereby resulting in a conviction for a crime
that he was not charged with. Jones's argument is without merit. This testimony was specifically admitted as evidence of
other misconduct for purposes that are permissible under I.R.E, 404(b). Immediately after presentation of this evidence, the
court gave the jurors a limiting instruction, informing them that they had just heard evidence that the defendant committed
wrongs or acts "other than that for which the defendant is on trial" and that this evidence was presented only for the limited
purpose of proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge or absence of mistake. Given this limiting
instruction, no fatal variance existed.

(26] Lastly, Jones argues that the court's instructions to the jury constituted a fatal variance because the court added "on or
about" to the time frame of the offenses alleged in the information. He contends that **890 *50 this broadened the bases upon
which Jones might be convicted. We disagree. This slight expansion of the time frame does not allow the jury to find Jones
guilty of a different offense than that alleged in the information. Jones has identified no fatal variances between the
information and the evidence or jury instructions.

E. Rule 404(b) Notice
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Ull Prior to trial, the State gave Jones written notice of its intent to offer evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts pursuant
to Rule 404(b) of the Idaho Rules of Eyidence. Specifically, the notice referred to evidence of "prior acts of improper
touching by the defendant of [L.l., AJ., L.M.] .... " Jones filed a motion in limine to exclude such evidence, asserting that the
State's notice was insufficient because it did not disclose any details of the anticipated testimony. At the hearing on the
motion in limine, the State made an offer of proof regarding the testimony of L.M. but the prosecutor said that he did not
know exactly what testimony would be given by the victims, L.J. and AJ., concerning incidents of uncharged improper
touching. Jones asked that the court limit the testimony of L.J. and AJ. to those incidents to which they testified at the
preliminary hearing, but the court refused to do so. Rather, the court chose to reserve ruling on that potential testimony until
the trial, if and when the State proffered testimony about other incidents.
During the trial, L.J. testified about two incidents of improper touching which she had not mentioned in the preliminary
hearing. Jones objected to this testimony, asserting that the State had not provided adequate notice of this Rule 404(b)
evidence. The court overruled Jones's objection. The court also gave the jury a limiting instruction, stating that the testimony
was not to be considered as proof of the defendant's character or as proof that the defendant has a disposition to commit
crimes. On appeal, Jones challenges the district court's ruling that the notice of intent was sufficient. He argues that the State's
notice did not adequately describe the incidents about which testimony would be given.

Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides that evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts may be admissible at trial for
purposes of proving matters other than bad character or propensity for crime. However, admissibility is conditioned on the
prosecution filing and serving "notice reasonably in advance of trial ... of the general nature of any such evidence it intends
to introduce at trial." I.R.E. 404(b). This Idaho rule is nearly identical to its federal counterpart, Federal Rule of Evidence
404(b). Because the issue of the extent of disclosure required by I.R.E. 404(b) has never been addressed by Idaho appellate
courts, we will examine federal authority concerning the notice requirement.

The committee notes regarding the 1991 amendment to F.R.E. 404(b), which added the notice requirement, are instructive.
They indicate that the amendment was intended "to reduce surprise and promote early resolution on the issue of
admissibility," and was not intended to require the prosecution to disclose the names and addresses of its witnesses. The
committee notes also state that no specific fonn of notice is required and that the committee opted to allow for a generalized
notice provision which would only require the prosecution to inform the defense of the general nature of the evidence.
Accordingly, under the federal rules, the notice need not contain specifics but rather may be of a general nature, sufficient
merely to apprise the defendant of its existence and avoid surprise.

We observe that the Rule 404(b) notice is not the only mechanism by which a defendant may obtain information about the
contemplated evidence. If a notice provided by the State contemplates testimony from a witness who was not previously
disclosed, and if the defendant requested the names of witnesses under I.C.R. 16(b), the State would be obligated to
supplement its disclosure pursuant to I.C.R. 16(i). Further, if upon receipt of the notice the defendant believes that additional
information is necessary, additional discovery may be requested under I.C.R. 16(b)(8). The existence of these alternatives
weighs in favor of allowing considerable generality in Rule 404(b) notice.

**891 *51 The notice in the present case was sufficient to alert the defense to the general nature of the additional testimony
and to thereby avoid surprise. The witnesses were identified in the notice, and the general type of conduct alleged to have
been committed was revealed also. This information was sufficient to allow the admissibility issue to be raised by Jones
although the trial court elected not to rule on admissibility before the trial. No greater specificity is required by I.R.E.
404(b). Moreover, Jones has not shown that more specific information would have aided in his defense. The district court
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committed no error in determining that the notice requirement of I.R.E. 404(b) was met.

F. Credibility Instruction

1m Jones next contends that the district court erred in refusing Jones's proposed instruction on credibil ity, which was based
on the pattern credibility instruction in the Idaho Civil Jury Instructions (lDJI). He argues that the credibility instruction
provided in the Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions (ICJI), which is the instruction used by the court, gives the jury insufficient
guidance for the determination of witness credibility. Jones does not assert that the court's instruction misstates the law;
rather, he contends that the pattern instructions discriminate against criminal defendants because the [OJI credibility
instruction provides the jury with more direction than does the IClI instruction. According to Jones, this discrimination is
violative of his right to equal protection.

[29][30] Equa[ protection of the law is guaranteed by Article I, Section 2 of the Idaho Constitution and by the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. Northcutt v. Sun Valley Co., 117 Idaho 35 I. 357. 787 P.2d 1159. 1165 ([ 990).
The principle underlying equal protection is that all persons in like circumstances should receive the same benefits and
burdens of the law. Bon Appeat Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. State, Dep't o[Employment, 117 Idaho 1002, 1003, 793 P.2d 675,
676 (l989);Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397,401, 973 P.2d 749,753 (Ct.App.1999). Accordingly, no equal protection
analysis is required and no violation of equal protection will be found in situations where the State has not engaged in the
disparate treatment of similarly situated individuals. Shobe v. Ada County, Bd. or Comm'rs, 130 Idaho 580. 585-86, 944
P.2d715. 720-21 (1997); Stafe v. ROZlntree, 129 Idaho 146. 151. 922 P.2d [072. 1077 (Ct.App.1996).

Jones's claim of an equal protection violation is without merit. Although the IDJI credibi Iity instruction is longer and more
detailed than the ICJI instruction, in substance the two are alike. Jones has not demonstrated that there is such a substantive
difference between the two instructions that criminal defendants are disadvantaged. As a result, he has shown no disparate
treatment of criminal defendants.

G. Motion for Acquittal on Count IV

[3 I] At the conclusion of the State's case, Jones moved for a judgment of acquittal on all counts. With regard to count IV,
Jones argued that the State had failed to establish any improper touching in "the fall of2000," as alleged in the information,
because L.J. testified that the last time that Jones had touched her was on August 8, 2000, two days after her tenth birthday.
The court denied Jones's motion. On appeal, Jones renews his argument that count IV was unsupported by the evidence
because the State failed to prove that any lewd conduct occurred in the "fall of2000."

[32)[331 A motion for ajudgrnent of acquittal under LC.R. 29(a) must be granted if there is insufficient evidence to sustain a
conviction on the challenged offense. State v. Dietrich. 135 Idaho 870. 873. 26 P.3d 53. 56 (Ct.App.200 I ); State v.
Gonzalez. 134 Idaho 907, 909.12 P.3d 382. 384 (Ct.App.2000). Upon review of the denial of such a motion, this Court
independently reviews the evidence in the record to determine ifreasonab[e minds could conclude that the defendant's guilt
on each material element was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Henry, 138 Idaho 364, 368, 63 P.3d 490. 494
(Ct.App.2003); Gonzalez, 134 Idaho at 909, 12 P.3d at 384.
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**892 *52 The only allegation that Jones claims the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt is the time at which the
offense occurred. However, as we stated above, time is not a material element to the crime of lewd and lascivious conduct
with a minor. See Coleman, 128 Idaho at 471, 915 P.2d at 33; Marks, 120 Idaho at 729, 819 P.2d at 583. Even if August 8
may not be considered "fall," this slight variance between the charge and the evidence was not material, and Jones has not
shown that the lack of notice of the specific date prejudiced his defense. Because the charge in count IV is supported by
sufficient evidence as to the material elements of the crime, we affirm the district court's denial of Jones's motion for
judgment of acquittal.

H. Sentence

llil

Lastly, Jones contends that the sentences imposed by the district court are excessive in light of his advanced age, his

lack of a prior felony record and the fact that he has strong family support.

[35)[36J[37)[38] Our standards for appellate review ofa sentence are well settled. When a sentence is imposed within the
maximum permitted for the offense, we review the sentence for an abuse of discretion. State v. Anderson, 103 Idaho 622,
623, 651 P.2d 556, 557 (Ct.App.1982). If the sentence is not illegal, the appellant has the burden to show that it is
unreasonable, and thus a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Brown. 121 Idaho 385, 393. 825 P.2d 482, 490 (1992). A
sentence may represent such an abuse if it is shown to be unreasonable upon the facts of the case. Slate v. Nice, 103 Idaho
89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (I 982). A sentence of confinement is reasonable if it appears that the confinement is necessary "to
accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence,
rehabilitation or retribution applicable to a given case." State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710
(Ct.App.1982).

Although this is Jones's first felony conviction, there is evidence that the abuse of LJ., AJ., and another granddaughter
occurred over a number of years. According to a psychosexual evaluation, Jones presented a high risk of reoffending. We
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Jones.

III.

CONCLUSION

Jones has not shown any fatal deficiencies in the information or reversible trial error, and his sentences are not excessive.
Therefore, the judgment of conviction and sentences are affirmed.

Judge GUTIERREZ and Judge Pro Tem WALTERS CONCUR.
Idaho App.,2003.
State v. Jones
140 Idaho 41,89 P.3d 881
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JOHN T. BUJAK
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
Canyon County Courthouse
1115 Albany&
Caldwell, Idaho 83606-0668
Telephone: (208) 454-7391

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

THE STATE OF IDAHO
Plaintiff,

VANCE WATKINS,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CR2008-26831

RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S
FIRST MOTION TO SUPPRESS

---------------------------)
COMES NOW, Erica M. Kallin, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Canyon County, State
of Idaho, and hereby submits the following Response to Defendant's First Motion Suppress.
The Defendant moves for the suppression of his admissions and confessions made to
Detectives Brandy Sutherland, Angela Weekes and Victor Terry of the Nampa Police
Department. This motion is based on the interview that took place between the Detectives and
the Defendant on December 1, 2004. The Defendant has previously filed a Motion to Suppress
the evidence, as well as the statements the Defendant made during the Detention Order, which
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S
FIRST MOTION TO SUPPRESS
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was denied by Judge Hoff. This motion should be denied because: 1) it is time bared, 2)

Miranda[ll requirements were not required because he was not in-custody, and 3) even if the
Defendant was in custody, the Defendant was properly advised his Miranda rights and never
invoked. Therefore, his statements were not the result of any constitutional violations, and his
motion to suppress should be denied.

The Defendant cannot challenge the statements made during the
Detention Order, as they are the law of the case.
The Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress all evidence obtained during the Detention
Order, including the statements made by the Defendant on June 10,2005. This motion was
heard by Judge Hoff on August 26, 2005 and was denied. The Defendant did not raise the denial
of his Motion to Suppress on Appeal. As such, the Court's ruling is now the law of the case on
that issue. Under the law of the case principle, "on a second or subsequent appeal the courts
generally will not consider errors which arose prior to the first appeal and which might have been
raised as issues in the earlier appeal." Jarman v. Hale, 122 Idaho 952, 956, 842 P.2d 288,292
(Ct. App. 1992); Capps v. Wood, 117 Idaho 614, 618, 790 P.2d 395,399 (Ct. App. 1990). This
doctrine discourages piecemeal litigation and is consistent with the analogous doctrine of res
judicata. Jarman, 122 Idaho at 956,842 P.2d at 292; Capps, 117 Idaho at 618, 790 P.2d at 399.
The law of the case principle operates to preclude a party from raising issues which could have
been, but which were not, raised in thelfirst appeal. See Capps, 117 Idaho 614, 790 P.2d 395 (Ct.
App. 1990). As such, the Defendant is barred from arguing any of the statements made.

[I)

Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. 436(1966).
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The Defendant is time barred from filing any motions pursuant to ICR 12.
Idaho Criminal Rule 12(d) states:
Motions pursuant to Rule 12(b) must be filed within twenty-eight
(28) days after the entry of a plea of not guilty or seven (7) days
before trial whichever is earlier ... The court in its discretion may
shorten or enlarge the time provided herein, and for good cause
shown, or for excusable neglect, may relieve a party of failure to
comply with this rule.
A motion to suppress is a 12(b) motion. Idaho Criminal Rule 12 requires that a motion to
suppress be filed within twenty-eight days of the entry of a plea of not guilty, or seven days
before trial, whichever is earlier. I.C.R. 12(b), I.C.R. 12(d). A party's failure to meet the
deadline constitutes a waiver of the motion. I.C.R. 12(f). A court may relieve a party's failure to
comply with the rule only if the party shows good cause or excusable neglect for the failure.
LC.R. 12(d); See State v. Gleason, 130 Idaho 586 (Ct. App. 1997); see also State v. Dice, 126
Idaho 595, 597 (Ct. App. 1994). A cOl}rt may not "arbitrarily enlarge or shorten the filing
requirements of the rule"; to "permit a court to do so without the required exempting factors
would emasculate the intent of the rule." State v. Alanis, 109 Idaho 884, 888 (Idaho 1985). In
fact, it is abuse of discretion for the court to consider an untimely filed motion to suppress if
there has not been a finding of good cause or excusable neglect. Id If a party has failed to meet
the deadline, a court may not hear a motion simply because it appears meritorious. State v. Dice,
126 Idaho 595, 597 (Idaho App. 1994). To do so would "eviscerate the purpose of the rule." Id.

RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S
FIRST MOTION TO SUPPRESS
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Consequently, if good cause or excusable neglect is not shown by the moving party, the court
may not hear the motion. Id.
In this case, the Defendant entered a plea of not guilty on December 22, 2004 in front of
Judge Culet. His case proceeded to Jury Trial on August 20, 2005. Thus, the deadline for the
Defendant to file a motion to suppress was January 19,2005, twenty-eight days after the entry of
his plea, because January 19, 2005 is eatlier than seven days prior to the trial. The Defendant
filed his first motion to suppress on June 10, 2005 which was 170 days after his arraignment;
however, the State did not raise a timeliness issue. The Defendant has filed a Motion to
Suppress on May 21,2010. Even if the Defendant was allowed to file any and all motions again
after remand (which is not consistent with the case law), the Defendant was arraigned on
February 4, 2010 and the time to file motions lapsed on March 4, 201 O.Now the Defendant is
trying to get another bite at the apple 2020 days after his first arraignment, and 106 days after his
arraignment after remand. This is well beyond the time proscribed by the statute. The Defense
has made no showing of good cause as to why the time to file motions should be extended by

1992 days. The Defendant never filed for Post Conviction Relief from his original trial. As
such, the defendant is bared from arguing excusable neglect or ineffective assistance of counsel
on the part of his prior attorney. There has been absolutely no showing of good cause or
excusable neglect, so the Court must deny the motion to suppress.

RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S
FIRST MOTION TO SUPPRESS
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The Defendant was not in custody either for the purposes of
either the 4th or 5th Amendments
The Defendant contends that he was in custody for both the purpose of a Fourth
Amendment Detention and Fifth Amendment Custody. The State disagrees. Therefore, the
Fourth Amendment issue will be addressed first, followed by analysis of the Fifth Amendment
argument.

a.

The Defendant was not in custody for

lh Amendment purposes

Generally, there are three types of contacts between law enforcement and private citizens:
(1) consensual encounter (not a seizure, and therefore no justification is required); (2)
stop/investigation detention (a seizure justified by reasonable suspicion); and (3) actual arrest
(a seizure justified by probable cause). See State v. Holcomb, 128 Idaho 296 (Ct. App. 1995);

State v. Zubizareta, 122 Idaho 823 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Knapp, 120 Idaho 343 (Ct. App.
1991); and State v. Zapp, 108 Idaho 723 (Ct. App. 1985). The Defendant's Motion to Suppress
does not deal with an "actual arrest" contact, but rather whether or not the Detectives contact
with the Defendant was a consensual contact or a stop/investigative detention. The State
contends that it was a consensual encounter.
The landmark cases in the area of consensual encounters are Us. v. Mendenhall, 446
U.S. 544 (1980) and Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991). The Court in Bostick clearly noted
that not all contacts between officers and citizens involve a seizure within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. See Bostick, 501 U.S. 429; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); State v. Reese,
132 Idaho 652 (1999); State v. Nickel, 134 Idaho 610, 7 P.3d 219 (2000); and State v. Clifford,

RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S
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130 Idaho 259 (Ct. App. 1997). An individual is not seized unless their liberty is restrained by
either an officer's show of authority or use of physical force. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S.
621 (1991); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980); Terry, 392 U.S. 1; Reese, 132
Idaho 652, State v. Cardenas, 143 Idaho 903, 155 P.3d 704 (Ct. App. 2006); and State v.

Agundis, 127 Idaho 587 (Ct. App. 1995). A consensual encounter is not a seizure and it does not
implicate the Fourth Amendment. See Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, and Bostick, 501 U.S. 429.
Therefore, an officer does not need to establish reasonable suspicion or probable cause to justify
such an encounter.
A consensual encounter includes situations where an officer approaches an individual on
the street, in a parked vehicle, or in another public place and engages them in mere conversation
and asks them questions if they choose to listen. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429; Florida v. Rodriguez,
469 U.S. 1 (1984); INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491

(1983); Clifford, 130 Idaho 259; Zubizareta, 122 Idaho 823 (Ct. App. 1992); and State v. Jordan,
122 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1992). An individual that makes contact with law enforcement, such as
arriving at a police station on his own accord, falls well below a consensual encounter. Should
the Defendant raise the issue that this was a detention, the State will discuss that this contact did
not even arise to the level of a consensual encounter let alone a detention.
"So long as a reasonable person would feel free to go about his or her business, an
encounter with a police officer is consensual and the encounter need not be justified by
reasonable suspicion." Id; Bostick, 501 U.S. 429. "Only when the officer, by means of
physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may [the
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S
FIRST MOTION TO SUPPRESS
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court] conclude that a 'seizure' has occurred." Terry, 392 U.S. at 19, n. 16.; see also State v.

Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474,479 (Ct. App., 1999); Reese, 132 Idaho at 653; State v. Pick, 124 Idaho
601,604 (Ct. App., 1993)Y] In other words, unless the circumstances of the encounter are "so
intimidating as to demonstrate that a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to
leave ifhe had not responded," one cannot say that an officer's request results in a seizure within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Nelson, 134 Idaho at 678; Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216.
"As a result, a police officer generally does not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely
approaching an individual on the street or in another public place, by asking if the person is
willing to answer some questions or by putting questions to him or here if the person is willing to
listen." Nelson, 134 Idaho at 678; Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434; Zubizareta, 122 Idaho 823, 826 (Ct.
App. 1992); State v. Osborne, 121 Idaho 520, 523 (Ct. App., 1991). An officer does not violate
the Fourth Amendment, when an individual approaches the officer and or arranges to meet the
officer to discuss a matter. Id. Thus, the inquiry in determining whether a seizure occurred is
whether, under all the circumstances surrounding the encounter, a reasonable person would have
felt free to leave or otherwise decline the officer's requests and terminate the encounter.

[2] The State does recognize that when an officer stops and detains an individual they must comply with the
constitutional standards of reasonableness. See Matter o(Clayton, 113 Idaho 817 (1988); and State v. Waldie, 126
Idaho 964 (Ct. App. 1995). A person is seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment if the officer restrains
the person's liberty by one of the following means:
(1) a "show of authority" resulting in "actual submission" by the suspect; or
(2) application of "physical force" to the suspect's body.
See Clai(ornia v. Hodad D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991);
v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1 (1968); State v. Reese, 132 Idaho 652 (1999); State v. Harwood, 133 Idaho 50 (Ct. App. 1999); and State v.
Agundis, 127 Idaho 587 (Ct. App. 1995).

u.s.
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, Reese, 132 Idaho at 653; State v. Fuentes, 129 Idaho at 832 (citing Bostick, 501 U.S. at
437).[3]
In Mendenhall, the United States Supreme Court stated the following:
Examples of circumstances that might indicate a seizure, even
where the person did not attempt to leave, would be the threatening
presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer,
some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of
language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the
officer's request might be compelled. 446 U.S. at 554; See also
State v. Reese, 132 Idaho 652 (1999); State v. Clifford, 130 Idaho
259,939 P.2d 578 (Ct. App. 1997); and State v. Godwin, 121 Idaho
491 (1992).
As stated by Chief Justice Rehnquist in Delgado, while "most citizens will respond to a
police request, the fact that people do so, and do so without being told they are free not to
respond, hardly eliminates the consensual nature of the response." 466 U.S. at 216.
In this case, Watkins was driven to the police station by law enforcement officers.
Watkins was advised by Detective Sutherland that he was not under arrest. In fact Watkins was
taken back to his house at then end of the interview after the detention order was executed. At
no point in time did Sutherland ever coerce Watkins, never did she intimidate him, never did she

[3] The test to detennine if an officer used authority sufficient to restrain a defendant's liberty is objective, and is
based on how a reasonable person would have understood the officer's words and actions rather than the defendant's
perception of whether he was restrained. The proper inquiry is whether, based on the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the encounter, a reasonable person would feel free to leave or otherwise decline the officer's request
and tenninate the encounter. See Flordia v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, (1991); Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567
(1988); U.S. v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); State v. Fuentes, 129 Idaho 830
(Ct. App. 1997); State v. Agundis, 127 Idaho 587 (Ct. App. 1995); State v. Reese, 132 Idaho 652 (1999); Matter of
Mackey, 124 Idaho 585 (Ct. App. 1993); and State v. Jordan, 122 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1992).
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display physical authority and control over him. Hence, nowhere in the Defendant's argument or
in the audio recording would a reasonable person feel that they were in custody.

h.

The Defendant was not in custody for 5th Amendment Purposes

Miranda warnings are not required even when a person is questioned at a police station.

California v. Beheler. 463 U.S. 1121, 103 S. Ct. 3517 (1983); see also U.s. v. Crawford,372
FJd 1048, 1059 (9th Cir., 2004). The Defendant was not in custody and therefore an anticipatory
invocation was not binding.
The Defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his right
against self-incrimination and right to counsel.
The Supreme Court has explained that "[t]he critical safeguard" provided by the Miranda
warnings is the knowledge of "a person's 'right to cut off questioning. ,,, Michigan v. Mosley,
423 U.S. 96, 103,96 S.Ct. 321 (1975) (quoting Miranda. 384 U.S. at 474,86 S.Ct. 1602); see

also Thompkins v. Berghuis, 547 F.3d 572,582 (C.A. 6 (Mich.), 2008), cert. granted. The
safeguards suggested in Miranda were intended to create a "practical reinforcement for the right
against compulsory self incrimination." See Michigan v. Tucker. 417 U.S. 433, 444, 94 S.Ct.
2357,2364 (1974). A waiver of Miranda rights need not be explicit but may be inferred from the
actions and words of a person interrogated. Tague v. Louisiana, 444 U.S. 469, 471, 100 S.Ct.
652,653 (1980). The question is not one ofform, but whether the defendant, in light of the
L

totality of circumstances surrounding his statements, knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
waived his Miranda rights. See North Carolina v. Butler. 441 U.S. 369, 373, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 1757

(1979); United States v. Carra. 604 F.2d 1271, 1274 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied 444 U.S. 994,
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100 S.Ct. 529 (1979); State v. Ybarra, 102 Idaho 573, 634 P.2d 435 (1981); State v. Padilla, 101
Idaho 713,620 P.2d 286 (1979).141 State v. Mitchell, 104 Idaho 493, 497-498, 660 P.2d 1336,
1340 - 1341 (1983); State v. Hall, 111 Idaho 827, 727 P.2d 1255 (Ct.App. 1986); State v. Alger,
115 Idaho 42,45, 764 P.2d 119, 122 (Ct. App. 1988).
The issue in this case is whether Watkins possessed the capacity to make a voluntary,
knowing and intelligent waiver. The Court must examine the facts and explore the totality of
circumstances to determine ifhis waiver was valid. Id.; E.g., Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S.
341,96 S.Ct. 1612 (1976). The totality approach inquires into all the circumstances surrounding
the interrogation. Thus, there is a two-prong inquiry into whether the waiver was (1) voluntary,
and (2) knowingly and intelligently made. Application of this standard requires evaluation of the
Defendant's age, experience, education, background, and intelligence, as well as inquiry into
whether he had (1) the capacity to understand the warnings given him; (2) the nature of his Fifth
Amendment rights; and (3) the consequences of waiving those rights. See Butler, supra; Fare v.
Michael C, 442 U.S. 707, 725, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 2572 (1979).

a. Voluntariness
The procedure for establishing the voluntariness of a confession has been expressed as
follows:
Generally, the prosecution can meet its burden of proving a prima
facie [case] of voluntariness by eliciting from the interrogating
officer that the suspect had not been threatened or promised
anything and appeared to freely decide for himself to forego the
[4] Miranda itself does not require a written or express waiver. See Butler, supra; State v. Mitchell, 104 Idaho 493,
497-498,660 P.2d 1336, 1340 - 1341 (1983
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assistance of counsel and to provide an incriminating statement. If
the defendant introduces evidence suggesting official overreaching
and a significant impact of that overreaching upon the suspect, of
course, the prosecution may well have to respond with more
detailed and persuasive evidence in order to meet its burden of
persuasion. State v. Davila, 127 Idaho 888, 891, 908 P.2d 581,
584 (Ct. App. 1995).
The voluntariness of a confession need be established only by a preponderance of the
evidence. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168, 107 S.Ct. 515, 522 (1986) (citing Lego v.
Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 92 S.Ct. 619 (1972); State v. Culbertson, 105 Idaho 128, 130, 666 P.2d

1139, 1141 (1983». To determine the voluntariness of a confession, the court must consider the
effect that the totality of the circumstances had upon the will of the defendant. Arizona v.
Fulminante,499 U.S. 279, 111 S.Ct. 1246 (1991); Miller v. Fenton, 796 F.2d 598, 604 (3d Cir.
1986), cert. denied, Miller v. Neubert, 479 U.S. 989, 107 S.Ct. 585 (1986); State v. Mitchell, 104

Idaho 493, 660 P.2d 1336 (1983). The question in this case is whether the defendant's will was
overborne when he confessed. See Id; State v. Davila, 127 Idaho 888, 891-892, 908 P.2d 581,
584 -585 (Ct. App., 1995). "[T]o find a violation of a defendant's due process rights by virtue of
an involuntary confession, coercive police conduct is necessary." State v. Whiteley, 124 Idaho
261, 268, 858 P.2d 800, 807 (Ct. App. 1993); State v. Doe, 131 Idaho 709, 713, 963 P.2d 392,
396 (Ct. App. 1998).
In this case, the Defendant was never unlawfully coerced or threatened. Furthermore,
nothing in the record suggests that his will was overborne. To the contrary, Sutherland went
above and beyond with the Defendant. Never once during the interview did any of the detectives
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even raise their voices at the Defendant. Never once did they threaten the Defendant. Never
once did they use unlawfully coercive tactics to illicit an incriminating response.
During the course of the interview, the Defendant was very amenable to working with the
detectives. He never showed signs of fear, and never said or implied that he was intimidated.
As the court in the Davila case stated, if the State can show that the suspect had (1) not
been threatened, (2) not promised anything, and (3) appeared to freely decide for himselfto
forego the assistance of counsel, then the statements and confessions are deemed voluntary. The
Defendant has not alleged, and the record does not reflect, that the State did any of these.
Nowhere in the interview did the detectives threaten the Defendant, and nothing in the
Defendant's motion suggests to the contrary. The Defendant also was never promised anything.
Finally, the Defendant during the course of the interviews never once asked for, or even
implied, that he wanted an attorney to assist him in the interview. In fact, it wasn't until he
returned to the police station for a polygraph that he indicated to law enforcement that he wanted
to speak to his family. Accordingly, the state has established its burden of proving aprimaJacie
case of voluntariness.

h. Knowingly and Intelligently
The factors to be considered in determining whether a suspect knowingly and
intelligently waived his constitutional rights include:
(1)

Whether Miranda warnings were given;

(2)

The age of the accused;

(3)

The accuser's level of education or low intelligence as well as his background;
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(4)

The length of detention;

(5)

The repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning; and

(6)

Deprivation of food or sleep.

State v. Troy, 124 Idaho 211, 214, 858 P.2d 750, 753 (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412

U.S. 218,226, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2047 (1973»; State v. Radford, 134 Idaho 187, 191, 998 P.2d 80,
84 (2000); State v. Doe, 131 Idaho 709;712, 963 P.2d 392,395 (Ct. App. 1998).
A number of cases address these criteria and provide the context within which this Court
should evaluate Roberts' arguments.
First, in State v. Doe, the court found that Doe intelligently waived his rights even
though: (1) he was a juvenile, (2) he could only read and write at a fourth grade level but had an
eighth grade education, (3) he demonstrated a lack of sophistication and a low level of
intelligence, (4) he was on medication, and (5) he had Attention Deficit Disorder. 131 Idaho
709, 712,963 P.2d 392, 395 (Ct. App. 1998); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725, 99 S.Ct.
2560 (1979); State v. Doe, 130 Idaho 811, 817, 948 P.2d 166, 172 (Ct. App. 1997).
Another case was State v. Dunn, 134 Idaho 165,997 P.2d 626 (Ct. App. 2000). Dunn
J.

was a 25-year-old with Attention Deficit Disorder, who scored in the "mentally deficient range,"
and was deemed to have a drug addiction problem. The court nevertheless found Dunn able to
give a voluntary, knowingly, and intelligent waiver of Miranda. Id
Further, in State v. Nguyen, 122 Idaho 151,832 P.2d 324 (Ct. App. 1992), cited by the
Defendant, the court held that even though Nguyen claimed he had a poor knowledge of the
English language, he understood enough to knowingly and intelligently waive.
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S
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In comparison, Watkins is an adult in his mid-thirties. He has had a long life with many
experiences. He has held employment and attended school. English is his first language.
Compared to the defendants in Doe, Dunn, Nguyen, Watkins appears to be far more competent to
intelligently and knowingly understand the warnings and waive them. He acknowledged that he
understood the Miranda rights and was clearly focused, responsive, and articulate throughout the
interview. He was able to appropriately ask and answer questions, and never indicated that he
was confused. There was no suggestion that Watkins was of insufficient intelligence to
understand the rights he was waiving, or what the consequences of that waiver might be. See
Fare. Thus, the way in which he responded, the questions he asked, and the conversation that he
had with the detectives, show that he had sufficient intelligence to understand what was going
on.
Therefore, the State has shown a prima facia case that the Defendant made a knowing
and intelligent waiver. The Defendant, based on the totality of the factors set forth in Troy.
understood the stakes of the interview.

c Totality of the Circumstances
Finally, in light of the totality of circumstances surrounding his statements, the defendant
knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. See North Carolina v.
Butler, 441 U.S. at 373, 99 S.Ct. at 1757; United States v. Carra, 604 F.2d 1271, 1274 (10th Cir.
1979), cert. denied 444 U.S. 994, 100 S.Ct. 529 (1979); State v. Ybarra, supra; State v. Padilla,
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supra.f5J State v. Mitchell, 104 Idaho 493, 497-498, 660 P.2d 1336, 1340 - 1341 (1983); State v.
Hall. 111 Idaho 827, 727 P.2d 1255 (Ct.App.1986); State v. Alger, 115 Idaho 42, 45, 764 P.2d
119,122 (Ct. App. 1988).
Upon objective review of the exchange between Sutherland and Watkins, it becomes
clear that no ambiguity could reasonably be inferred into Roberts' response. The State contends
that his response, along with his subsequent decisions to ask and answer questions, strongly
supports the conclusion that -- under the totality of circumstances - Watkins knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights.
"A valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of the accused after
warnings are given or simply from the fact that a confession was in fact eventually obtained."
Miranda. 384 U.S. at 475, 86 S.Ct. 1602. In North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979) the
Supreme Court re-affirmed its holding in Carnley v. Cochran. 369 U.S. 506, 516, 82 S.Ct. 884
(1962), that "[p]resuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible," but the Court did state
"in at least some cases [a] waiver can be clearly inferred from the actions and words of the
person interrogated." Butler, 441 U.S. at 373 & n. 4, 99 S.Ct. 1755. These other actions would
be nodding one's head, making an affirmative sound, and answering questions and creating a
dialogue with the interviewer. See Thompkins v. Berghuis, 547 F.3d 572,582 (C.A.6 (Mich.),
2008), cert. granted. In this case this is exactly what the Defendant did. After Detective

Miranda itself does not require a written or express waiver. See North Carolina v. Butler. supra; State v. Mitchell,
104 Idaho 493,497-498,660 P.2d 1336, 1340 - 1341 (1983).

[5]
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Sutherland advised the Defendant of his Miranda rights, he indicated he understood with a "uh
huh."
Based on the totality of the questioning, the detectives made sure that Watkins
understood his rights. The detectives fully explained that he was not under arrest and was being
questioned in connection with the sexual touching of his daughter. They informed him of all the
rights delineated in Miranda, and ascertained that he understood those rights. There is no
indication through the interview that the Defendant failed to understand what the detectives had
told him. The Defendant never indicated in any manner that he wished to remain silent, or that
he wanted an attorney.
If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or
during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the
interrogation must cease. At this point he has shown that he intends
to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken
after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the
product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise .... If the individual
states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until
an attorney is present. At that time, the individual must have an
opportunity to confer with the attorney and to have him present
during any subsequent questioning. If the individual cannot obtain
an attorney and he indicates that he wants one before speaking to
police, they must respect his decision to remain silent. Miranda, at
473-474,86 S.Ct., at 1627, 1628; Fare, 442 U.S. at 717-718,99
S.Ct. at 2568.
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At no time did the defendant ever invoke his rights. He did not state or imply that he
wished to remain silent, or have an attomeyJ6] This is clearly supported by the audio of the
interview with Watkins.

[6] As the Defendant has not raised the issue the State will not belabor the difference between invocation and
waiver. Suffice it to note that the Supreme Court has cautioned that "[i]nvocation and waiver are entirely distinct
inquiries, and the two must not be blurred by merging them together." Smith v. Illinois. 469 U.S. 91, 98, 105 S.Ct.
490, (1984). In terms of a suspect's invocation of her right to remain silent, in Miranda the Supreme Court held that
"[i]qhe individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain
silent, the interrogation must cease." Miranda. 384 U.S. at 473-74,86 S.Ct. 1602 (emphasis added). Although the
Supreme Court has not addressed what conduct or statements suffice to "indicate in any manner" one's intent to
invoke the right to remain silent, the Supreme Court has explained the standard governing the invocation of one's
right to counsel. In Davis v. United States. 512 U.S. 452, 455, 114 S.Ct. 2350 (1994), the Supreme Court noted that
the suspect "waived his rights to remain silent and to counsel, both and a half into the interview, the suspect stated
that '''[m]aybe I should talk to a lawyer.' " Id., at 455, 114 S.Ct. 2350. After the investigating agents sought
clarification as to whether the suspect wanted a lawyer, the suspect said" 'No, I don't want a lawyer.' " Id. Rejecting
the defendant's argument that his statement that "[m]aybe I should talk to a lawyer" effectively invoked his right to
counsel such that the interrogation should have ceased and his statements been suppressed, the Supreme Court held
that to invoke one's right to counsel "the suspect must unambiguously request counsel" because the Court's
"precedents do not require the cessation of questioning" "if a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is
ambiguous or equivocal." Id. at 459, 114 S.Ct. 2350. The Court specifically restated its holding as establishing "that,
after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights, law enforcement officers may continue questioning
until and unless the suspect clearly requests an attorney." Id. at 461,86 S.Ct. 1602 (emphases added); Thompkins v.
BerghuiS, 547 F.3d 572, 582 -583 (C.A.6 (Mich.), 2008).orally and in writing." Approximately an hour
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CONCLUSION
The Defendant is time bared from raising this issue. Not only has years past but the law
ofthe case prohibits him from raising issues which could have been previously raised.
Furthermore, he was not in custody for purposes of Miranda and at the end of the interview was
returned to his house by law enforcement. For those reasons, the State asks this Court to deny
the Defendant's First Motion to Suppress.

DATED Thislit- day of May, 2010.

Prosecuting Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Response to
Defendant's First Motion To Suppress was served upon the attorney for the Defendant, the
Canyon County Public Defender, by placing said instrument in their basket at the Clerk's Office
on or about this ~ day of May, 2010
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KALLIN

.

Prosecuting Attorney
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JOHN T. BUJAK
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
Canyon County Courthouse
1115 Albany&
Caldwell, Idaho 83606-0668

MDUIH , QIPUTV

Telephone: (208) 454-7391

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

THE STATE OF IDAHO
Plaintiff,

VANCE WATKINS,
Defendant.

)
)
)

CASE NO. CR2008-26831

)
)

RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S
SECOND MOTION TO SUPPRESS

)
)
)

----------------------------)
COMES NOW, Erica M. Kallin, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Canyon County, State
ofIdaho, and hereby submits the following Response to Defendant's Second Motion Suppress.

The Defendant cannot challenge the statements made during the
Detention Order, as they are the law of the case.
The Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress the condom, Anbesol and eye dropper,
indicating they were not indicated on the search warrant and therefore illegally seized. The
Search Warrant, as well as the evidence seized, were known to the Defendant and his attorney in
2005. No motions were filed to suppress any of this evidence and the evidence itself was not
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S
SECOND MOTION TO SUPPRESS
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challenged on appeal, nor was Post Conviction Relief sought for failure to raise that issue. As
such, the search warrant is valid under the law of the case theory. Under the law of the case
principle, "on a second or subsequent appeal the courts generally will not consider errors which
arose prior to the first appeal and which might have been raised as issues in the earlier appeal."

Jarman v. Hale, 122 Idaho 952,956,842 P.2d 288, 292 (Ct. App. 1992); Capps v. Wood, 117
Idaho 614, 618, 790 P.2d 395,399 (Ct. App. 1990). This doctrine discourages piecemeal
litigation and is consistent with the analogous doctrine of res judicata. Jarman, 122 Idaho at
956, 842 P.2d at 292; Capps, 117 Idaho at 618, 790 P.2d at 399. The law of the case principle
operates to preclude a party from raising issues which could have been, but which were not,
raised in the first appeal. See Capps, 117 Idaho 614, 790 P .2d 395 (Ct. App. 1990). As such, the
Defendant is barred from raising this suppression motion.
The Defendant is time barred from f"ding any motions pursuant to IeR 12.

Idaho Criminal Rule 12(d) states:
Motions pursuant to Rule 12(b) must be filed within twenty-eight
(28) days after the entry of a plea of not guilty or seven (7) days
before trial whichever is earlier ... The court in its discretion may
shorten or enlarge the time provided herein, and for good cause
shown, or for excusable neglect, may relieve a party of failure to
comply with this rule.
A motion to suppress is a 12(b) motion. Idaho Criminal Rule 12 requires that a motion to
suppress be filed within twenty-eight days of the entry of a plea of not guilty, or seven days
before trial, whichever is earlier. I.C.I). 12(b), I.C.R. 12(d). A party's failure to meet the
deadline constitutes a waiver of the motion. I.C.R. 12(f). A court may relieve a party's failure to
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comply with the rule only if the party shows good cause or excusable neglect for the failure.
I.C.R. 12(d); See State v. Gleason, 130 Idaho 586 (Ct. App. 1997); see also State v. Dice, 126
Idaho 595, 597 (Ct. App. 1994). A court may not "arbitrarily enlarge or shorten the filing
requirements of the rule"; to "permit a court to do so without the required exempting factors
would emasculate the intent ofthe rule." State v. Alanis, 109 Idaho 884, 888 (Idaho 1985). In
fact, it is abuse of discretion for the court to consider an untimely filed motion to suppress if
there has not been a finding of good cause or excusable neglect. Id. If a party has failed to meet
the deadline, a court may not hear a motion simply because it appears meritorious. State v. Dice,
126 Idaho 595, 597 (Idaho App. 1994). To do so would "eviscerate the purpose of the rule." Id.
Consequently, if good cause or excusable neglect is not shown by the moving party, the court
may not hear the motion. Id.
In this case, the Defendant entered a plea of not guilty on December 22, 2004 in front of
Judge Culet. His case proceeded to Jury Trial on August 20,2005. Thus, the deadline for the
Defendant to file a motion to suppress was January 19,2005, twenty-eight days after the entry of
his plea, because January 19,2005 is earlier than seven days prior to the trial. The Defendant
filed his first motion to suppress on June 10, 2005 which was 170 days after his arraignment;
however, the State did not raise a timeliness issue. The Defendant has filed a Motion to
Suppress on May 21,2010. Even if the Defendant was allowed to file any and all motions again
after remand (which is not consistent with the case law), the Defendant was arraigned on
February 4,2010 and the time to file motions lapsed on March 4, 201O.Now the Defendant is
trying to get another bite at the apple 2020 days after his first arraignment, and 106 days after his
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S
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arraignment after remand. This is well beyond the time proscribed by the statute. The Defense
has made no showing of good cause as to why the time to file motions should be extended by
1992 days. The Defendant never filed for Post Conviction Relief from his original trial. As
such, the defendant is bared from arguing excusable neglect or ineffective assistance of counsel
on the part of his prior attorney. There has been absolutely no showing of good cause or
excusable neglect, so the Court must deny the motion to suppress.

The condom constitutes mementos of sex abuse and therefore falls within
the parameters of the search warrant.
The Defendant has not challenged the actual issuance of the Search Warrant; as such the
Search Warrant on its face is valid. The issue becomes whether the condom falls under the
parameters of the search warrant. Search Warrant # 1847 was signed by Judge DeMeyer on
December 1,2004. Judge DeMeyer wrote on the search warrant that law enforcement could
seize any "mementos of sexual relations." Memento is defined as a keepsake or a souvenir.
Webster's II New College Dictionary (1999.) A condom is a souvenir of the crime, much like
the photograph in State v. Lewis, 123 Idaho 336,848 P.2d 394 (1993). In Lewis, the Court
determined that although photographs were not specifically authorized to be seized under the
search warrant, the Court determined it constituted memorabilia of the victimization and
therefore fell under the search warrant. Here, the condom is a memento of the sexual abuse of

R. W. There is no requirement for how'long someone keeps something for it to constitute a
memento. Rather, the condom itself is something that is a souvenir of the sexual abuse ofR.W.
As such, it falls within the parameters of the search warrant.

RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S
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The condom, Anbesol and eye dropper was found in plain view
during the execution of the search warrant.
Even if the condom, Anbesol and eye dropper do not fall under the parameters of the
search warrant, they were lawfully seized in plain view. The Plain View Doctrine provides that
if an officer is lawfully on a premise, has a lawful right to access the object and the incriminating
character of the object is immediately apparent (i.e. the officer has probable cause to believe the
object is evidence of criminal activity), the officer may seize the evidence without a subsequent
warrant. See State v. Butterbaugh, 138 Idaho 96, 99, 57 P.3d 807,810 (Idaho Ct. App. 1999),

Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990), Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983), State v. Buti,
131 Idaho, 793, 964 P.2d 660 (1998).
In order for the plaint view doctrine to apply, the officers must be lawfully conducting a
search within the parameters of the warrant (they cannot exceed the scope of the search
authorized by the warrant.) In State v. Claiborne, 120 Idaho 581, 818 P.2d 285 (1991), the
officers were executing a search warrant, during which time they discovered a book containing
sexually exploitative material. The Court determined that the officers discovered the book while
lawfully searching the home within the parameters of the search warrant and the book, based
upon the officer's training and experience, contained evidence of a crime. Thus they had
probable cause to believe the item is associated with criminal activity. Id. at 290-291 citing

Texas v. Brown.
Here, the officers had lawful authority to search the garbage, as evidence contained in the
search warrant could have been thrown away. They also had authority to search the nightstand
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looking for lubricants. During the search of the garbage, Officer Archuletta discovered the used
condom in the garbage can. He immediately notified the primary detective, Detective Peck, of
its existence. Given they were executing a search warrant for Lewd Conduct charges, the
condom was immediately apparent as evidence of a crime. Additionally, while executing the
search warrant upstairs, the officers opened the Defendant's nightstand and discovered two
different lubricants, as well as the unopened condoms, the Anbesol and eye dropper. Search
Warrant #1847 gave the officers the ability to seize any lubricants. Lubricants is defined as, "a
usually oily substance, as grease, that reduces friction, heat and wear when applied as a surface
coating to moving parts or between solid surfaces." Webster's II New College Dictionary
(1999) Anbesol is a greasy substance that could reduce friction, so it could fall under the search
warrant. Additionally, given the proximity to the lubricants and condoms, the officers had
reason to seize the Anbesol as evidence of a crime, based upon their training and experience.
Because the evidence was in plain view, the officers had legal authority to seize the condom,
Anbesol and eye dropper.

CONCLUSION
The Defendant is time bared from raising this issue. Not only has years past but the law
of the case prohibits him from raising issues which could have been previously raised.
Furthermore, the evidence was seized lawfully either pursuant to the search warrant or was
seized as evidence in plain view. For those reasons, the State asks this Court deny the
Defendant's Second Motion to Suppress.
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DATED This

24.

day of May, 2010.

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Response to
Defendant's Second Motion To Suppress was served upon the attorney for the Defendant, the
Canyon County Public Defender, by placing said instrument in their basket at the Clerk's Office
on or about this

~day of May, 2010
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Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, February 1991 Term.
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.
Billy Gilbert CLAIBORNE, Defendant-Appel\ant.

No. 18509.
May 8, 1991.
Dissent on Denial of Rehearing Oct. 29, 1991.

349 Searches and Seizures
3491 In General
349k25 Persons, Places and Things Protected
349k25.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 349k25)
A book described on its front cover as dealing with
"PedophilialPederasty/The
Anal
CompleX/Completely Photo-Illustrated" was "expressive
material" for purpose of the special requirements in
the area of searches and seizures directed toward
such materials. V.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 1,1.

ill Constitutional Law 92 ~2191

Defendant was convicted in District Court, Fourth
Judicial District, County of Ada, G. David Carey, J.,
and he appealed from partial denial of his motion to
suppress. The Supreme Court, McDevitt, J., held that
requirements of plain view doctrine for seizure of
book containing sexually exploitative material were
met where book was found during lawful search
while officers were legitimately in defendant's home,
where officers discovered the book inadvertently
while searching for items named in search warrant,
and it was immediately apparent to officers that the
book contained sexually exploitative material.

92 Constitutional Law
92XVIII Freedom of Speech, Expression, and
Press
92XVIII(Y) Sexual Expression
92k2189 Obscenity in General
92k2191 k. Lack of Constitutional Protection. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 92k90.4(I»
Obscenity is unprotected by the First Amendment.
V.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

Affirmed.

.IIl Constitutional Law 92 ~2194

Johnson, J., dissented with opinion in which Bistline,

92 Constitutional Law
92XVIII Freedom of Speech, Expression, and
Press
92XVIIUY) Sexual Expression
92k2193 Print Publications
92k2194 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly 92k90.4(6»

1., concurred.
Bistline, J., dissented from denial of motion for rehearing and filed opinion.
West Headnotes

ill Obscenity 281 ~7.6
281 Obscenity
281k7.5 Pretrial Seizure, Suppression, or Censorship
281k7.6 k. In General; Necessity for Adversary Hearing. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 28Ik7.S)

Searches and Seizures 349 ~5.1

Searches and Seizures 349 ~30
349 Searches and Seizures
3491 In General
349k30 k. Items Subject to Seizure in General; Nexus. Most Cited Cases
Seizure during search of defendant's home of book
containing sexual\y exploitative material did not involve prior restraint inasmuch as defendant was not
in business of producing or distributing expressive
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818 P.2d 285'
120 Idaho 581, 818 P.2d 285
(Cite as: 120 Idaho 581, 818 P.2d 285)

materials.
I.C.
§.
Const.Amends. I, 1.

18-1507(2)0);

V.S.C.A.

ill Searches and Seizures 349 ~149
349 Searches and Seizures
349IIl Execution and Return of Warrants
349kl47 Scope of Search
349k 149 k. Objects in Plain View; Inadvertent Discovery. Most Cited Cases
Seizure of book containing sexually exploitative material was proper under plain view doctrine where
book was found during lawful search while officers
were legitimately in defendant's home, officers discovered the book inadvertently while searching for
items named in valid warrant, and it was immediately
apparent to officers that book contained sexually exploitative material. V.S.C.A. Const.Amends. I, 1;
I.C. §§ 18-1507(2)(j), 19-1507A.

ill Searches and Seizures 349 ~49

allegations brought by a twelve-year-old girl and her
mother accusing**286 *582 Claiborne of attempting
to entice the girl into performing sexual acts with
him. On January II, 1989, after talking to the young
girl and tape-recording a conversation between her
and the defendant, Ada County Sheriffs Detective
Ken Smith executed an eight page affidavit in support of a search warrant. Based upon this affidavit the
magistrate issued two search warrants. The first warrant permitted a search of the defendant's home for
the following seven items:
I. sexually explicit letters;
2. purple lace panties;
3. photo album with nude photos of Claiborn [sic]
and his wife;
4. sexually explicit magazines;
5. vibrator;

349 Searches and Seizures
3491 In General
349k47 Plain View from Lawful Vantage
Point
349k49 k. Nature of Items Seized; Nexus.
Most Cited Cases
Requirement that it must be immediately apparent to
police that item searched under plain view doctrine
may be evidence of crime, contraband or otherwise
subject to seizure is met when officer has probable
cause to believe that item in question is associated
with criminal activity, and this determination may be
based on surrounding facts and circumstances, and
officer may draw reasonable inferences based on his
training and experience in determining whether connection exists. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
**285 *581 Seiniger, Nevin, Kofoed and Herzfeld,
Boise, for defendant-appellant. David Z. Nevin, argued.

Larry J. EchoHawk, Atty. Gen., Michael A. HenderDeputy Atty. Gen., Boise, for plaintiffrespondent. Michael A. Henderson, argued.

gm,

McDEVITT, Justice.
Billy Gilbert Claiborne was under investigation by
the Ada County Sheriffs Department as a result of

6. box with letters;
7. rose colored lipstick.
The second warrant was for the safe at the
defendant's office. A third warrant was issued on
January 13, 1989, to search the defendant's home
once more. Nothing was seized from the defendant's
office, however, numerous items were taken from his
home during the execution of the first warrant. One
item seized was a book entitled The Ugly Duckling.
which is the focus of our inquiry.
On January 24, 1989, an Ada County grand jury returned a five-count indictment against the defendant.
The first two counts charged him with sexual abuse
of the twelve-year-old girl in violation of I.C. § 181506. The remaining three counts charged him with
possession of sexually exploitative material in violation ofI.C. § 18-1507 A.
The defendant filed a Motion to Suppress, which
sought to suppress the fruits of the searches, specifically naming, among other materials, The Ugly Duckling. The district court issued a Memorandum and
Order granting in part and denying in part the Motion
to Suppress. The district court ruled that some of the

© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

0001S~

Page 3

818 P.2d 285'
120 Idaho 581, 818 P.2d 285
(Cite as: 120 Idaho 581, 818 P.2d 285)

items which were not named in the warrant were not
properly seized. As for The Ugly Duckling, however,
the court found that it was properly seized under the
plain view exception.
The parties entered an agreement pursuant to LC.R.
11(a)(2) with the defendant entering a conditional
guilty plea to possession of sexually exploitative material, and reserving the right to appeal the district
court's partial denial of his Motion to Suppress. A1\
other charges were dropped and the defendant was
sentenced to serve a prison term of one to five years
with the court retaining jurisdiction for 120 days
pending this appeal.
The issue presented is whether the district court was
correct in ruling that The Ugly Duckling was properly
seized under the plain view exception to the warrant
requirement. Our task is to determine where statutorily prohibited materials, as defined by I.C. § 181507(2)(j),.El::il such as The Ugly Duckling, (hereinafter called "sexua1\y exploitative materials") fa1\ on
the spectrum of permissible or impermissible seizures. We then must decide when the requirements
for the seizure of such materials are met.
FNI. "Sexua1\y exploitative material" means
any photograph, motion picture, videotape,
print, negative, slide, or other mechanically,
electronically, or chemically reproduced visual material which depicts a child engaged
in, participating in, observing, or being used
for explicit sexual conduct.
The defendant urges that "expressive materials" are
entitled to heightened scrutiny and are presumptively
protected at the time of the seizure, and that The Ugly
Duckling qualifies as expressive material.
In order for us to properly address this question, we
must begin with a working definition of "expressive
materials." As common as this term is, it seems no
court has ever set forth its exact meaning. After a
careful examination of the cases involving the First
Amendment and more specifica1\y, freedom of
speech concerns, we have found but fragments of
definitions that have proven helpful in our analysis.
One case consistently referred to in this area is Lovell
v. City ofGrifjin. Ga.. 303 U.S. 444, 58 S.Ct. 666.82
L.Ed. 949 (1938), where the United States Supreme
Court spoke of "the liberty of the press" and said,

"[t]he press in its historic connotation **287 *583
comprehends every sort of publication which affords
a vehicle of information and opinion." Id.. 303 U.S.
at 452. 58 S.Ct. at 669 (emphasis added). In Grove
Press, Inc. v. Christenberry. 175 F.Supp. 488
(S.D.N. Y.1959), affd. 276 F.2d 433 (2d Cir.l960),
the court spoke about the importance of the freedom
of expression and stated, "[ilt matters not whether
ideas be expressed in political pamphlets or works or
political, economic or social theory or criticism, or
through artistic media. A1\ such expressions must be
freely available." Id. at 502-03.
From these guidelines, we have distilled the definition of "expressive materials" to mean any medium
through which ideas, information, and opinions are
expressed, articulated, or made known.
Next we must consider whether The Ugly Duckling
fits within this definition of "expressive materials."
The Ugly Duckling is a sma1\ paperback book with
the title in large print on the cover. On the bottom, in
smaller print, are the words:
PedophilialPederasty/The
Anal
plex/Completely Photo-Illustrated.

Com-

In the center of the cover is a drawing of an adult
man sitting on a chair surrounded by four young children. On the back cover are the words:
Pedophilia, Pederasty and the Anal Complex are
considered the "ugly ducklings" of Man's sexual
nature. Now, for the frrst time anywhere, F.A. Griffin takes an honest, in-depth look at these three taboos.
Inside is a history of these types of sexual practices in
different cultures throughout history. Interspersed
throughout the text are illustrations, many of which
are explicit photographs of young children engaged
in a variety of sexual acts.

ill Arguably,

The Ugly Duckling can be considered
"expressive material" under our definition; it is an
expression of ideas and information, however repugnant they may be to the general population. Our next
level of inquiry is whether and to what extent it is
protected under the United States Constitution.

Within the area of "expressive materials" are sub-
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groups which are treated differently by virtue of their
content. One subgroup consists of materials deemed
obscene. Miller v. California. 413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct.
2607,37 L.Ed.2d 419 (973), held that obscenity is
not protected by the First Amendment and set forth
these guidelines for the trier of fact:

at 2782, saying, "[i]t is '[t]he risk of prior restraint,
which is the underlying basis for the special Fourth
Amendment protections according searches for and
seizure of First Amendment materials' that motivates
this rule." Id. 489 U.S. at 63-64. 109 S.Ct. at 928.

ill The

(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards" would find that the
work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in
a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c)
whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Miller. 413 U.S. at 24, 93 S.Ct. at 2615 (citations
omitted).

ill

Although obscenity is unprotected by the First
Amendment, it is still subject to special requirements
in the area of searches and seizures because the presumptive protection of "expressive materials" is extended to materials that, at the time of the seizure,
have not been conclusively proven to be obscene.
The United States Supreme Court stated in Maryland
v. Macon. 472 U.S. 463, 105 S.Ct. 2778, 86 L.Ed.2d
370 (1985):
The First Amendment imposes special constraints
on searches for and seizures of presumptively protected material, and requires that the Fourth
Amendment be applied with "scrupulous exactitude" in such circumstances. Consequently the
Court has imposed particularized rules applicable
to searches for and seizures of allegedly obscene
films, books and papers.
Id. 472 U.S. at 468, 105 S.Ct. at 2781 (citations
omitted).
It is important to keep in mind the reasons for heightened procedural safeguards in the context of seizing
"expressive materials." The foundation for this protection lies in the First Amendment. "Expressive materials" have traditionally been afforded more protection in the search and seizure **288 *584 area because of the danger of prior restraint. In Fort Wqyne
Books v. Indiana. 489 U.S. 46, 109 S.Ct. 916, 103
L.Ed.2d 34 (I989), the United States Supreme Court
cited Maryland v. Macon. 472 U.S. at 470, 105 S.Ct.

danger of prior restraint is not present here.
The defendant was not in the business of producing
or distributing "expressive materials." The police
seized one copy of one book that was in the private
possession of the defendant. Therefore the danger
sought to be avoided by the implementation of
heightened procedural safeguards in the area of seizing "expressive materials" is not a concern in this
situation.
Another constitutional concern present in the seizure
of obscenity is the recognition that it is difficult, if
not impossible, for police officers in the field to make
a determination that material is obscene at the time of
the seizure. The defmition of obscenity involves detailed analysis and fact finding by an appropriate trier
of fact not capable of being made by the individuals
participating in a search and seizure. The defmition
of sexually exploitative material, by contrast, is much
more detailed, and narrowly defmed by statute. This
difference has been recognized:
We also note that the difference in constitutional
requirements between child protection and obscenity statutes also results in different requirements for
an affidavit supporting a warrant ... To pass constitutional muster as unprotected obscenity, a work
must appeal to the prurient interest in sex when
taken as a whole, must portray sexual conduct in a
patently offensive way, and must not, taken as a
whole, have serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value. Although the existence of these
characteristics is ultimately a question of fact,
submitted to a jury, a determination of this "fact"
involves complicated knowledge and information
far beyond that which is evident from the face of a
photograph alone ... In contrast, the constitutional
requirements for a child pornography statute are
much simpler and more susceptible to credible assertion in an affidavit ... An assertion that certain
pictures depict "sexually explicit conduct" prohibited by [the statute] does not require of the affiant
extensive knowledge of the prurient interest of the
average person, of what portrayals of sexual conduct are patently offensive, or of literary, artistic,
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political, or scientific criteria for "serious merit."
The affiant need only be able to identify the specific, clearly dermed acts tisted in [the statute] ....
United States v. Smith. 795 F.2d 841, 848 n. 7 (9th
Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1032, 107 S.Ct.
1964,95 L.Ed.2d 535 (987), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
974, 109 S.Ct. 512, 102 L.Ed.2d 547 (988) (citations omitted).

Thus, the problem of police making subjective judgments at the time of the seizure is not present in the
case of seizing sexually exploitative materials.
The United States Supreme Court carved out another
area of "expressive materials" for special treatment
with two significant decisions dealing with sexually
exploitative material. New York v. Ferber. 458 U.S.
747, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (982), rejected the traditional obscenity standards set forth in
Miller v. California, as being inapplicable to child
pornography, saying that a "trier of fact need not find
that the material appeals to the prurient interest of the
average person; it is not required that sexual conduct
portrayed be done so in a patently offensive marmer;
and the material at issue need not be considered as a
whole." 458 U.S. at 764, 102 S.Ct. at 3359. In
Osborne v. Ohio. 495 U.S. 103, 110 S.Ct. 1691. 109
L.Ed.2d 98 (1990), the Court went further and held
that, unlike obscenity, states may prohibit the private
possession of child pornography. The states have
strong interests in enacting such legislation. In
**289*S8SNew York v. Ferber. 458 U.S. 747, 102
S.Ct. 3348, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (982), the Court wrote:

First, as Ferber recognized, the materials produced
by child pornographers permanently record the victim's abuse. The pornography's continued existence
causes the child victims continuing harm by haunting the children in years to come. The State's ban
on possession and viewing encourages the possessors of these materials to destroy them. Second,
encouraging the destruction of these materials is
also desirable because evidence suggests that pedophiles use child pornography to seduce other
children into sexual activity.

'd. 495 U.S. at Ill. 110 S.Ct. at 1697 (citations
omitted).
Idaho has seen fit to enact legislation prohibiting the
possession of sexually exploitative material which is
dermed as:
"Sexually exploitative material" means any photograph, motion picture, videotape, print, negative,
slide, or other mechanically, electronically, or
chemically reproduced visual material which depicts a child engaged in, participating in, observing, or being used for explicit sexual conduct.
Idaho Code § 18-1507(2)<D.
Idaho Code § 18-1507A, the provision prohibiting
the possession of such material, states, in its entirety:

'd.

Possession of sexually exploitative material for
other than a commercial purpose-Penalty.- (1) It
is the policy of the legislature in enacting this section to protect children from the physical and psychological damage caused by their being used in
photographic representations of sexual conduct
which involves children. It is, therefore, the intent
of the legislature to penalize possession of photographic representations of sexual conduct which
involves children in order to protect the identity of
children who are victimized by involvement in the
photographic representations, and to protect children from future involvement in the photographic
representations of sexual conduct.

Other interests were outlined in Osborne v. Ohio. 495
U.S. 103, 110 S.Ct. 1691. 109 L.Ed.2d 98 (990):

(2) Every person who knowingly and willfully
has in his possession any sexually exploitative material as defined in section 18-1507, Idaho Code,

It is evident beyond the need for elaboration that a
State's interest in "safeguarding the physical and
psychological well-being of a minor" is "compelling" .... The legislative judgment, as well as the
judgment found in relevant literature, is that the use
of children as subjects of pornographic materials is
harmful to the physiological, emotional, and mental health of the child. That judgment, we think,
easily passes muster under the First Amendment.

458 U.S. at 756-58, 102 S.Ct. at 3354-55 (citations omitted).
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for other than a commercial purpose, is gUilty of a
felony, and shall be punished by imprisonment in
the state prison for a period not to exceed five (5)
years and by a fine not to exceed five thousand dollars ($5,000).
Because Idaho has chosen to criminalize the possession of sexually exploitative material, The Ugly
Duckling achieves the status of prohibited material.
Although it may fall under the broad definition of
"expressive materials," it is at the same time evidence
of the crime of possession of sexually exploitative
material. This changes the traditional obscenity seizure analysis considerably. When a book is judged to
be evidence of a crime, it is seizable with a valid warrant or under one of the exceptions to the warrant
requirement just as any other piece of evidence of a
crime would be. The United States Supreme Court, in
Fort Wayne Books v. Indiana stated:
Most importantly, in Heller v. New York. 413 U.S.
483, 492 [93 S.Ct. 2789, 2794, 37 L.Ed.2d 7451
(1973), the Court noted that "seizing films to destroy them or to block their distribution or exhibition is a very different matter from seizing a single
copy of a film for the bona fide purpose of preserving it as evidence in a criminal proceeding" ... The
same is obviously true for books or any other expressive **290 *586 materials. While a single copy
of a book or film may be seized and retained for
evidentiary purposes based on a finding of probable cause, the publication may not be taken out of
circulation completely until there has been a determination of obscenity after an adversary hearing.

ld.. 489 U.S. at 83, 109 S.Ct. at 927.
We now must return to our original inquiry of
whether or not the plain view exception to the warrant requirement may be applied to the seizure of The
Ugly Duckling in this case.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects society against unreasonable searches
and seizures by requiring a warrant supported by
probable cause describing with particularity the place
to be searched and the items to be seized. U.S. Const.
amend. IV. There are recognized exceptions to the
warrant requirement, one of which is the plain view
exception. This exception permits the seizure of
items not named in the warrant if they meet certain

requirements. These requirements were outlined in
Texas v. Brown. 460 U.S. 730, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 75
L.Ed.2d 502 (983):
First, the officer must lawfully make an "initial intrusion" or otherwise properly be in a position from
which he can view a particular area. Second, the
officer must discover incriminating evidence "inadvertently," which is to say, he may not "know in
advance the location of [certain] evidence and intend to seize it," relying on the plain-view doctrine
only as a pretext. Finally, it must be "immediately
apparent" to the police that the items they observe
may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.
Id.. 460 U.S. at 737, 103 S.Ct. at 1540-41 (citations
omitted).fW.

FN2. The second requirement, that the evidence must be discovered "inadvertently"
appears to have been eliminated by Horton
v. California. 496 U.S. 128 , 110 S.Ct. 230 l,
110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990),

HI

Applying this test to the case at bar, the first
prong was satisfied because The Ugly Duckling was
found during a lawful search while the officers were
legitimately in the defendant's home. The second
prong of the test was satisfied by the fact that the
officers discovered the book inadvertently while
searching for items named in a valid warrant. In order
to satisfy the third prong of the test, we must determine if it was immediately apparent to the officers
that The Ugly Duckling contained sexually exploitative material in violation ofl.C. § 18-1507A.

ill This requirement is met when an officer has probable cause to believe that the item in question is associated with criminal activity. Texas v. Brown. 460
U.S. 730, 741-42, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 1543, 75 L.Ed.2d
502 (983), This determination may be based on the
surrounding facts and circumstances. State v. Lair. 95
Wash.2d 706, 712, 630 P.2d 427, 433 (1981). An
officer "may draw reasonable inferences based on his
training and experience in determining whether a
connection exists." State v. Tamez, 116 Idaho 945,
946,782 P.2d 353, 354 (Ct.App.l989). In addition, it
is acceptable to look at "the collective knowledge of
the officers executing the searches." United States v.
Newton. 788 F.2d 1392 (8th Cir.1986).

l!j Gov. Works.
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We believe that it was immediately apparent to the
officers searching Claiborne's home that Th{! Ugly
Duckling contained sexua\1y exploitative material.
The words on the front cover:
Pedophilia/Pederasty/The
Anal
plexlCompletely Photo~I1lustrated

Com~

and the words on the back cover:
Pedophilia, Pederasty and the Anal Complex are
considered the "ugly ducklings" of Man's sexual
nature. Now, for the first time anywhere, F.A. Grif~
fin takes an honest, in~depth look at these three ta~
boos.
alerted officers as to the contents and clearly make it
immediately apparent that sexua\1y exploitative material in the form of "Pedophilia .. , Photo Illustrated"
will be found inside. A cursory glance at the inner
contents only serves to confirm that conviction.
There are numerous photographs**291 *587 of prepubescent boys and girls engaged in or observing
explicit sexual activities with both other children and
adults that meet the definition of sexually exploitative
material as set forth in I.C. § l8-1507(2)(j).
Thus, because the statute narrowly and specifically
defmes sexually exploitative material, and because of
the lesser constitutional protections afforded this material, officers involved in the search were not re~
quired to make a subjective determination regarding
the status of sexually exploitative materials. Here, it
was immediately apparent to the officers upon viewing the cover of The Ugly Duckling that it contained
sexua\1y exploitative material.
We hold that all three requirements for a valid plain
view seizure were met.
We affirm the district court's ruling that The Ugly
Duckling was properly seized under the plain view
exception to the warrant requirement.
BAKES, C.J., and BOYLE, J. concur.
JOHNSON, Justice, dissenting.
"You can't tell a book by its cover," so an old English
proverb tells us. Today, the Court rewrites this proverb to a\1ow a statement on a book's cover to permit a
law enforcement officer to seize the book without a

warrant. I am unable to join in this opinion. In my
view, the plain view doctrine is not applicable to the
seizure of a book because of statements on its cover
about its contents.
Although the United States Supreme Court has not
ruled on this question, in a footnote in Lo-)i Sales
Inc. v. New York. 442 U.S. 319, 326 n. 5, 99 S.Ct.
2319, 2324 n. 5, 60 L.Ed.2d 920 (1979) the Court
noted that "materials normally may not be seized on
the basis of alleged obscenity without a warrant."
In United States v. Hale, 784 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied 479 U.S. 829, 107 S.Ct. 110,93 L.Ed.2d
59 (986), the Ninth Circuit considered the issue of
the seizure of alleged child pornography under the
plain view doctrine:
Under Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent,
the "First Amendment imposes special constraints
on searches for and seizures of presumptively protected material ... and requires that the Fourth
Amendment be applied with 'scrupulous exactitude' in such circumstances." As we have held,
"Because of the First Amendment, the seizure of
all publications must meet higher procedural standards than normal."
These "higher procedural standards" take two
forms. First, the warrant must specifica\1y describe
the material to be seized. Blanket clauses that do
not refer to specific items and to material directly
related to specific items are not proper bases for
constitutional searches and seizures. Second, the
exceptions to the warrant requirement are narrowly
construed. The plain view exception argued by the
government, for example, cannot be used to search
for or seize alleged obscenity or alleged child pornography that is unspecified in the warrant. Otherwise, police officers could seize any publication
or film they deem to be unprotected by the First
Amendment, thereby subverting the higher procedural standards that require a neutral magistrate to
make the initial determination of probable cause as
to specific items. The fact that child pornography is
unprotected by the First Amendment is irrelevant.
All expression is presumptively protected at the
time of the warrantless seizure; child pornography
is no different in this regardfrom obscenity.

[d. at 1469 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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The Ninth Circuit has recently noted that to the extent
Hale stands for the proposition that a stricter probable cause standard should apply when First
Amendment values are implicated it has been overruled by New York v. P.J. Video, Inc.. 475 U.S. 868.
875. 106 S.Ct. 1610. 1615. 89 L.Ed.2d 871 (1986).
u.s. v. Weber, 923 F.2d 1338. 1343 n. 6 (9th
Cir.1990). P.J. Video does not, however, hold that the
plain view doctrine applies to the seizure of a publication thought to contain child pornography. In
**292 *588 P.J. Video, the Court buttressed its conclusion that a different standard for determining
probable cause is not necessary where First Amendment protection is at issue with a reference to "the
requirement that the magistrate determine probable
cause as a means of safeguarding First Amendment
interests." Allowing an officer to make a probable
cause determination under the plain view doctrine
based on the reading of a book's cover is inconsistent
with this view.
The recent decision of the Supreme Court in Osborne
v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103. 110 S.Ct. 1691. 109 L.Ed.2d
98 (1990) does not undermine the force of the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Hale rejecting the application of
the plain view doctrine to the seizure of alleged child
pornography. In Osborne, the Court held that a state
may constitutionally proscribe the possession and
viewing of child pornography. Osborne did not purport to deal with the Fourth Amendment question
presented in this case. The opinion of the Ohio Supreme Court in Osborne reveals that the search and
seizure of child pornography there was conducted
pursuant to a warrant, not pursuant to the plain view
doctrine. State v. Osborne, 37 Ohio St.3d 249. 525
N.E.2d 1363. 1372 (988).
The fact that the cover of The Ugly Duckling referred
to its being "Completely Photo-Illustrated" should
not be considered as a substitute for a warrant issued
by a neutral magistrate based on a determination of
probable cause. To do so would weaken the presumption that all publications are protected under the First
Amendment.
I do not gainsay the right of the state to seek a warrant for the search and seizure of The Ugly Duckling
based on information provided by the officers who
executed the warrant for the search of ClaiBorne's
residence. Nor do I contend that the state could not

prosecute Claiborne if the book were seized pursuant
to a warrant issued by a magistrate. What I do find
erroneous is permitting the seizure of the book without a warrant issued after a determination of probable
cause by a magistrate. The application of the plain
view doctrine in this case puts law enforcement officers in the position of determining what is entitled to
First Amendment protection.
BISTLINE, J., concurs.BISTLINE, J. dissenting from
the denial of the motion for rehearing.
In the Court's initial opinion it was held, erroneously
as Justice Johnson's dissenting opinion forcefully
demonstrated, that material presumptively protected
by the first amendment may be seized without a warrant under the "plain view doctrine." In the petition
for rehearing, the Court is asked by respected defense
counsel to reconsider whether the facts of this case
permit a conclusion that the requirements for a plain
view seizure were present. The Court should not be
overly quick to eschew this opportunity to reconsider
the question. On a proper review, in hindsight, the
Court should reach the conclusion that the State
failed to carry its burden of proving that the seizure
of appellant's copy of The Ugly Duckling was constitutionally permissible under the plain view doctrine.
A warrantless search and seizure is presumptively
unreasonable. And, although it has been said many
times, it is important to remember that it is the prosecutor who bears the burden of proving that a warrantless seizure falls within one of our carefully
drawn and jealously guarded exceptions to the warrant requirement. State v. Bottelson. 102 Idaho 90.
92. 625 P.2d 1093. 1095 (981). Here, where the
book was seized without the authority of a warrant, it
became the State's burden to show the seizure was
constitutionally permissible.
The Court cites to Texas v. Brown. 460 U.S. 730,
737. 103 S.Ct. 1535. 1540-41. 75 L.Ed.2d 502
Ll..2.§J1 for its statement of the three requirements
which are required to establish a valid plain view
seizure: 1) a valid initial intrusion into the constitutionally protected area, 2) the officer must inadvertently discover the evidencefW., and 3) that **293
*589 it must be immediately apparent to the police
that the object is subject to seizure. A review of the
suppression hearing transcript shows the State fell
well short of its burden under Brown.
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FN I. The United States Supreme Court has
eliminated the inadvertence requirement
from the fourth amendment plain view doctrine. Horton v. California. 496 U.S. 128,
110 S. Ct. 2301. 2304, 110 L.Ed.2d 112
(1990). The search warrant here was executed prior to the issuance of Horton. But,
where the majority relies on Brown v. Texas
and does not apply Horton to this case, the
questions of whether Horton will be adopted
under Article I, § 17, and if it is adopted
whether it applies retroactively are left for
another day.
On a reading of the appeal record it is immediately
observed that the State did not present one single
witness at the suppression hearing. It should go without saying that it is certainly difficult, if not impossible, to prove anything without the benefit of evidence. That seemingly indisputable observation is
mentioned because the recognition of it has apparently eluded those other members of the Court who
comprise the majority. Detective Kenneth Smith was
a likely witness for the State, and yet he was called to
the witness stand by the defense. Smith testified that
he was not present when the police seized The Ugly
Duckling. but had heard some things about it. To wit:
Q [BY DEFENSE COUNSEL] "Ugly Duckling"
and "Sexual Encounter No.6," Exhibits 3 and 4,
were located in the same place, is that correct?

along with twelve books. Additionally, there
were four films and two empty film containers in the box. Out of these forty-six items
seized, only two resulted in an indictment.
Other items seized in the search included
copies of "Playboy" and "Penthouse" and a
copy of The Art of Sensual Massage. At a
second search of the house, the police seized
forty-six videotapes many of which were not
sexually explicit or exploitative, including
one on taxes, one on how to fly a minihelicopter, the Wizard of Oz, the Blues
Brothers, several made for T.V. movies and
a tape of a family reunion. None of these
tapes resulted in an indictment or information being filed against the appellant.

******
Q Okay. Now was the box closed or open?
A Again, I have no personal knowledge of that.

Q Okay. Has anyone told you?
A No. I don't know.

Q All right. Have you seen the box?
A Not to my recollection.

i.'

A Yes.

Q Was there marking on it?

Q Will you describe where that was?

A I have no recollection.

A I personally did not seize those items. They were
seized by Detective Bart Hamilton. I have no personal knowledge of where they were seized other
than what I was told by Detective Bart Hamilton.

Q You have seen it since it was seized, have you
not?

Q Explain what your understanding from Detective
Hamilton is.
A In the master closet bedroom, on the floor, in a
box. And the box contained all 40 magazines Gkus
items b I and b2 listed on the property invoice.
FN2. Actually, the inventory list shows that
there were twenty-eight magazines seized

A My recollection is that the box was seized and
then we placed it in one of our evidence boxes, and
I don't know what the status of the box is, whether
it was seized or what. I have no idea.
The State's cross-examination of Detective Smith
merely re-established that the book in question was in
a box along with 44 other items of legal, albeit erotic,
material.
At best, all that one can discern from the record eve-
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rything in the box was seized without a close examination by the police. The testimony from Detective
Smith suggests that the officers did not realize they
had seized sexually exploitative material until after
the materials already had been taken to the police
station. While searching the home the first time, the
officers saw numerous videotapes which they felt had
suspicious titles. Detective Smith was asked whether
the decision to seek another search warrant was motivated only by those titles. He was careful to say that
**294 *590 the officers relied on the other items they
had seized in the fIrst search.
Upon seeing them [the videotapes at the house],
also upon reviewing the items that we did seize, in
reviewing those items, we did locate items that appeared to be child pornographic, child pornography. (emphasis added)
The implication of Detective Smith's testimony is that
it was not readily apparent to the police they had
seized sexually exploitative material until it was examined at the police station.
Common sense would suggest to anyone that the police properly would not have taken all forty-six items,
but not take the box. The box would have been taken,
if only for the convenience of handling the other materials. If the detective decided to simply take the box
and everything in it back to the police station, it is
entirely possible, if not probable, that the contents
were not completely examined until after they had
been seized. That is, Detective Hamilton could have
looked at a few items, which mayor may not have
included the one in question, and then decided to take
everything.
This "seize in haste, examine at leisure" method of
police work was certainly in effect at the time of the
second search of the house where the seventy-four
videotapes were seized without regard for content.
There is no reason to believe that the police were any
more solicitous of the appellant's fIrst and fourth
amendment rights during the fIrst search when the
Ugly Duckling was seized.
Because it is not at all clear whether the examination,
not the seizure, of The Ugly Duckling occurred at the
home, or later at the station, it is inappropriate for
this Court to fInd that the State carried its burden of
proving the search was justifIed by the plain view

doctrine. If the Ugly Duckling was not discovered
until the contents of the box were examined at the
police station, then the seizure could not fall within
the plain view exception as the seizure would have
already been accomplished prior to the time it became readily apparent to the police that The Ugly
Duckling was sexually exploitative material.
In sum, the Court could conclude that the search was
justifIed by the plain view doctrine, provided however that Detective Hamilton examined the contents
of the box while searching for those items listed in
the search warrant, and also provided that during the
examination he inadvertently saw the book, and it
was immediately apparent to him that it was sexually
exploitative material as that term is defIned in 1hl
18-1507(2)(j). But the Court could only so urge if
Detective Hamilton had testifIed, which he did not.
Appellate courts do not sit to engage in imagination
of what might have been proveable; rather, our function is to discern what has or has not been factually
proven, and then apply pertinent statutory or case
precedent and principles of law. Here the State failed
to prove that it knew The Ugly Duckling was sexually
exploitative material before it was seized and taken to
the police station. The State has utterly failed to
prove its search came within the plain view exception
to the warrant requirement. Accordingly, the evidence should have been suppressed, which is so as a
matter of law. There are no issues of fact discernable
in the State's presentation.
The lesson which should be learned today, both by
those who comprise the majority and by the officialdom of Garden City, is that police officers are entitled to more education and instruction in the laws
attendant to search and seizure. This dissent does not
intend to convey the message that the police officers
were at fault. Rather it appears that they were untrained and unadvised relative to an undertaking
which requires specialized knowledge in a particularized area of criminal law.
Idaho,1991.
State v. Claiborne
120 Idaho 581,818 P.2d 285
END OF DOCUMENT
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Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, December 1992 Term.
STATE ofidaho, Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.
George Frank LEWIS, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 18580.
Feb.2S, 1993.
Rehearing Denied March 30, 1993.
Defendant was convicted in the District Court Fourth
Judicial District, Ada County, Deborah A. Ball, J., of
lewd and lascivious conduct with minor under age of
16, and he appealed. The Supreme Court, McDevitt,
C.J., held that: (1) double jeopardy did not bar prosecution, despite prior prosecution for knowingly transferring bodily fluid containing human immunodeficiency virus (HIV); (2) continuance of trial was not
abuse of discretion; (3) selecting jury from another
county was not improper; (4) certain photographs
and "memorabilia" were properly admitted; (S) evidence of prior uncharged sexual contact with same
victim was properly admitted; and (6) allowing expert to testifY regarding whether defendant fit profile
of sexual abuse victim was proper.

previous prosecution for knowingly transferring human immunodeficiency virus (HIV); in order to
prove violation of lewd conduct statute, it was not
necessary to prove that defendant had intent to infect
or expose victim, with knowledge of HlV status, or
that any body fluid, tissue, or organ was transferred
to victim, all of which are elements of HlV crime
and conduct that state proved in lewd conduct triai
did not constitute violation of HIV offense statute.
I.C. §§ 18-IS08, 39-608; V.S.C.A. Const.Amend. S.

ill Criminal Law IlO €;:::::>S77.IO(4)
ill Criminal Law
IIOXVIII Time of Trial
II OXVIII(B) Decisions Subsequent to 1966
IlOkS77.IO Factors Affecting Application
of Requirements in General
IIOkS77.1O(4) k. Cause for Delay,
"Good Cause", and Excuse or Justification in General. Most Cited Cases
District court did not abuse discretion by continuing
trial for about two and one-half months, for purpose
of determining whether action had to be dismissed
for delay; trial began within six months of filing of
criminal information, and basis for continuance was
that another trial was going on. I.C. § 19-3S0 1.

m Criminal Law 110 ~577.10(4)

Affmned.
Bistline, J., filed opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
West Headnotes

ill Double Jeopardy 135H ~148
135H Double Jeopardy
13SHV Offenses, Elements, and Issues Foreclosed
13SHV(A) In General
13SHk139 Particular Offenses, Identity of
13SHk148 k. Sex Offenses; Obscenity.
Most Cited Cases
Prosecution for lewd conduct with minor under age
of 16 was not barred, on double jeopardy grounds, by

110 Criminal Law
IIOXVIII Time of Trial
IIOXVIII(B) Decisions Subsequent to 1966
I I OkS77.1 0 Factors Affecting Application
of Requirements in General
IIOkS77.1O(4) k. Cause for Delay,
"Good Cause", and Excuse or Justification in General. Most Cited Cases
Criminal Law IlO ~586

ill Criminal Law
IIOXIX Continuance
IIOk586 k. Discretion of Court. Most Cited
District court has discretion in determining whether
good cause exists to justifY continuance in trial. 1L.§
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19-3501.

Ml Jury 230 ~33(3)
230 Jury
230II Right to Trial by Jury
230k30 Denial or Infringement of Right
230k33 Constitution and Selection of Jury
230k33(3) k. Selection from Vicinage.
Most Cited Cases
Selecting jury from another county was not abuse of
district court's discretion; court did not act on its own
motion, but on state's request, which came in form of
assertion that "change of venue is appropriate in
terms of selecting ajury." I.C. § 19-1816.

J£. Searches and Seizures 349 ~191
349 Searches and Seizures
349VI Judicial Review or Determination
349k191 k. In General; Conclusiveness of
Warrant in General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly IIOkIl58(2»
When Supreme Court reviews issuance of search
warrant ~y magistrate, review is limited to ensuring
that magIstrate had substantial basis for concluding
that probable cause existed, and Court gives great
deference to magistrate's determination.

llil Searches and Seizures 349 ~114
349 Searches and Seizures
349H Warrants
349kl13 Probable or Reasonable Cause
349kl14 k. Particular Concrete Applications. Most Cited Cases
.
Issuance of search warrant authorizing detective to
s~arch for various items, including photographs, dianes, and other memorabilia, in defendant's apartment
in connection with investigation regarding alleged
sexual abuse of minor was supported by probable
cause. Const. Art. 1. § 17; U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.

ill Searches and Seizures 349 ~148
349 Searches and Seizures
349lII Execution and Return of Warrants
349kl47 Scope of Search
.
349kl48 k. Places, Persons, and Things
Within Scope of Warrant. Most Cited Cases

Document, which was written in fIrst person and pertained to homosexual acts between writer and person
who appeared to be minor, was properly seized pursuant to warrant authorizing search for "memorabilia" of minor sex abuse victims and for "diary" listing names of victims and activities engaged in.
Const. Art. 1, § 17; U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.

mCriminal Law 110 ~412(3)
ill Criminal Law
110XVn Evidence
110XVIJ(M) Declarations
llOk411 Declarations by Accused
11 Ok412 In General
llOk412(3) k. Subject Matter as Affecting Admissibility. Most Cited Cases
Police detective's testimony that defendant had made
statement acknowledging that he had sexual preference for adolescent boys was properly admitted in
prosecution for lewd conduct with minor; trial court
ruled that there was proper foundation laid for testimony and that it was relevant and admissible, and
defendant did not object to testimony as violating
rule governing admission of evidence of other
crimes, wrongs or acts. Rules of Evid., Rules 402404,404(b).

I.2l Witnesses 410 ~370(4)
410 Witnesses
410 IV Credibility and Impeachment
410JWC) Interest and Bias of Witness
41 Ok3 70 Friendly or Unfriendly Relations
with or Feeling Toward Party
41Ok370(4) k. Sexual Relations. Most
Cited Cases
Evidence of prior uncharged sexual contact with victim was properly admitted, in prosecution for lewd
conduct with minor, to help jury assess victim's
credibility. Rules of Evid., Rules 402-404, 404(b).

llill Criminal Law 110 €:=>474.4(4)
ill Criminal Law
IIOXVII Evidence
110XVII(R) Opinion Evidence
llOk468 Subjects of Expert Testimony
II Ok474.4 Character Traits or Profiles;
Syndromes
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110k474.4(4) k. Battered or Abused
Children. Most Cited Cases
Criminal Law 110 €=>478(1)

JJ..Q Criminal Law
IIOXVII Evidence
II0XVlI{R) Opinion Evidence
IIOk477 Competency of Experts
IIOk478 Knowledge, Experience, and
Skill
11Ok478(J) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
Allowing psychologist who treated victim after alleged crime to testify regarding whether victim fit
profile of sexual abuse victim was not abuse of discretion in prosecution for lewd conduct with minor,
given psychologist's qualifications and experience in
therapeutic intervention with minor sexual abuse victims and "people involved in homosexual issues."
Rules of Evid., Rule 702.

llll Criminal Law 110 €:=>470(3)
ill Criminal Law
110XVII Evidence
IIOXVII(R) Opinion Evidence
lIOk468 Subjects of Expert Testimony
1l0k470 Matters Directly in Issue; U1timate Issues
IlOk470(3) k. Occurrence of Crime;
Defendant's Participation. Most Cited Cases
If proper foundation has been laid, it is proper for
expert to testify regarding whether person has been
sexually abused. Rules of Evid., Rule 702.

Page 3

IIOk942 Impeachment of Witness
II Ok942(1) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Defendant was not entitled to new trial in prosecution
for lewd conduct with minor, on grounds of alleged
newly discovered evidence, consisting of evidence
tending to show that videotape allegedly viewed by
victim and defendant on day of offense was in possession of another person at that time; evidence was
merely impeaching evidence, and persons who were
sources for this evidence had extensive contact with
defendant while defendant was in jail ,prior to trial.

I!.Jl Infants 211 €:=>20
211 Infants
211 II Protection
21 ] k20 k. Criminal Prosecutions Under Laws
for Protection of Children. Most Cited Cases
Sentence of fixed term of life in prison was not excessive for crime of lewd conduct with minor under
age of 16; defendant had previously been convicted
for sexual offense against minor, was HIV-positive at
time of acts involved in present case, had been subject of allegations of uncharged sexual misconduct
with minors, and continued to deny that he had committed the crime. I.C. § 18-1508.
**396 *338 Alan E. Trimming, Ada County Public
Defender, and Deborah A. Whipple (argued), Deputy
Public Defender, Boise, for defendant-appellant.
Larry EchoHawk, Atty. Gen., and Michael A. Henderson (argued), Deputy Atty. Gen., Boise, for plaintiff-respondent.
McDEVITT, Chief Justice.

lll.l Criminal Law 110 €:=>939(3)
NATURE OF THE CASE

ill Criminal Law
] I OXXI Motions for New Trial
IIOk937 Newly Discovered Evidence
lIOk939 Diligence
11Ok939(3) k. Failure to Ascertain
Knowledge of Witness. Most Cited Cases
Criminal Law 110 ~942(1)

ill Criminal Law
IIOXXI Motions for New Trial
IIOk937 Newly Discovered Evidence

Appellant, George Frank Lewis ("Lewis"), was convicted of the crime of lewd conduct with a minor
under the age of sixteen, in violation of I.C. § 181508. He was sentenced to a fixed term of life in
prison. On appeal, Lewis contends that he was tried
for the crime of lewd conduct in violation of the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution based upon the claim that a previous charge
(knowingly transferring a bodily fluid containing the
HIV virus, I.C. § 39-608) resulted in a mistrial and,
according to Lewis, involved proof of the same conduct. In addition, Lewis contends that the district
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court erred in delaying his trial, selecting a jury from
another county, allowing certain evidence and testimony to be presented to the jury, denying his motion
for a new trial, and sentencing him to a fixed term of
life in prison. For the reasons set forth below, we
affirm the decision of the district court.

County. The State requested that the jury be selected
from another county. Finally, the court ruled that
there be no mention of Lewis being HIV -positive. FN I
FN 1. Despite the court's ruling regarding
Lewis' HIV status, Lewis decided to tell the
jury in this case of his HIV status. During
the in camera pre-trial motions, Lewis' attorney informed the judge that Lewis had
decided to tell the jury of his HIV status.
The trial judge warned Lewis of doing so,
explaining the possible consequences, and
Lewis' attorney responded that it was a matter of trial tactics. During the voir dire of
prospective jurors, Lewis' attorney said,
"Mr. Lewis has tested positive for the HIV
virus, the AIDS virus." Finally, during the
closing argument, Mr. Lewis, acting as his
own attorney, stated, "I am infected with the
HIV virus."

BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS
On June 11, 1989, a criminal complaint was filed
against Lewis. In the complaint, the State alleged that
Lewis had committed the crime of lewd conduct with
a minor under the age of sixteen, in violation of L.h..§.
18-1508. More specifically, the complaint stated that
the conduct occurred in February of 1989, with a
fifteen-year-old boy and involved the acts of Lewis
performing oral sex and attempting to perform anal
sex upon the boy, both with the intent to gratify
Lewis' sexual desire. After a preliminary hearing held
on June 13, 1989, an information was filed against
Lewis on June 15, 1989. Lewis was arraigned on the
charges and pled not guilty.
On September 19, 1989, the parties appeared at the
time set for jury trial by the court. At this hearing, the
court advised the parties that trial needed to be reset.
Lewis requested a "trial as soon as possible." The
court inquired as to certain dates, heard responses,
and the parties fmally**397 *339 agreed to set trial
for November 20, 1989, at 9:00 a.m.
On November 6, 1989, Lewis filed a motion to dismiss the information. Grounds for the motion were:
(I) Lewis had been tried for attempting to transfer the
HIV virus, "which contained the identical issue as in
this matter;" and (2) the HIV charge ended in a mistrial, over Lewis' objections, and the State is now
collaterally estopped from further proceedings. In
support of the motion, Lewis cited "principles of res
judicata and the 'double jeopardy' clause of the
United States Constitution." During oral argument on
this motion, counsel for Lewis discussed I.C. § 18ill, a statutory double jeopardy constraint.
On November 7, 1989, the parties again appeared
before the court. At the hearing, Lewis withdrew his
November 6, 1989 motion to represent himself. In
addition, the court discussed its concern about selecting a jury due to publicity, and whether jury selection
in a county other than Ada County should be considered. Lewis requested that jury selection be from Ada

On November 17, 1989, Lewis filed a motion in

limine and a motion to suppress. Among other things,
Lewis asked that the court not allow into evidence a
statement made by Lewis to a police officer regarding his sexual preference, a videotape, testimony
from an expert witness, and certain property that was
seized from his apartment.
On November 20, 1989, the parties met in court for a
status conference. At this conference, the court announced its decision to select a jury from another
county, to which Lewis objected, stating his desire to
go to trial immediately. The court responded that
another trial was going on at the time, and it set jury
trial for November 28, 1989. Finally, the court heard
argument on Lewis' claim of double jeopardy.
Also on November 20, 1989, Marji Shepherd, Ada
County Jury Commissioner, filed an affidavit stating
that she interviewed seventy-six prospective jurors,
asking them questions concerning their ability to be
fair and impartial in the Lewis case, as well as their
familiarity with Lewis, including the AIDS issue,
through the media. In this regard, she stated that forty
people said they could not be impartial, thirty-five
said they could, and one was undecided. Jury Commissioner Shepherd also stated that, based upon her
experience, it would be necessary to call at least 300
prospective jurors in Ada County in order to have a
fair and impartial jury for Lewis, and that it would
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resenting Lewis. The court granted the motion.

not be possible to sequester 300 prospective jurors.
On November 27, 1989, the court issued its decision
on jury selection and Lewis' motion to dismiss. As to
jury selection, the court decided to impanel a jury
from another county pursuant to I. C. § 19-1816, due
to the publicity of Lewis' HIV case, his HlV status
not being relevant to this case, and the matters set
forth in Jury Commissioner Shepard's affidavit. The
court denied Lewis' motion to dismiss. In so doing,
the court stated that if Lewis had been acquitted in
the HIV case, the State would be collaterally estopped from proceeding in this case. However, since
a mistrial was declared and there was no final judgment on whether Lewis and the victim had sexual
contact, the court concluded that this prosecution was
not barred. In addition, the court noted that I.C. § 39608, the statute relating to transferring the HIV virus,
does not require sexual contact or that the victim be
under the age of sixteen.
On November 29, 1989, the parties again met in court
to take up motions. At the hearing, Lewis filed an
amended motion to **398 *340 suppress. The
amended motion to suppress, regarding all videotapes, writings, notes, and letters seized, cited the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and article I, section 17 of the Idaho Constitution, and
claimed that probable cause did not exist to support
the warrant. Additionally, Lewis filed an affidavit
stating that he did not consent to the May 5, 1989,
search of his premises. The case proceeded to trial.
On December 5, 1989, the sixth day of jury trial, the
jury reached a verdict of guilty.
On January 19, 1990, Lewis filed a motion to reappoint August H. Cahill as defense counsel.fl::!l He also
filed a motion for a new trial pursuant to I.C.R. 34
and I.C. § 19-2406, stating that "[n]ew evidence exists which substantially impeaches the credibility of
the state's primary witness .... " In support of this motion, Lewis filed an affidavit of Joie Hein. Mr. Hein
stated that the victim could not have seen a certain
videotape with Lewis on a certain day because Hein
had borrowed that tape from Lewis' roommate' on the
day in question.

On January 29, 1990, a sentencing hearing was held.
At the hearing, the court denied Lewis' motion to
strike certain evidence in the presentence investigation report, and it sentenced Lewis to a fixed life term
in prison.
On February 8, 1990, Lewis' roommate, Michael
Carver, filed an affidavit. In his affidavit, Mr. Carver
stated that he had lent the above-mentioned videotape
to Joie Hein on the day the victim testified that he
had watched it with Lewis.
On March I, 1990, Lewis filed a notice of appeal. He
appealed from the January 29, 1990 judgment pursuant to I.A.R. Il(c)(l).
On May 3, 1990, the parties met in court to argue the
motion for a new trial. At the hearing, Lewis filed a
motion to disqualify the presiding judge, and the parties agreed to continue the matter.
On May 23, 1990, Lewis filed a motion for reconsideration of sentence. The motion was made pursuant
to I.C.R. 35.
On June 13, 1990, the court issued its decision and
order denying the motion for a new trial. In denying
the motion, the court cited State v. Drapeau. 97 Idaho
685,551 P.2d 972 (1976), for the standard for granting a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence. Applying this standard, the court found, inter
alia, that Lewis had not acted with due diligence to
discover the new evidence because he had unrestricted access to Mr. Carver and Mr. Hein. In addition, the court found that the jury was properly selected from another county, commenting that there
was no way to evaluate whether Boise-area people
are more sensitized to gay issues.

ANALYSIS
We address the following issues:
I. Did the district court err in ruling that this case was

FN2. On the second day of jury trial, November 30, 1989, Lewis filed a motion to
represent himself. Mr. Cahill had been rep-

not barred by the double jeopardy clause of the
United States Constitution, U.S. Const. amend. V.
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genital-genital contact, oral-genital contact, anal-genital contact, oral-anal contact, manual-anal contact, or manualgenital contact, whether between persons
of the same or opposite sex, or who shall
involve a minor or child in any act of bestiality or sado-masochistic abuse or lewd
exhibition as any of such acts are defined
in section 18-1507, Idaho Code, when any
of such acts are done with the intent of
arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the
lust or passions or sexual desires of such
person or of such minor or child, shall be
guilty of a felony and shall be imprisoned
in the state prison for a term of not more
than life.

11. Did the district court abuse its discretion by continuing Lewis' trial?
III. Did the district court violate a constitutional right
or abuse its discretion by selecting a jury from another county?
IV. Did the district court err in denying Lewis' motion to suppress evidence?
V. Did the district court correctly apply rules of evidence in admitting certain evidence at trial?
VI. Did the district court abuse its discretion by allowing the testimony of an expert witness?
VII. Did the district court abuse its discretion by denying Lewis' motion for a new trial?

FN4. This statute provides:
39-608. Transfer of body fluid which
may
contain
the
HIV
virusPunishment-Definitions-Defenses.-( 1)
Any person who exposes another in any
manner with the intent to infect or, knowing that he or she is or has been afflicted
with acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS), AIDS related complexes
(ARC), or other manifestations of human
immunodeficiency virus (HlV) infection,
transfers or attempts to transfer any of his .
or her body fluid, body tissue or organs to
another person is guilty of a felony and
shall be punished by imprisonment in the
state prison for a period not to exceed fifteen (15) years, by fine not in excess of
five thousand dollars ($5,000), or by both
such imprisonment and fine.

VIII. Did the district court abuse its discretion by
sentencing Lewis to a fixed term of life in prison?
**399 *3411.
DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN RULING
THAT THIS CASE WAS NOT BARRED BY THE
DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE OF THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION, U.S. CONST.AMEND.

V?
We hold that the district court did not err in ruling
that Lewis' prosecution for the crime of lewd conduct, I.C. § 18-1508 (1984) FN3, was not barred by
double jeopardy because of his previous prosecution
for the crime of transferring the HlV virus, I.C. § 39608 llM, which ended in a sua sponte mistrial.

(2) Defmitions. As used in this section:

FN3. We apply the 1984 version of this statute instead of the 1992 version because the
conduct giving rise to this prosecution took
place prior to the 1992 amendment. This
statute provides:

(a) "Body fluid" means semen (irrespective of the presence of spermatozoa),
blood, saliva, vaginal secretion, breast
milk, and urine.

18-1508. Lewd conduct with minor or
child under sixteen.-Any person who
shall wilfully and lewdly commit any
lewd or lascivious act or acts upon or with
the body or any part or member thereof of
a minor or child under the age of sixteen
(16) years, including but not limited to,

(b) "Transfer" means engaging in sexual
activity by genital-genital contact, oralgenital contact, anal-genital contact; or
permitting the use of a hypodermic syringe, needle, or similar device without
sterilization; or giving, whether or not for
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value, blood, semen, body tissue, or organs to a person, blood bank, hospital, or
other medical care facility for purposes of
transfer to another person.
(3) Defenses:
(a) Consent. It is an affIrmative defense
that the sexual activity took place between
consenting adults after full disclosure by
the accused of the risk of such activity.
(b) Medical advice. It is an affrrmative defense that the transfer of body fluid, body
tissue, or organs occurred after advice
from a licensed physician that the accused
was noninfectious.
We begin our analysis of this issue with a review of
United ~tates Su~me Court opinions dealing
With double Jeopardy.
The three United States
Supreme Court cases are: Blockburger v. United
States. 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306
(1932); Gracly v. Corbin. 495 U.S. 508, 110 S.Ct.
2084, 109 L.Ed.2d 548 (1990); and United States v.
Felix. 503 U.S. 378, 112 S.Ct. 1377, 118 L.Ed.2d 25
(1992).

relevant federal statutes provided:
It shall be unlawful for any person to purchase,
sell, dispense, or distribute any **400 *342 of the
aforesaid drugs [opium and other narcotics] except
in the original stamped package or from the original stamped package; and the absence of appropriate tax-paid stamps from any of the aforesaid drugs
shall be prima facie evidence of a violation of this
section by the person in whose possession same
may be found ....
Btockburger. 284 U.S. at 300 n. I, 52 S.Ct. at 180-81

!1.J..
It shall be unlawful for any person to sell, barter,

exchange, or give away any of the drugs specified
in section 691 of this title, except in pursuance ofa
written order of the person to whom such article is
sold, bartered, exchanged, or given on a form to be
issued in blank for that purpose by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.

t~ee

FN5. U.S. Const. amend. V provides, in
relevant part, that "nor shall any person be
subject for the same offense to be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb .... "
A. Blockburger v. United States. 284 U.S. 299, 52
S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932): In Blockburger, the

defendant was charged with five counts of violating
provisions of the Harrison Narcotic Act, and he was
found gUilty of the second, third, and fifth counts.
The Court explained:
The second count charged a sale on a specified day
of ten grains of the drug not in or from the original
stamped package; the third count charged a 'sale on
the following day of eight grains of the drug not in
or from the original stamped package; the fifth
count charged the latter sale also as having been
made not in pursuance of a written order of the
purchaser as required by the statute.
Btockburger. 284 U.S. at 301, 52 S.Ct. at 181. The

Blockburger. 284 U.S. at 300 n. 2, 52 S.Ct. at 181 n.

2·
On appeal, the defendant argued that the two sales
charged in the second and third counts, having been
made to the same person, constituted a single offense.
Further, he argued that the fifth count, having been
made not from the original stamped package and
having been made not in pursuance of a written order, constituted one offense.
As to the defendant's first argument, the Court held
that the sales charged in the second and third counts,
were "distinct and separate sales made at different
times." Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 30 I, 52 S.Ct. at 181.
The Court explained that, although the purchaser paid
for the additional quantity shortly after the first quantity was delivered, the first sale had been consummated by its delivery, making "[e]ach of several successive sales constitute[ ] a distinct offense, however
closely they may follow each other." Blockburger.
284 U.S. at 302, 52 S.Ct. at 181.
As to the defendant's second argument, the Court
recognized that the above-quoted provisions of the
Narcotic Act create "two distinct offenses," one creating a crime of selling any of the drugs unless they
are in or from the original stamped package, and the
other creating a crime of selling any of the drugs
without a written order from the purchaser.
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Btockburger. 284 U.S. at 303-04, 52 S.Ct. at 182.
The Court stated the issue as whether, when there has
been one sale, "both sections being violated by the
same act, the accused committed two offenses or only
one." Blockburger, 284 U,S, at 304, 52 S,Ct. at 182,
In concluding that two offenses were committed, the
Court held:

Each of the offenses created requires proof of a
different element. The applicable rule is that, where
the same act or transaction constitutes a violation
of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be
applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other
does not..., "A single act may be an offense against
two statutes; and if each statute requires proof of an
additional fact which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction under either statute does not exempt the defendant from prosecution and punishment under the other,"
Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304, 52 S.et. at 182 (citations omitted).

B. Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 110 S.Ct. 2084,
109 L.Ed.2d 548 (I 990): In Grady, the defendant
drove his vehicle across the double yellow line of the
road, striking two oncoming vehicles. The driver of
the second vehicle struck by the defendant died later
that evening. The defendant was served with two
tickets directing him to appear in the local court on a
certain date for: (1) driving while intoxicated, a misdemeanor; and (2) failing to keep right of the median.
Prior to the defendant's scheduled appearance, an
assistant district attorney began to prepare for a
homicide prosecution in connection with the accident. The defendant entered guilty pleas to the two
traffic tickets, and was given the minimum sentence
for these two crimes. There was never any mention of
the fatality at either the acceptance of the defendant's
guilty pleas or his sentencing hearing.
About two months after the sentencing hearing, a
grand jury investigating the accident indicted the defendant, charging him **401 *343 with: (1) reckless
manslaughter, (2) second degree vehicular manslaughter, and (3) criminally negligent homicide, all
for causing the death of the driver of the second vehicle; (4) third degree reckless assault for causing injury to the passenger of the second vehicle; and (5)

driving while intoxicated. Furthermore:
The prosecution filed a bill of particulars that identified the three reckless or negligent acts on which
it would rely to prove the homicide and assault
charges: (1) operating a motor vehicle on a public
highway in an intoxicated condition, (2) failing to
keep right of the median, and (3) driving approximately 45 to 50 miles per hour in heavy rain,
"which was a speed too fast for the weather and
road conditions then pending."
Grady. 495 U.S. at 513-14, 110 S.Ct. at 2089. The
defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing
that the prosecution would violate statutory and constitutional double jeopardy constraints.

The United States Supreme Court in Grady affirmed
the New York Court of Appeals' opinion, which
agreed with the defendant's argument. Grady. 495
U.S. at 515, 110 S.Ct. at 2089-90. The Court held
that, in addition to the traditional Blockburger test,
[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause bars a subsequent
prosecution if, to establish an essential element of
an offense charged in that prosecution, the government will prove conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has already been
prosecuted.
Grady. 495 U.S. at 510, 110 S.C!. at 2087 (footnote
omitted).lli2

FN6. The Grady Court further stated:
[I]f in the course of securing a conviction
for one offense the State necessarily has
proved the conduct comprising all of the
elements of another offense not yet prosecuted (a "component offense"), the Double Jeopardy Clause would bar subsequent
prosecution of the component offense.
Grady. 495 U.S. at 521 n. 11, 110 S.C!. at
2093 n. 11.

The Grady Court reached its holding by adopting
reasoning set forth ten years earlier in Illinois v.
Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 100 S.Ct. 2260, 65 L.Ed.2d 228
(1980). It deemed the following analysis to "govern[
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] this case:"
Like Thomas Corbin, John Vitale allegedly caused
a fatal car accident. A police officer at the scene issued Vitale a traffic citation charging him with
failure to reduce speed to avoid an accident in violation of § 11-601(a) of the Illinois Vehicle Code.
Vitale was convicted of that offense and sentenced
to pay a $15 fine. The day after his conviction, the
State charged Vitale with two counts of involuntary
manslaughter based on his reckless driving. Vitale
argued that this subsequent prosecution was barred
by the Double Jeopardy Clause.
This Court held that the second prosecution was
not barred under the traditional Blockburger test
because each offense "require[d] proof of a fact
which the other [did] not." See Blockburger. 284
U.S. at 304, 52 S.Ct. at 182. Although involuntary
manslaughter required proof of a death, failure to
reduce speed did not. Likewise, failure to slow was
not a statutory element of involuntary manslaughter. Vitale. 447 U.S. at 418-19, 100 S.Ct. at 2266.
Thus, the subsequent prosecution survived the
Blockburger test.
But the Court did not stop at that point. Justice
White, writing for the Court, added that, even
though the two prosecutions did not violate the
Blockburger test:
[I]t may be that to sustain its manslaughter case the
State may find it necessary to prove a failure to
slow or to rely on conduct necessarily involving
such failure; it may concede as much prior to trial.
In that case, because Vitale has already been convicted for conduct that is a necessary element of
the more serious crime for which he has been
charged, his claim of double jeopardy would be
substantiaL ...
Grady. 495 U.S. at 515-16, 110 S.Ct. at 2090 (citations omitted), quoting Vitale. 447 U.S. at 420, 100
S.Ct. at 2267. 00

FN7. In Felix, the United States Supreme
Court acknowledged that the Grady test was
adopted from dicta in Vita/e. Fe/ix. 503 U.S.
at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 1384.

**402 *344 The United States Supreme Court fashioned a two-step double jeopardy analysis: (1) apply
the Blockburger test; if the prosecution is not barred
under Blockburger, then; (2) apply the Grady test.
For the Blockburger test, the inquiry is whether the
two or more offenses have "identical statutory elements or that one is a lesser included offense of the
other.... " Grady. 495 U.S. at 516, 110 S.Ct. at 2090
(emphasis added), citing Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S.
161. 166, 97 S.Ct. 2221. 2225, 53 L.Ed.2d 187
(] 977). For the Grady test, "[t]he critical inquiry is
what conduct the State will prove .... " Grady. 495
U.S. at 521. 110 S.Ct. at 2093 (emphasis added).
The Grady Court applied the two-step double jeopardy analysis to the facts of that case. First, it recognized that the defendant conceded that the B/ockburger test did not bar the prosecution of the reckless
manslaughter, criminally negligent homicide, and
third degree reckless assault offenses. FN8 Grady. 495
U.S. at 522, 110 S.Ct. at 2094. In applying the second
step of the analysis, the Court turned to the prosecution's bill of particulars, which was binding on the
State as its theory of proof. Grady, 495 U.S. at 52223, 110 S.Ct. at 2094, citing Corbin v. Hillery. 74
N.Y.2d 279, 290, 545 N.Y.S.2d 71. 75, 543 N.E.2d
714, 720 (1989), affirmed The Grady Court quoted
from the document, and held that the State admitted
that it would prove the entirety of the conduct for
which the defendant was convicted. Grady, 495 U.S.
at 523, 110 S.Ct. at 2094.
FN8. The State did not contest the New
York Court of Appeal's ruling that driving
while intoxicated and vehicular manslaughter were barred under state law and Blockburger. Grady, 495 U.S. at 522 n. 13, 110
S.Ct. at 2094 n. 13.
C. United States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378, 112 S.Ct.
1377, 118 L.Ed.2d 25 (l992): The defendant operated a methamphetamine facility in Beggs, Oklahoma. In July of 1987, DEA agents raided the Beggs
facility and shut it down. Subsequently, the defendant
ordered materials for manufacturing methamphetamine to be delivered to him in Joplin, Missouri. DEA
agents witnessed the Joplin transfer and arrested the
defendant shortly thereafter.
The defendant was charged and convicted in Missouri for the crime of attempting to manufacture
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methamphetamine based upon the Joplin transfer. In
the Missouri case, the Felix Court summarized what
the government showed:
1. On August 26, 1987, the defendant asked to purchase the materials from a DEA informant;

2. The defendant made a down payment of $7,500
on the materials;
3. The defendant instructed the informant to deliver
the materials to a Joplin hotel on August 31, 1987;
4. The informant met the defendant at that hotel on
that date with the materials; and,
5. The defendant inspected the materials, hitched
his car to the trailer in which the materials had
been transported, and then he was arrested.
Felix. 503 U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 1380.

At the trial in the Missouri case, the defendant disputed that he had the requisite criminal intent. In order to prove his intent, the government introduced
evidence that the defendant had manufactured
methamphetamine in Oklahoma. The Felix Court
summarized this evidence as follows:
I. During the spring of 1987, the defendant had
purchased material from the DEA agent for manufacturing methamphetamine;

2. The defendant gave those materials to Paul
Roach in exchange for lessons on how to manufacture methamphetamine;
3. Roach testified that he and the defendant had
made methamphetamine in a trailer near Beggs,
Oklahoma; and,
4. Government agents seized the trailer but did not
arrest the defendant, as the defendant avoided arrest by hiding in the nearby woods.
Felix. 503 U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 1380. The Court
admitted this evidence pursuant **403 *345 to F.R.E.
1!M(hl, regarding the defendant's state of mind with
respect to the materials.

Subsequently, the defendant was charged and convicted in Oklahoma of one count of conspiracy to
manufacture, possess, and distribute methamphetamine and seven substantive counts, four counts relating to manufacturing and possession with intent to
distribute, one count relating to maintaining a
methamphetamine manufacturing lab, and the last
two counts relating to interstate travel with the intent
to promote his illegal enterprise. "At trial, the Government introduced much of the same evidence of the
Missouri and Oklahoma transactions that had been
introduced in the Missouri trial." Felix. 503 U.S. at ---, 112 S.Ct. at 1381.
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit, the convictions for conspiracy and
the first five substantive counts were reversed based
upon the Grady test. The United States Supreme
Court reversed the Court of Appeals.
As to the substantive counts, the Felix Court stated
that "[t]he actual crimes charged in each case were
different in both time and place; there was absolutely
no common conduct linking the alleged offenses."
Felix. 503 U.S. at _no, 112 S.Ct. at 1382. In this regard:
The Court of Appeals appear[ed] to have acknowledged as much, as it concentrated not on the actual
crimes prosecuted in the separate trials, but instead
on the type of evidence presented by the Government during the two trials.... Thus, the Court of
Appeals holding must rest on an assumption that if
the Government offers in evidence in one prosecution acts of misconduct that might ultimately be
charged as criminal offenses in a second prosecution, the latter prosecution is barred under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Felix. 503 U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 1382. The Felix
Court disagreed with this rationale, reiterating that "a
mere overlap in proof between two prosecutions does
not establish a double jeopardy violation." Felix, 503
U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 1382. It also pointed to the
Grady opinion's disclaimer of adopting a "same evidence" test.1W. Felix, 112 S.Ct. at m_, 112 S.Ct. at
1382, citing Gradv. 495 U.S. at 521 n. 12, 110 s.et.
at 2093 n. 12.

FN9. At the end of the Felix Court's opinion,
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promotes justice, economy, and convenience.

the Court states:
It appears that while Grady eschewed a
"same evidence" test and 'Garrett rejected
a "single transaction" test, Garrett v.
United States, 471 U.S. 773, 790, 105
S.Ct. 2407,2417,85 L.Ed.2d 764 (1985),
the line between those tests and the "same
conduct" language of Grady is not easy to
discern.

Felix. 503 U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 1385.
The Grady decision, which was a 5-4 decision, was written by Justice Brennan.
Writing for the Court, he recognized that
"[t]he Court ... has 'steadfastly refused to
adopt the "single transaction" view of the
Double Jeopardy Clause.' " Grady. 495
U.S. at 523 n. 15, 110 S.Ct. at 2094 n. 15.
quoting Garrett v. United States. 471 U.S.
773, 790, 105 S.Ct. 2407, 2417, 85
L.Ed.2d 764 (1985). In Ashe v. Swenson,
397 U.S. 436, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d
469 (970), the Court was faced with a
situation where a defendant was charged
with robbing one of six men at a poker
party, found not guilty, and subsequently
charged with robbing another one of the
six men. The Supreme Court reversed because in the fIrst trial, where the defendant
was found not guilty, the only "rationally
conceivable issue" before the jury was the
identity of the defendant as the robber.
Ashe, 397 U.S. at 445,90 S.Ct. at 1195. It
is interesting that in Justice Brennan's
concurring opinion in Ashe he announced:

In my view, the Double Jeopardy Clause
requires the prosecution, except in most
limited circumstances, to join at one trial
all the charges against a defendant that
grow out of a single criminal act, occurrence, episode, or transaction. This "same
transaction" test of "same offense" not
only enforces the ancient prohibition
against vexatious multiple prosecutions
embodied in the Double Jeopardy Clause,
but responds as well to the increasingly
widespread recognition that the consolidation in one lawsuit of all issues arising out
of a single transaction or occurrence best

Ashe, 397 U.S. at 453, 90 S.Ct. at 1199
(Brennan, J., concurring, joined by Douglas and Marshall, JJ.), (footnotes omitted).

D. Application of the Double Jeopardy Analysis to
the Present Case.

ill 1, Jeopardy Attached in Lewis' First Trial:

In the
HIV case, the jury was impanelled and sworn. "Jeopardy attaches when a jury is sworn." **404*346State
v. Sharp, 104 Idaho 691. 693,662 P.2d 1135, 1137
(1983), citing Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 98 S.Ct.
2156, 57 L.Ed.2d 24 (1978). Jeop;1l'dy did attach in
Lewis' first trial. We must therefore analyze the issue
of whether Lewis was twice placed in jeopardy.
2. The Traditional Blockburger Test: The traditional
Blockburger test requires us to examine the elements
of each crime and determine whether each crime requires proof of a fact that the other does not. Grady.
495 U.S. at 516, 110 S.Ct. at 2090.

The crime of lewd conduct with a minor or child under sixteen, I.C. § 18-1508 (1984), contains the following elements:
(la) A lewd or lascivious act committed upon or
with the body or a body part of a minor or child
under the age of sixteen; or
(1 b) Involving a minor or child in any act of bestiality or sadomasochistic abuse or lewd exhibition,
as defmed in I.C. § 18-1507; and

(2) Intent to arouse, appeal to, or gratify the lust,
passions, or sexual desires of the defendant or victim.
The crime of transferring a body fluid which may
contain the HIV virus, I.C. § 39-608, contains the
following elements:
(la) Expose another person in any manner with the
intent to infect; or
(1 b) With defendant's knowledge that he or she has
been afflicted with acquired immunodeficiency
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syndrome (AIDS), AIDS related complexes
(ARC), or other manifestations of human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV); and
(2) A transfer or attempted transfer of body fluid,
tissue, or organs to another person.
I.C. § 39-608(1 ). The statute goes on to defme "body
fluid" as, among other things, semen, I.C. § 39608(2)(a). and "transfer" as including, among other
modes sexual and otherwise, anal-genital contact,
I.C. § 39-608(2)(b). Finally, consent and medical
advice are defenses to I.C. § 39-608(1). I.C. § 39608(3)(a).
It is clear from our examination of the statutory ele-

ments of each crime that the Blockburger test is satisfied. In order to prove a violation of the HIV offense,
it is not necessary to prove that the victim is under
the age of sixteen, that the defendant had an intent to
arouse, appeal to, or gratify his or her, or the victim's,
lust, passions, or sexual desires-all of which are elements of the lewd conduct crime. In order to prove a
violation of the lewd conduct statute, it is not necessary to prove that the defendant had an intent to infect the victim or expose the victim with knowledge
of his or her HIV status, or that any body fluid, tissue, or organ was transferred to the victim-all of
which are elements of the HIV crime. Therefore, we
hold that the traditional Blockburger test, which focuses upon the elements of each crime, is satisfied in
this case.

3. The Grady Test: The second part of the double
jeopardy analysis requires us to focus upon the conduct which the State intended to prove in the HIV
case and the conduct it proved at the lewd conduct
trial.flil.Q Grady. 495 U.S. at 521. 110 S.Ct. at 2093.
FNI0. We do have the indictment and certain transcripts from the HIV case before us
on appeal.
In the lewd conduct case, the State alleged the following: (I) during February of 1989, the defendant
committed a lewd and lascivious act upon the body of
the victim; (2) the victim was under the age of sixteen years old; and (3) the defendant had the intent to
gratify his sexual desire.

In the HIV case, the indictment read:
GEORGE FRANK LEWIS is accused by the
Grand Jury of Ada County by this Indictment, of
the crime of KNOWINGLY ATTEMPTING TO
TRANSFER BODY FLUIDS WHICH MA Y
CONTAIN THE HIV VIRUS, I.C. § 39-608 committed as follows:
That the defendant, GEORGE FRANK LEWIS,
on or about February, 1989, in the County of Ada,
State of Idaho, did attempt to transfer his body fluids to another person, knowing that he has been afflicted with the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS), AIDS related complexes (ARC), or
other
manifestations
of
the
Human
Immunodeficiency Virus, to wit: attempting to anal
penetrate**40S *347 [the victim] with his penis,
with the intent to gratify the sexual desires of the
defendant, by passing semen onto or into [the victim's] body.

While the State may have introduced evidence in the
lewd conduct case that it would have introduced in
the HIV case, it is clear that "a mere overlap in proof
between two prosecutions does not establish a double
jeopardy violation." Felix, 503 U.S. at ----. 112 S.Ct.
at 1382. Instead, the Grady test looks only to "what
conduct the State will prove, not the evidence the
State will use to prove that conduct." Grady, 495
U.S. at 521. 110 S.Ct. at 2093 (emphasis added). Although the HIV charge and the lewd conduct charge
may have arisen at or near the same time and place,
the Grady test is not a "same transaction" test. Felix,
503 U.S. at ----. 112 S.Ct. at 1385; Grady, 495 U.S.
at 523 n. 15. 110 S.Ct. at 2094 n. 15. Further, "it is
clear that when two crimes arise from the same sequence of events, such is not sufficient to invoke the
protection of I.e. § 18-301." il:!l! State v. Chapman.
112 Idaho 1011, 10 13. 739 P.2d 310. 312 (1987).
FN II. This statute provides:
18-301. Acts punisbable in different
ways-Double jeopardy.-An act or omission which is made punishable in different
ways by different provisions of this code
may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case can it be punished
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under more than one; an acquittal or conviction and sentence under either one bars
a prosecution for the same act or omission
under any other.
In establishing the essential elements of the lewd
conduct charge, the State introduced evidence that
Lewis' conduct consisted of anal-genital or oralgenital contact with an under sixteen-year-old victim
and that Lewis or the victim had the intent to arouse,
appeal to, or gratifY their lust, passions, or sexual
desires. This conduct does not constitute a violation
of the HIV offense because the State did not produce
evidence of Lewis' conduct as a knowing carrier of
HIV. Therefore, the lewd conduct prosecution was
not barred by double jeopardy.fl:ill
FN 12. We recognize that Lewis has argued
that because of the sua sponte mistrial in the
HIV case, the State must show a "manifest
necessity" in order to prosecute the lewd
conduct case. Sharp. 104 Idaho at 693, 662
P.2d at 1137, citing Arizona v. Washin'don.
434 U.S. 497, 98 S.Ct. 824, 54 L.Ed.2d 717
(1978); Downum v. United States. 372 U.S.
734, 83 S.C!. 1033, 10 L.Ed.2d 100 (] 963).
In order for the district court to allow for a
"retrial of [Lewis]," i.e., a refiling of the
HIV charge, the State would have had to
prove a "manifest necessity" for the sua
sponte mistrial. Sharp. 104 Idaho at 693,
662 P.2d at 1137. Based upon our decision
on the double jeopardy claim, we need not
address the "manifest necessity" issue,
II.

DID THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY CONTINUING LEWIS' TRIAL?

illill We hold that the district court did not abuse its

Lewis had filed several motions, including a motion
to dismiss that was set for hearing on November 20,
1989, at 1:30. At the hearing on November 20, 1989,
the court noted that Lewis' motions, which had not
yet been heard and decided, were filed late. Yet,
Lewis' counsel did "object[ ] to another change of
date." However, at the November 7, 1989 hearing,
the parties and court agreed to begin jury selection on
November 21, 1989. The trial ultimately began on
November 29, 1989.
Idaho Code § 19-3501 provides, in relevant part:
19-3501. When action may be dismissed.-The
court, unless good cause to the contrary is shown,
must order the prosecution or indictment to be
dismissed, in the following cases:

2. If a defendant, whose trial has not been postponed upon his application, is not brought to trial
within six (6) months **406 *348 from the date
that the indictment or information is filed with the
court.
Thus, the district court has discretion in determining
whether "good cause" exists to justifY a continuance
in the trial. In re Rash. 64 Idaho 521, 526, 134 P.2d
420, 421-22 (1943). Whenever this Court is faced
with an appeal from a discretionary determination,
we ask three questions:
(1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the
issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial
court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards
applicable to the specific choices available to it;
and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision
by an exercise of reason.

discretion by continuing Lewis' trial until December
29, 1989.

Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co ..
119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991), citing
State v. Hedger. 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331,
1333 (1989).

At the hearing on September 19, 1989, the district
court suggested a trial date of December 5, to which
Lewis' counsel responded that, "I would certainly
object to that late of a setting." The parties and the
court discussed alternate dates to set the trial, and
ultimately agreed upon November 20, 1989, Lewis'
counsel stating, "That would be fine with me, Judge."

In this case, the record clearly shows that the district
court correctly understood this issue to be one of discretion. Further, the record shows that the decision
was made within the confines of its discretion and
consistent with the applicable legal standards. First,
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the length of the continuance was about two and onehalf months (from the original date of September 19,
1989, to the ultimate date of November 29, 1989) and
the trial began within six months of the filing of the
criminal information (June 15, 1989); second, the
basis for the continuance (that "another trial was going on ... ") was an adequate reason. State v. Talmage.
104 Idaho 249,251, 658 P.2d 920, 922 (1983), citing
Barker v. Wingo. 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33
L.Ed.2d 10 I (1972). Finally, the record shows that
the district court reached its decision to continue the
trial until November 29th by an exercise of reason.

district court, in this case, did order the change in
jury selection upon its own motion. For authority,
Lewis points to I.C. §§ 19-1801 and 19-1808, which
require motion by the defendant or the State, respectively, in order to effect a change of venue, and to
I.C.R. 21, which provides for change of venue upon
motion by the defendant or the State, and cites State
v. Ash. 94 Idaho 542, 493 P.2d 701 (1972), wherein
this Court ruled it improper for a district court to
change venue pursuant to I.C. § 19-180 I on its own
motion. We conclude that the State did move for the
change of jury selection.

III.

At the November 7, 1989 hearing, the district court
identified the following issues to be discussed: (1)
Lewis representing himself; (2) the publicity of the
case and consideration of impaneling a jury from
another county; and (3) consideration of a jury questionnaire. During the discussion of the jury selection
issue, the State asserted**407 *349 that "a change of
venue is appropriate in terms of selecting a jury." The
State therefore requested the court to select a jury
from another county.

DID THE DISTRICT COURT VIOLATE A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OR ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY SELECTING A WRY FROM ANOTHER
COUNTY?

ill

We hold that the district court did not violate a
constitutional right or abuse its discretion by selecting a jury from another county to sit in the lewd conduct case.

IV.
Idaho Code § 19-1816, which was flrst enacted in
1983, provides, in relevant part:
19-1816. Impaneling jury from another
county.-(a) As an alternative to entering the order
of removal provided in the preceding sections of
this chapter, the court may instead enter an order
directing that jurors be impaneled from the county
to which venue would otherwise have been transferred, if it finds:
1. That a fair and impartial jury cannot be impaneled in the county where the criminal complaint, information or indictment is filed;
2. That it would be more economical to transport
the jury than to transport the pending action; and
3. That justice will be served thereby.

Lewis contends that I.C. § 19-1816 does not empower a district court, on its own motion, to order
selection of a jury from another county, and that the

DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN DENYING
LEWIS' MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE?
We hold that the district court did not err in admitting
into evidence certain photographs and the document
entitled "And Then There Was James," both of which
Lewis moved to suppress.
[5][6][71 The search warrant issued by the magistrate
authorized Detective Armstrong to search for the
following:
[Clertain evidence of a crime, to wit: pornographic
VCR tape entitled "Boys On Film;" another pornographic VCR tape untitled containing adults of
both sexes engaging in sexual acts; lists of names
of past, present or potential victims; memorabilia
of victims including photos, clothing, or other personal items; a diary listing names of victims and
activities engaged in; camera and VCR recording
equipment; correspondence with victims; indicia of
ownership or occupance of Apt 14, 270 I Rosehill,
Boise.
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In support of his request for a search warrant, Detective Armstrong signed an affidavit which detailed his
experience (seventeen years) as a law enforcement
officer, his experience (thirteen years) and training in
the investigation of crimes involving the sexual abuse
of children, including identifying adults who sexually
abuse children, and the events that had taken place in
the Lewis investigation. In addition, Detective Armstrong stated:

The search was lawful. The search warrant authorized the officers to enter Lewis' apartment and conduct a search for various items, including memorabilia and diaries. tlill
FN13. "Memorabilia" means "things remarkable and worthy of remembrance or record" and "a record of noteworthy things."
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1408 (1986). "Diary" means "a register
or record of events, transactions, or observations kept daily or at frequent intervals," "a
record of personal activities, reflections, or
feelings," and "a book intended or used for a
diary." Webster's Third New International
Dictionary 625 (1986).

Your affiant knows from his experience and training that pedophiles or adults who habitually seek
sex with children usually keep records or diaries,
listing their sexual partners' names and the activities engaged in. That these offenders usually keep
pictures of their sexual victims, or keep items belonging to their victims in order to recall the sex
acts with those children. These offenders often
write out plans involving future victims, and correspond via letters with victims.
The district court ruled that the affidavit was sufficient and that the material was properly seized.
When we review the issuance of a search warrant by
a magistrate, our review is limited to ensuring that
the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding
that probable cause existed, and we give great deference to the magistrate's determination. State v. Lang,
105 Idaho 683,684,672 P.2d 561, 562 (1983). Looking to the language of the affidavit of Detective Armstrong, we hold that there was a substantial basis that
probable cause existed for the issuance of the warrant. Furthermore, it is clear from our review of the
record that the photographs and document fell
within the scope of the warrant. The photographs,
which depict, inter alia, scantily clad young men and
homosexual acts, fall within the provision of the warrant providing for the search of "memorabilia of victims including photos, clothing, or other personal
items." (Emphasis added.) The document, which was
written in the fIrst person and regarded homosexual
acts between the writer and a person who had the
"unworried look of a fifteen-year-old," was properly
seized pursuant to the "memorabilia" and "diary"
provisions of the warrant. Although it is clearly "expressive material," "it is seizable with a valid warrant
or under one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement just as any other piece of evidence of a
crime would be." State v. Claiborne. 120 Idaho 581,
585, 818 P.2d 285, 289 (1991).

**408 *350 V.
DID THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY APPL Y RULES OF EVIDENCE IN ADMITTING
CERTAIN EVIDENCE AT TRIAL?

I!1.L2J. We hold that the district court did not abuse its
discretion by admitting certain evidence at trial.
On appeal, Lewis claims that the court should not
have admitted the following evidence pursuant to
I.R.E. 404(b): (1) testimony from Detective Larry
Armstrong regarding Lewis' statement that he had a
sexual preference for young boys; (2) the videotape
entitled "Boys On Film;" (3) a document entitled
"And Then There Was James;" and (4) uncharged
sexual misconduct with the alleged victim prior to the
charged misconduct.
Rule 404Cb) of the Idaho Rules of Evidence provides:
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of
other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to
prove the character of a person in order to show
that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.
Relevant evidence is admissible, I.R.E. 402, but is
to be weighed against its prejudicial impact, confu-
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sion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by undue
delay, waste of time, or cumulative effect, I.R.E. 403.
A. Detective Armstrong's Testimony: During the
State's direct examination, Detective Armstrong testified:
I asked Mr. Lewis if he didn't have a sexual preference for adolescent boys, and he responded, "Yeah,
but that doesn't mean I have to take advantage of
the situation."
At the time this statement was offered, Lewis objected on the basis of foundation, order of proof, and
"opening the door" to prior convictions. The district
court ruled that there was a proper foundation laid for
the testimony, and that it was relevant and admissible. Lewis did not object to this testimony as violative of I.R.E. 404(b). Our review of the record satisfies us that the court correctly applied the rules of
evidence in admitting this testimony.
B. The Video "Boys On Film:" The victim testified
that he and Lewis watched a portion of this video on
the day in question. During pre-trial motions, Lewis
argued that the only issue was whether the victim
really saw the film, and that the jury did not need to
see it. Lewis did not object to it as being violative of
I.R.E. 404(b). The court ruled that the film tended to
corroborate the victim's account of the crime, but it
reserved ruling on whether the jury could view the
film. The record does not reveal that the court ruled
that the jury could view it. The court correctly applied the rules of evidence.

C. The Document "And Then There Was James:"
Detective Armstrong testified that he perceived the
document to be indicia of pedophilia. At the time it
was offered, Lewis objected to Detective Armstrong's
testimony based upon the document not then being
admitted. The court then admitted it, ruling that a
proper foundation had been laid. The court properly
applied the rules of evidence.

D. Prior Uncharged Sexual Contact With The Victim:
The victim testified regarding earlier uncharged sexual acts between himself and Lewis. During pretrial
motions, Lewis objected to this testimony as violative
of l.R.E. 404. The State contends that the testimony
was properly admitted as proof of Lewis' plan to
groom the victim for sexual purposes.
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We have recently analyzed evidence of prior uncharged sexual misconduct between a defendant and
his victims in State v. Tolman. 121 Idaho 899, 828
P.2d 1304 (1992). In this regard, we focused upon
whether the testimony revealed a common scheme or
plan to sexually abuse an identifiable group and
comparing that to the victim and the circumstances
surrounding the victim's allegations. Tolman. 121
Idaho at 905,828 P.2d at 1310. In addition, we stated
that testimony of prior sexual **409 *351 misconduct is admissible where the parties' credibility is at
issue. Tolman. 121 Idaho at 904. 828 P.2d at 1309.
In this case, the victim testified that he and Lewis
engaged in sexual acts a few weeks before the acts in
question in this case. The testimony revealed that
during two trips the two of them took to Idaho City,
Idaho, and to Lowman, Idaho, they engaged in oral
sex, and Lewis tried to ease the victim's conscience
by telling him that "everybody does it." Lewis did
not testify at trial. Essentially, then, his defense was
that the alleged acts did not occur. "This type of posture at trial places the credibility of the victim
squarely in issue for the jury to decide." State v. Phi/lips, 123 Idaho 178. 181. 845 P.2d 1211. 1214
(1993). When the alleged conduct in this case is considered with the victim's testimony regarding prior
sexual misconduct with Lewis, "the jury was better
able to compare patterns and methods, details and
generalities, consistencies and discrepancies, and
thereby markle a more meaningful and accurate assessment of the parties' credibility." Tolman. 121
Idaho at 90S. 828 P.2d at 1310. Our review of the
record satisfies us that the district court properly admitted this testimony in conformity with the rules of
evidence.
VI.

DID THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY ALLOWING THE TESTIMONY OF
AN EXPERT WITNESS?
[10][11] We hold that the district court did not abuse
its discretion by allowing the testimony of Dr. James
Oyler, a psychologist who had treated the victim after
the crime.
Lewis argues that Dr. Oyler invaded the jury's province by offering his opinion that the victim was truth-
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ful in his claim that Lewis had sexually abused him.
This argument is flawed for two reasons: (1) the record reveals that Dr. Oyler did not testifY that it was
his opinion that the victim was telling the truth; and
(2) the dialogue where this statement is supposed to
have been made was during Lewis' cross-examination
of Dr. Oyler, during which Lewis tried unsuccessfully to get Dr. Oyler to express his opinion on the
victim's truthfulness.
Idaho Rule of Evidence 702 guides the admission of
expert testimony. It provides:
Rule 702. Testimony by experts.-If scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise.
Furthermore, "[i]t is within the discretion of the district court to determine whether a person is qualified
to testifY as an expert witness." State v. Thomasson.
122 Idaho 172. 175.832 P.2d 743. 746 (1992), citing
State v. Rodgers. 119 Idaho 1047. 1051. 812 P.2d
1208. 1212 (1991). In this case, Dr. Oyler testified
that he was a psychologist licensed to practice in the
State of Idaho. He was educated at Idaho State University and received a master's degree in clinical psychology in San Francisco, California. He detailed his
work experience in psychology, including his involvement in therapeutic intervention with minors
who were victims of sexual abuse and people involved in homosexual issues. He further testified as
to his therapeutic relationship with the victim, including his opinion that the victim fit the profile of a sexual abuse victim. Given Dr. Oyler's qualifications and
experience, as set forth in the foundation laid for his
testimony, we cannot say that the district court
abused its discretion by allowing him to testifY regarding whether the victim fit the profile of a sexual
abuse victim. If a proper foundation has been laid, it
is proper for the expert to testifY regarding whether a
person has been sexually abused. State v. Hester. 114
Idaho 688, 692-93. 760 P.2d 27.31-32(988).

VII.

A NEW TRIAL?

Ll.fl

We hold that the district court did not abuse its
discretion by denying Lewis' motion for a new trial.

**410 *352 The decision to grant a new trial rests in
the sound discretion of the district court. State v.
Lankford. 116 Idaho 860, 873,781 P.2d 197, 1010
(989), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1032, 110 S.Ct. 3295,
11 J L.Ed.2d 803 (990).
Lewis' motion for a new trial was based upon Michael Carver's and Joie Hein's statements concerning
the whereabouts of a videotape on the day the alleged
conduct occurred between Lewis and the victim. The
victim testified that he had watched certain portions
of the videotape with Lewis on this day. Subsequent
to the trial, Carver and Hein signed affidavits stating
that Carver, who was Lewis' roommate, had loaned
the videotape in question to Hein, and Hein was still
in possession of it on the day the victim testified that
he had watched it with Lewis. The district court ruled
this evidence to be newly discovered evidence, and
concluded that the motion be denied pursuant to the
standard set forth in State v. Drapeau. 97 Idaho 685,
551 P.2d 972 (1976).
The Drapeau standard, which applies to motions for
new trials based upon newly discovered evidence, is:
(1) the evidence was unknown to the defendant at the
time of trial; (2) the evidence is material, not merely
cumulative or impeaching; (3) it will probably produce an acquittal; and (4) failure to learn of it was
due to no lack of diligence on the part of the defendant. Drapeau. 97 Idaho at 691, 551 P.2d at 978. The
trial court ruled that the evidence was merely impeaching evidence, that it probably would not produce an acquittal, and that failure to learn of it was
due to a lack of diligence on Lewis' part. As to the
diligence question, the court found that while Lewis
was in jail prior to the trial, Carver visited Lewis
forty-five times, and Hein visited Lewis ten times,
and that both Carver and Hein were frequently at the
courthouse proceedings relating to Lewis. The record
shows that the court perceived this issue as a discretionary determination, that it correctly applied the
proper analysis, and reached its decision through an
exercise of reason.

VIII.

DID THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING LEWIS' MOTION FOR
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DID THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY SENTENCING LEWIS TO A FIXED
TERM OF LIFE IN PRISON?

the record, we hold that the sentence imposed by the
district court was not excessive under any reasonable
view of the facts.

[ill We hold that the district court did not abuse its
discretion by sentencing Lewis to a fixed term of life
in prison. In other words, the sentence imposed by
the district court is reasonable.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of conviction
and the sentence imposed by the district court are
affirmed.

Our standard in reviewing sentences is:
Sentencing is a matter committed to the discretion of the trial judge, and the defendant has the
burden of showing a clear abuse thereof on appeal.
In exercising that discretion, reasonableness is a
fundamental requirement.

State v. Broadhead. 120 Idaho 141. 144, 814 P.2d
401. 404 (1991), overruled on other grounds; State v.
Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 394, 825 P.2d 482, 491
(J 992), citing State v. Dillon. 100 Idaho 723, 724,
604 P.2d 737,738 (1979).
Lewis' burden is to "show that in light of the governing criteria, [his] sentence was excessive under any
reasonable view of the facts." Broadhead. I 20 Idaho
at 145, 814 P.2d at 405, quoting State v. Small. 107
Idaho 504, 505, 690 P.2d 1336, 1337 (1984). Thus, in
order for this Court to conclude that Lewis' fixed life
sentence is unreasonable, we must be convinced that
the sentence was excessive under any reasonable
view of the facts, considering (I) the protection of
society, (2) deterrence of Lewis and others, (3) the
possibility of Lewis' rehabilitation, and (4) punishment or retribution for Lewis. Broadhead. 120 Idaho
at 146, 814 P.2d at 406.
The record reveals that Lewis has previously been
convicted for a sexual offense against a minor in
1979 in Nashville, Tennessee. Also, Lewis was HIVpositive at the time of the acts for which he was convicted in the present case. Further, there were several
allegations of uncharged sexual misconduct between
Lewis and minors during the sentencing proceedings.
Finally, Lewis continues to deny that he committed
this crime. Based upon the information before it, the
district court **411 *353 stated that this was the
"most aggravated case [it has] seen." It considered
the objectives of sentencing, and concluded that "the
protection of society does warrant the penalty of life
in prison without possibility of parole." Based upon

JOHNSON and TROUT, JJ., and REINHARDT, J.,
Pro Tern., concur. BISTLINE, Justice, concurring in
Parts II, V(B) and (C), and VIII, dissenting from the
remainder.
"Drunk driving is a national tragedy. Prosecutors'
offices are often overworked and may not always
have the time to monitor seemingly minor cases as
they wind through the judicial system. But these facts
cannot excuse the need for scrupulous adherence to
our constitutional principles." Grady v. Corbin. 495
U.S. 508, 524. 110 S.Ct. 2084, 2095, 109 L.Ed.2d
548 (1990). Thus spoke the United States Supreme
Court in Grady, a case with which the majority deals
extensively. Child molestation is in some ways more
of a national tragedy than drunk driving. Also, let it
be noted that Lewis is hardly a sympathetic defendant. In forcing his will on someone too young to be
able to consent to sex, he also tried to engage in a
course of conduct that, if successful, could potentially
have exposed his young victim to a deadly virus. It is
crucial to recall, however, that this Court must not
decide its criminal cases based upon the character of
the accused, as difficult as that may sometimes be to
disregard. Instead, we must decide our cases based on
the law. Because the majority, for whatever reason,
disregards aspects of the proceedings against Lewis
that are blatantly contrary to the relevant constitutional, statutory and case law, I cannot concur in
much ofthe majority opinion.
I. The Lewd and Lascivious Prosecution Against
Lewis Is Barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause.
The majority's discussion of the law of double jeopardy is both cogent and complete, but its analysis of
the facts sub judice and its application of the law to
those facts are neither. The majority opinion attempts
to apply the relevant precedent of Grady to Lewis's
case in a three-sentence paragraph, to-wit:
In establishing the essential elements of the lewd
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conduct charge, the State introduced evidence that
Lewis' conduct consisted of anal-genital or oralgenital contact with an under sixteen year old victim and that Lewis or the victim had the intent to
arouse, appeal to, or gratify their lust, passions, or
sexual desires. This conduct does not constitute a
violation of the HIV offense because the State did
not produce evidence of Lewis' conduct as a knowing carrier of HIV. Therefore, the lewd conduct
prosecution was not barred by double jeopardy.
State v. Lewis, at 405 (emphasis omitted). The Court
summarily concludes that double jeopardy does not
bar the lewd and lascivious prosecution since Lewis's
"conduct does not constitute a violation of the HIV
offense because the State did not produce evidence of
Lewis' conduct as a knowing carrier of HIV." Id.
(emphasis added). This conclusion is not only wholly
unsupported by meaningful analysis, but it also blatantly disregards the same opinion's preceding legal
analysis. The majority thereby engages in an alchemic attempt to convert evidence of an element of
a crime into conduct.

By analyzing the evidence involved rather than the
conduct, the majority opinion defies the dictates of
Grady. As the majority explains, Grady requires
analysis of the defendant's conduct to determine
whether an accused is being punished twice for the
same offense, holding that ''the Double Jeopardy
Clause bars a subsequent prosecution if, to establish
an essential element of an offense charged in that
prosecution, the government will prove conduct that
constitutes an offense for which the **412 *354 defendant has already been prosecuted." 495 U.S. at
510. 110 S.Ct. at 2087 (emphasis added). Grady later
specifically asserts that "[t]his is not an 'actual evidence' or 'same evidence' test. The critical inqUiry is
what conduct the State will prove, not the evidence
the State will use to prove that conduct." 495 U.S. at
521, 110 S.Ct. at 2093 (emphasis added).
To demonstrate the majority's error, it is necessary to
delineate precisely what conduct is at issue in the two
prosecutions. It is first noted that the indictment
which laid the HIV charge states,
Lewis, on or about February, 1989, ... did attempt
to transfer his body fluids to another person, knowing that he has been afflicted with the Acguired
Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS), AIDS re-
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lated complexes (ARC), or other manifestations of
the Human Immunodeficiency Virus, to-wit: attempting to anal/y penetrate [the victim] with his
penis, with the intent to gratify the sexual desires
of the defendant, by passing seman [sic] onto or
into [the victim's] body.
Thus, the first prosecution alleged that Lewis attempted anal-genital contact.f!:l.!1 The subsequent
prosecution, initiated by complaint and information,
charged Lewis with the crime of lewd and lascivious
conduct in that "Lewis, on or about February, 1989,
... did, ... commit a lewd and lascivious act upon the
body of a minor, ... to-wit: of the age of 15 years, by
placing his mouth on [the victimj's penis and by attempting to anally penetrate [the victim] with his
penis, with the intent to gratify the sexual desire of
the defendant." FNI5
FNI4. The reference to "passing" semen
"onto or into [the victim]'s body" is somewhat ambiguous, in light of the evidence adduced that Lewis ejaculated onto the victim's body but did not actually engage in actual anal-genital contact. Nonetheless, the
indictment must refer to the attempted analgenital contact only. Idaho Code § 39-608,
the statute under which Lewis was originally
prosecuted, specifically defines "transfer,"
an essential element of the crime (absent a
specific intent to infect), as "engaging in
sexual activity by genital-genital contact,
oral-genital contact, [or] anal-genital contact.. .. " Nowhere in this definition can one
find semen-skin contact, nor would one expect to, since the HIV virus has rarely, if
ever, been shown to be transferred by such
means.
FN 15. As far as can be ascertained from the
record before the court, the jury was instructed that Lewis could be convicted in the
lewd and lascivious trial for both oralgenital and attempted anal-genital contact.
The charging documents, statements of the
prosecution's theory of proof, should be
binding until challenged by the State. Cf
Grady, 495 U.S. at 522-23. 110 S.Ct. at
2094. Here, the State never claims that
Lewis was convicted only for the oralgenital contact, not for the attempted anal-
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genital contact. In fact, the State candidly
admits, "The attempted anal penetration that
formed part of the basis for this charge [the
attempted transfer of body fluids which may
contain the HIV virus] was the same act as
the attempted anal penetration charged in the
lewd conduct case." Respondent's Brief, p.
5. The State's reference to "part of the basis
of this charge" is unclear; in light of the discussion in the above footnote, the "rest of
the basis" for the HIV charge must be the
other elements of the offense, including the
fact that Lewis was HIV positive.
The question then becomes what constitutes "conduct." Although the majority opinion does not state
as much, its careless reference to conduct would
seem to embrace not only the oral-genital contact and
the attempted anal-genital contact, but also the victim's age, Lewis's and/or the victim's intent, and
Lewis's HIV-positive status. How these latter facts fit
into the definition of "conduct" is not readily understood. Webster defines "conduct" as, inter alia, a
noun meaning "I. The way a person acts: BEHA VlOR." Webster's II New Riverside University Dictionary 295-296 (1984). Black's Law Dictionary
similarly defines the word: "Personal behavior; deportment; mode of action; any positive or negative
act." Black's Law Dictionary 268 (5th ed. 1979).
Hence, "conduct" means a course of physical action.
Assuming that the members of the United States Supreme Court, all of whom signed on to the relevant
portion of Felix, know the dictionary meaning of the
word "conduct" (and that is a safe assumption),
"conduct" does not mean the defendant's status nor
state of mind, nor the victim's age.
The majority's implicit analysis of what constitutes
Lewis's conduct also fails because its presumed definition is no more than a re-application of the Blockburger **413 *355 test, as Lewis pointed out.
Whether Lewis was a knowing carrier of HIV or
whether Lewis possessed the requisite intent to gratify his desires on a fifteen year old are elements of
the two crimes, not "conduct." It is the Blockburger
test, not the Grady test, which looks to the elements
of the two charged crimes. No quarrel can be made
with the majority opinion's statement that the Lewis
prosecutions fail to satisfY the B10ckburger inquiry
and thus that the subsequent prosecution is not barred
under that theory. But the Supreme Court intended

the Grady inquiry as separate and additional to the
B10ckburger inquiry. In including these elements in
its Grady inquiry under the guise of "conduct," the
majority does little justice to United States Supreme
Court precedent.
The majority appears to have accepted the State's
contention, advanced in oral argument, that a passage
in Grady indicates that Grady's rationale would only
bar the second prosecution if the prosecution alleged
that Lewis was HIV -infected. The theory by which
the State reaches this conclusion is seductively clever
but ultimately unpersuasive. The Grady dicta which
the State points to discusses what sort of prosecution
would have been acceptable in regard to Corbin, the
defendant in Grady:
By its own pleadings, the State has admitted that it
will prove the entirety of the conduct for which
Corbin was convicted-driving while intoxicated
and failing to keep right of the median-to establish
essential elements of the homicide and assault offenses. Therefore, the Double Jeopardy Clause bars
this successive prosecution .... This holding would
not bar a subsequent prosecution on the homicide
and assault charges if the bill of particulars revealed that the State would not rely on proving
conduct for which Corbin had already been convicted (i.e., if the State relied solely on Corbin's
driving too fast in heavy rain to establish recklessness or negligence).
495 U.S. at 522-23. 110 S.Ct. at 2094 (emphasis
added). The State makes an Olympian leap in logic
from the dicta contained in the above paragraph to its
argument that what conduct is involved is not the
central inquiry. The State does so by contending that
in Grady, driving constituted conduct and intoxication a condition, yet the Grady court expressly would
permit Corbin to be subsequently prosecuted for the
same conduct, driving (i.e., driving too fast in heavy
rain). Thus, so the argument would go, the Supreme
Court did not really mean that the same conduct may
not be prosecuted twice. ftlli Here, the State argues
similarly that attempted anal-genital contact is conduct and HIV -positive is a condition, so the Double
Jeopardy Clause would permit a subsequent lewd and
lascivious prosecution of Lewis by alleging attempting anal-genital contact, the conduct, without proof of
HIV infection, the condition.
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FN 16. At least one problem with the State's
analysis is that Grady's holding involves a
vertical comparison-that is, between the
conduct for which the defendant is fIrst
prosecuted and the conduct for which' he or
she is subsequently prosecuted. Grady does
not purport to concern itself with a horizontal comparison-that is, between conduct that
might have been charged in the fIrst prosecution and conduct actually charged in that
same prosecution.
As shown above, however, it is impossible to escape
the Grady court's express holding that the proper inquiry involves examining conduct, not evidence adduced, as well as myriad other references to "conduct," even in the paragraph cited by the State. The
Grady court obviously considered that driving while
intoxicated is a separate course of conduct from drivinf. too fast, the driving amounting to a "transaction"
FN 7 consisting of various separate courses of conduct.
This defInition is as thin as the defInition of "conduct" should **414 *356 be spread.Bill Thus, the
state would need to argue that attempting anal-genital
contact while HIV -positive is a separate course of
conduct from the same instance of attempted analgenital contact without proof of such status" by the
same person at the same time.
FN 17. The term "transaction" is used because it falls within the United States Supreme Court's terminology, not because it is
necessarily the best choice of word. (The
same might be said of "conduct," and in fact
the Court in Felix acknowledged that "[i]t
appears that while Grady eschewed a 'same
evidence' test, and Garrett rejected a 'single
transaction' test, Garrett v. United States,
[471 U.S. 773, 790, 105 S.Ct. 2407. 2417,
85 L.Ed.2d 764 (985) ], the line between
those tests and the 'same conduct' language
is not easy to discern.")
FNI8. This Court should not give credence
to the perilous sophistry needed to conclude
that being HIV positive constitutes conduct.
People are generally known to drink a lot for
the purpose of getting drunk; on the other
hand, people generally do not receive blood
transfusions or engage in unprotected intercourse for the purpose of getting the AIDS

virus. Moreover, intoxication is a temporary,
controllable state and much more akin to
conduct rather than HIV -positive status,
which, as of now, is a permanent and incurable condition.
Such an argument defIes common sense. Corbin engaged in at least three courses of conduct as alleged
in the fIrst prosecution: he drove while intoxicated,
failed to keep to the right of median, and drove too
fast. These courses of conduct were all separate
courses of conduct, although, all three occurred
roughly contemporaneously. For instance, Corbin
could have driven too fast without driving while intoxicated, or vice versa. Hence, as the Supreme Court
suggested, it was possible to have a subsequent
prosecution on the homicide and assault charges using only the conduct of driving too fast as proof of
intent in the assault and homicide prosecutions.
The distinction becomes obvious when applying the
same analysis to the instant case. The State alleged in
both the HIV case and the lewd and lascivious case
that Lewis had attempted to engage in anal-genital
contact with the victim. The only conduct actually
constituting the element of attempted transfer of body
fluid in the HIV case was attempted anal-genital contact. Such a transfer would be impossible without the
conduct comprising attempted anal-genital contactthe same conduct that constituted an essential element in the subsequent lewd and lascivious caseunlike the situation in Grady, where Corbin's speeding occurred independently of homicide and assault.
If the State had alleged in the HIV case that Lewis
attempted anal-genital contact but had alleged in the
lewd and lascivious case that he engaged in only
oral-genital contact, it would be possible for Lewis to
commit the attempted transfer without engaging in
the conduct charged in the lewd and lascivious case,
and vice versa. In this hypothetical situation, the oralgenital contact and attempted anal-genital contact
would have occurred within the same transaction but
would not constitute the same conduct. Thus, this
hypothetical second prosecution would have been
permitted by the Double Jeopardy Clause, since the
Supreme Court has expressly rejected the "same
transaction test." Grady. 495 U.S. at 523 n. 15, 110
S.Ct. at 2094 n. 15. The above analysis is tortuous,
but, again, common sense tells us that one instance of
attempted anal-genital contact is not two courses of
conduct. And if the Double Jeopardy Clause bars
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anything, it bars prosecuting the accused twice for the
exact same course of conduct.
The prosecution's allegations of Lewis's conduct-the
only relevant inquiry under Grady and its progenyamounted to the same instance of attempted analgenital intercourse in both prosecutions. And in using
the entirety of the conduct for which Lewis had previously been prosecuted, i.e., attempted anal-genital
contact, the government sought to establish an essential element of the lewd and lascivious offense, i.e., a
lewd or lascivious act.
The alleged oral-genital contact raises another question. Rill As explained above, Grady would permit
subsequent prosecution of Lewis for alleged oralgenital contact because the oral-genital contact was
conduct separate from the attempted anal-genital contact and because oral-genital contact was not the conduct for which Lewis was prosecuted in the HIV
case. The fact remains, however, that the State in the
lewd and lascivious case inexplicably alleged both
oral-genital contact and attempted anal-genital contact. Because it is impossible to determine whether
the jury convicted Lewis on the lewd and lascivious
charge based on the anal-genital contact, **415 *357
the oral-genital, or both and because the subsequent
allegation of attempted anal-genital contact violated a
fundamental constitutional right, this error cannot be
considered harmless.
FNI9. Oddly enough, this issue was not
raised by the State.
Concluding that Lewis was twice prosecuted for the
same conduct does not end all inquiry of whether the
Double Jeopardy Clause bars the subsequent prosecution. Reprosecution after a mistrial is permissible if
the defendant requested or acquiesced in the mistrial.
us. v. Dinitz. 424 U.S. 600, 96 S.Ct. 1075, 47
L.Ed.2d 267 (I976)' Here, the trial judge in the HIV
case sua sponte declared a mistrial, to which Lewis
objected. Reprosecution after mistrial is also permissible if there was a "manifest necessity" for the mistrial. See, e.g., United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 579, 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824). A review of the
record reveals not a scintilla of necessity in the trial
judge's declaration of mistrial. The trial judge held
proceedings in which he declared,
Now, Mr. Lewis, it has come to my attention via

the media and statements that this case is beginning
to have a great deal of press coverage, and as I understand from sources that I've received that apparently there was even a TV special yesterday in regard to this matter, though I didn't see it.. .. And I
note, for the record, that I accepted a letter regarding some personal problems or life of myself. And
while I don't know of anything on my own life that
has any effect on this, I can't see how I can handle
this case anymore with the publicity and the things
that are going on.
Transcript of Proceedings of October 30, 1989, p. 1.
If excess publicity were a problem, the trial judge
would have possessed various other remedies to deal
with it. Certainly, the sole act of substituting a new
judge would not solve the perceived problem of excess publicity. Too, the judge's cryptic reference to a
letter is not explained. Two remedies would then
appear to be appropriate: either this Court should
vacate the judgment of conviction or it should remand back to the trial court in the lewd and lascivious case to determine by evidentiary hearing whether
manifest necessity for the new trial existed in the
HIV case.
II. The Prosecution Did Not Move to Impanel a Jury
from Another County.
In its discussion of this issue, the majority apparently
accepts Lewis's argument that a trial court may not
sua sponte order selection of a jury from another
county. This position is correct, in light of I.C. §§ 191816, 19-1801, and 19-1808; I.C.R. 21; and State v.
Ash, 94 Idaho 542, 493 P.2d 701 (1972). The Court
then proceeds to conclude that the State did move for
the change of jury selection. This conclusion is based
solely on the fact that the prosecution stated that "a
change of venue is appropriate in terms of selecting a
jury" after the district court repeatedly had mentioned
that it was considering resorting to an out-of-county
jury selection. The ftrst mention of out-of-county jury
selection appears in the following exchange at a
status conference:
Mr. Cahill [Lewis'S counsel at trial]: ... I realize
that the court had us here for some reason that I
am not really sure has to do with the jury selection,
and perhaps I should just talk to him [Lewis]. [ ] If
I could have some time to talk to him to see what
his position is going to be- ... is the court contem-
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plating jury selection outside of this jurisdiction?
The Court: I am thinking about it, yes. What I
would like to do is let you know what topics we are
going to discuss today, and I will give you a time
to discuss the matter with your client.. ..
Tr., Vol. I, p. 2 (emphasis added). The trial court continues by analyzing why it believes such an action
would be necessary, concluding
My feeling is at this point, ... that the wisest course
would be to leave the county, go to another district,
choose a jury there, keep the jury sequestered for
the trial, and try it in Ada County, but choose the
jury elsewhere. That would be my feeling that that
is probably the best course.
**416 *358 Jd, p. 5 (emphasis added). It then
granted a ten-minute recess to allow Mr. Cahill to
discuss the jury selection matter, as well as the other
matters the court brought up for discussion, with his
client. After the recess, the trial court returned to the
topic:
The Court: All right, now, about the other issues,
do you have any input on the issue of whether or
not we should choose an out-of-county jury in this
case?"
Mr. Cahill: Your Honor, after discussing the matter, we certainly appreciate the court's concern.
However, it is our desire that jury selection take
place in Ada County. We do not-we are not moving for a change in venue, in other words.
The Court: The State?

Mr. Rosenthal [the prosecutor]: Your Honor, I
think in light of the pUblicity that has taken place ...
I think a change of venue is appropriate in terms of
selecting ajury ....
Tr., Vol. I, pp. 7-8 (emphasis added).
In light of the above, the majority's concept of "motion" here is nothing less than bizarre. It is clear that
the trial court brought up the issue of out-of-county
jury selection sua sponte and then merely asked
whether the parties had "input." In the earlier exchange, Mr. Cahill noted that the trial court had
called the parties there to discuss matters, including,
perhaps, jury selection. The prosecution merely ac-

quiesced in the trial court's suggestion after the trial
court had engaged in substantial analysis on its own,
without the parties' input.
Clearly, the prosecutor did not provide any sort of
notice to Lewis that he was "moving" for a change in
venue or for a change in county for the purposes of
jury selection. As State v. Ash. 94 Idaho 542, 493
P.2d 701, explained, in holding that a trial court may
not change venue on its own motion, "There is a
good reason for this rule: under it, both parties have
an opportunity to present their views on the necessity
for a change of venue to the court before its decision
on the issue." Ash. 94 Idaho at 545. 493 P.2d at 704
(emphasis added). This is no less true than for a motion for selecting an out-of-county jury. A ten-minute
recess culminating in an exchange between the parties and the court comprising less than a page of transcript demonstrates that the court provided neither
party with an opportunity to present their views fully
and effectively.
Furthermore, Idaho Criminal Rules require that a pretrial motion be in writing. Rule 21 requires that "[t]he
court upon motion of either party shall transfer the
proceeding to another county if the court is satisfied
that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the
county where the case is pending." I.C.R. 21(a) (emphasis added). Rule 12, which governs motions before trial, states in relevant part that "[e]very pleading, motion, notice, or judgment or order of the court
shall be typed with black ribbon or produced by a
computer or word processor type printer .... " I.C.R.
lM£}. It is evident, then, that the State should have
put its "motion" in writing. FN20
FN20. Even if we were inclined to overlook
the plain language of the Idaho Criminal
Rules, the State still should have substantially complied with such regulations-that is,
it should have provided notice to Lewis.
Another good reason to require a motion and thus
notice is that a change in venue (or a change in jury
pool) implicates a substantial and express constitutional right. The Sixth Amendment of the United
States Constitution commands, "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
state and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously
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ascertained by law .... " Such a change in venue or jury
pool should not occur. lightly, on the whim of the
district court, but should be fully argued by both parties, with time for them to consult relevant law.
In view of the above, and in view of the fact that I.C.
§ 19-1816 requires a previous motion for transfer of

venue before a trial court may impanel a jury from
another county, the State's mere acquiescence in
**417 *359 the trial judge's motion to impanel an
out-of-county jury is not a "motion." FN2!
FN21. Because of my suggested disposition
of the procedural aspect of the jury charge, I
do not address Lewis's substantive constitutional argument. Unfortunately, neither does
the majority, except for its introductory sentence: "We hold that the district court did
not violate a constitutional right or abuse its
discretion by selecting a jury from another
county .... " Because of its disposition of the
procedural issue, the majority should discuss
beyond a one-sentence conclusion Lewis's
contention that even if the appropriate procedure was followed, the jury selection violated his substantive Sixth Amendment
rights.
III. "And Then There Was James" Exceeded the
Scope of the Search Warrant and Thus Should Have
Been Suppressed.
Putting aside whether the majority correctly concludes that probable cause existed for issuance of the
search warrant, it is not correct in asserting that the
document entitled "And Then There Was James"
("James") fell within the scope of the warrant. Hence,
the trial court erred in denying Lewis's motion to
suppress "James."
The search warrant provided that the police could
search for "memorabilia of victims ... ; a diary listing
names of victims and activities engaged in." Again,
the majority distorts commonly understood, unambiguous words in order to affirm Lewis's conViction.
"James" is a short narrative, perhaps fiction, told as a
flashback in the first-person. As such, it cannot qualify as a "diary" as dermed by the majority-"a register
or record ... kept daily or at frequent intervals" because "James" appears on its face to be only one
day's worth of writing. And if the narrative is fiction,

which it may well be, it cannot qualify as a "record"
or therefore "memorabilia." FN22 Moreover, the majority's analysis implodes when one actually reads the
warrant; "James" does not qualify as either a diary or
memorabilia as defined by the search warrant. Both
of these warrant provisions describe items containing
descriptions of multiple victims. "James," however,
is a narrative, perhaps fictional, about sexual activity
which the narrator conducted with a nineteen year old
male who is described as having "the soft, unworried
look ofa fifteen-year-old." Even if "James" describes
a non-fictional incident, which is by no means clear,
the recipient of adult, consensual sex can hardly be
called a "victim." Moreover, "James" only concerns
sexual activity with one person.
FN22. Since "James" implicates the First
Amendment as explained below, this court
should err on the side of caution and presume that "James" is fiction and therefore
not memorabilia.
The fact that "James" is not even remotely described
in the search warrant is particularly troubling because, as the majority opinion notes, "James" is
clearly expressive material. That opinion, however,
goes on to cite State v. Claiborne. 120 Idaho 581, 818
P.2d 285 (1991), for the proposition that expressive
material "is seizable with a valid warrant or under
one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement just
as any other piece of evidence of a crime would be."
Claiborne, 120 Idaho at 585, 818 P.2d at 289. This
quotation is disingenuous when Claiborne is read in
its entirety. In Claiborne, this Court held that a book
plainly and on its face constituting "sexually exploitative material," as defined and barred by a
criminal statute governing child pornography, could
be seized because it was "at the same time evidence
of the crime of possession of sexually exploitative
material," not because it was evidence of the underlying lewd and lascivious crime for which Claiborne
was prosecuted. Id A narrative describing sex between two adults does not on its face violate any
criminal statutes, since it is not clearly obscene unless
and until so judged after a trial. Thus, "James" falls
outside the rationale of Claiborne but within the rationale of Maryland v. Macon. 472 U.S. 463, 105
S.Ct. 2778, 86 L.Ed.2d 370 (1985): "The First
Amendment imposes special constraints on searches
for and seizures of presumptively protected material,
and requires that the Fourth Amendment be applied
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with 'scrupulous exactitude' in such circumstances."
472 U.S. at 468, 105 S.Ct. at 2781 (quoted in
Claiborne. 120 Idaho at 583, 818 P.2d at 287). As
explained above, **418 *360 a better view is that
"James" does not at all fall within the scope of the
warrant. But even if one accepts the majority's arguments as to "James" falling within "memorabilia" or
"diary," the narrative does so with a remarkable
amount of ambiguity.
The fact that "James" is clearly expressive material
which was not described with particularity in the
search warrant should mandate a holding that the
district court erred in denying Lewis's motion to suppress and in thereafter admitting "James" as evidence.
IV. Detective Armstrong's Testimony and Prior Uncharged Sexual Contact with Victim Constituted
Prejudicial Character Evidence and Thus Should
Have Been Excluded.
The majority contends that Lewis waived the issue of
whether Detective Armstrong's testimony violated
LR.E. 404(b) because Lewis failed to cite the specific
rule in his objection. Nonetheless, the majority admits that Lewis's counsel did object to the proffered
testimony on the grounds that the statement
"open[ed] the door" to prior convictions, i.e., bad
acts. Rule 404(b) is entitled "Other crimes, wrongs or
acts." The majority's hypertechnicality is patent and
unfair. Keeping in mind the intense and quickmoving nature of a trial, it is unrealistic to expect
counsel to object to a piece of evidence in precisely
the same manner that he or she would later raise the
issue on appeal. As a matter of law, it is plain that
Lewis adequately preserved the issue of Armstrong's
testimony for appeal. Elm.
FN23. I agree with the majority that Lewis
did not preserve the admissibility of "James"
beyond the search warrant issue dealt with
in the motion to suppress hearing. This is
unfortunate, because the probity and relevancy of the document was minimal at best,
while the potential prejudicial effect was
enormous. Thus, had the issue been preserved properly, the inescapable conclusion
would be that the admission of "James" violated I.R.E. 403.

Rule 404(b) bars the admission of evidence of "other
crimes, wrongs, or acts" for the purpose of "prov[ing]
the character of a person in order to show that he
acted in conformity therewith." I.R.E. 404(b). It is
difficult to imagine a statement which contravenes
this rule greater. The prosecution offered Detective
Armstrong's testimony to suggest that Lewis possessed an attraction to "adolescent boys" and thus
possessed a propensity to engage in sexual behavior
with them. The State does not assert any Rule 404(b)
exception (for instance, that the testimony was offered for other purposes, such as proof of motive or
intent), presumably because there is no exception
within which the testimony falls.
As for the evidence of prior uncharged sexual contact
with the victim, this justice stands by his dissent in
State v. Phillips. 123 Idaho 178, 845 P.2d 1211
(1993). State v. Tolman. 121 Idaho 899, 828 P.2d
1304 (1992), and its progeny were wrongly decided
in that they expand the "common scheme or plan"
exception in I.R.E. 404(b) to engulf and render meaningless the general rule therein: that evidence of other
acts is not admissible to attempt to show a defendant's person's propensity to engage in such acts.
What the majority refers to as a "plan" is nothing
more than evidence offered to prove the character of
Lewis as a pedophile, thus intimating to the jury that
he acted in conformity with that character. Also
noteworthy is that the majority's rationale that the
jury should hear the evidence of prior, uncharged acts
because the jury is "better able to compare patterns
and methods," etc., ignores that the jury is also better
able to conclude that since Lewis engaged in earlier
acts, he 1) committed in the charged act or 2) deserved to be punished for the charged acts, even if the
latter were not proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
The raison d'etre of the rules of evidence is that not
every piece of evidence should go to the jury, and for
good reason.
V. Dr. Oyler's Testimony that the Victim Fit the Profile of a Sexual Abuse Victim and that the Victim
Had Been Abused Should Not Have Been Allowed.
For the most part, the majority opinion correctly disposes of Lewis's claim that Oyler's**419 *361 testimony was improper. The troubling aspect of Oyler's
testimony involves the following exchange between
the prosecutor and Oyler:
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[Prosecutor]: Doctor, based on your training, your
your experience, as well as on your
evaluation, therapeutic intervention with [the victim], can you state with a reasonable psychological
probability whether [the victim] has been sexually
abused?
edu~ation<and

[Oyler]: He clearly fits the profile, and based on
that, I would say yes.
Tr., Vol. IV, p. 694.
First of all, although Lewis did not object as to foundation, it is notable that Oyler never testified as to
what this "profile" might be or what character traits it
might consist of. If Oyler had testified as to psychological or behavioral traits of which a profile of a
sexually abused youth might consist-laying the appropriate scientific foundation, of course-and then
noted which of these the victim exhibited, such testimony would be permissible, provided that it is beyond the knowledge of the average juror and that it is
scientifically sound. Second, notwithstanding this
Court's decision in State v. Hester. 114 Idaho 688,
760 P.2d 27 (1988), it is an inappropriate invasion of
the jurors' fact-finding function for an expert witness
to proceed the extra step and to conclude that a victim has actually been abused. Only the jury is entitled
to arrive at that conclusion if it so chooses based
upon the testimony it has heard.
Conclusion
Because of all of the constitutional, statutory, and
evidentiary errors noted above, this Court should
reverse and vacate the conviction. A neutral system
of justice demands no less.
Idaho, 1993 .
State v. Lewis
123 Idaho 336, 848 P.2d 394
END OF DOCUMENT
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